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WORLD POLITICS

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

STEPHEN G. TRIANTIS is Professor of Economics in the Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto. His publications include *Common Market and Economic Development* (1965) and *Cyclical Changes in Trade Balances of Countries Exporting Primary Products* (1967).

DAVID A. BALDWIN is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. He is the author of *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy* (1966), and is currently writing a book on economic statecraft in international politics.

COLIN S. GRAY is a staff member (strategic studies) of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and a Special Lecturer in Political Science at York University (Toronto). At present he is working on a study of Canadian Defence Policy, and writing a book on arms races in international politics.

R. N. BERKI is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies, University of Hull, England.

CLEMENT HENRY MOORE is Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science at the American University in Cairo, and Fellow of the American Research Center in Egypt. He is the author of *Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government* (1965) and *Politics in North Africa* (1970), and co-editor (with Samuel P. Huntington) of *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (1970).

STEPHEN A. CIMBALA is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, and is currently working on several studies of American national security policy and the military profession.

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CANADA'S INTEREST IN FOREIGN AID

By S. G. TRIANTIS*

I. Introduction

THERE is at present considerable uncertainty as to the purposes which Canada's foreign assistance program is intended to serve. This uncertainty is no doubt influencing our policies. The question of why we are giving and why we should give in the future is fundamental to practically all aspects of our aid policy—including the size, form, terms, and geographical orientation of our assistance, the choice between bilateral and multilateral channels, the administration of our aid, the public support for our assistance program, and the relations between Canada and the recipient countries.

A few preliminary remarks concerning the purpose of our foreign aid may be helpful.

It has been said that our purpose or objective is the economic development of the less developed countries. That is somewhat confusing. We need to distinguish between (a) the Canadian motive or purpose served—whether philanthropic, economic, political, or other, and (b) the development abroad by which this purpose is served—for instance economic development, military preparedness, or population control. For clarity, I shall refer to (a) as the *purpose* or *motive* of Canadian foreign assistance and to (b) as the *objective*. Economic development in the less developed countries, then, is not a Canadian purpose: it is one of the objectives or means by which some Canadian purpose might be served. In this paper I assume such development to be the fundamental objective and concern myself mainly with the purposes or motives of Canadian aid.

The purposes which our assistance program is believed to serve have probably changed over the years. Certain objective conditions have changed; for instance, the intensity of East-West rivalry through foreign aid. Also, certain purposes or aims, economic or political, which foreign aid was supposed to advance have been found difficult to serve. I shall be concerned mainly with the present and the future.

I now turn to an examination of the motives for Canadian aid.

* This is a slightly modified version of a study prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency and tabled in the Canadian House of Commons on January 12, 1970. Permission to publish it has been granted by the Government of Canada.

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II. Philanthropic or Humanitarian Motives

Philanthropy, or feelings of human solidarity, would appear to be an obvious motive or purpose of our foreign aid. However, while such feelings probably have been the motive of private volunteer activity, they do not seem to have been an important factor in governmental contributions toward economic development, especially through multilateral channels. The Government is an agency of the Canadian people; it would be difficult to argue that the latter have been collectively moved by feelings of human solidarity toward the underdeveloped countries.

The philanthropic activity of a group or people depends on (a) the degree of awareness of the conditions of poverty that must be relieved, (b) the knowledge of the amounts involved, or the cost of the philanthropy, and (c) the strength of the people's philanthropic motive, or the amount of satisfaction derived from a given philanthropic expenditure. Some remarks are in order concerning these factors.

(a) The knowledge of the majority of Canadians concerning the conditions of poverty in the underdeveloped countries is awfully meager—too inadequate to evoke any significant philanthropic action. (b) On the other hand, most Canadians are unaware of the fact that, on the average, in the year 1970/71 every family of four persons contributed over $80 to foreign aid, and that, over the next few years, this contribution is expected to rise further. They might object strenuously if they were advised of this cost and of the alternative purposes for which the funds might be spent. It is well to remember that our foreign aid policies are formulated by individuals earning higher incomes and knowing much more about conditions abroad than most Canadians.[1] (c) The philanthropic motive of the Canadian people would be difficult, if not impossible, to gauge. However, it would seem rather superficial to argue, as some would, that the motive is strong and that, to the average Canadian, "the growing gap and contrast of rich and poor is morally repugnant." Our record does not attest to such moral

[1] In the United States, "support for foreign aid has been more widespread among the better-off, more socially and occupationally privileged, and, particularly, the college educated than among the less economically, socially, and culturally privileged. However, the reverse has been the case for social welfare, medicare, progressive taxation, and other transfers of wealth at home—the lower the income, socio-economic status, and (to a lesser degree) education, the more prevalent the approval of such programs. . . . Many a Johnson Democrat of relatively low income and education would have cut aid abroad and spent these funds on welfare programs at home." A. O. Hero, Jr., "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Case of Foreign Aid," mimeographed paper (Boston 1969), 8.

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revolt in relation to similar gaps existing in Canada. Lately, it has been the increasing pressure from below, rather than the moral repugnance above, which has been forcing the Government's hand toward relief of poverty at home.

Foreign aid for the economic development of underdeveloped countries absorbs by far the largest part of the non-military aid extended by Canada, or by the West. A different situation exists in relation to aid for emergency relief—gifts of food and medical supplies to victims of famine, natural catastrophes and civil wars. In such cases, the awareness of Canadians is increased by the publicity given to the sudden calamity; the volume of aid involved is usually small, and the temporal limits of such aid are well defined; and Canadians, like others, are inclined to sympathize strongly with the victims of such emergencies.

Concerning aid for development, there has so far been little evidence of any widespread philanthropic motive in support of the volume of foreign aid extended at present and planned for the early 1970's. Some have argued that such evidence is found in the fact that, while our Government and Parliament have recently been under pressure to restrict public expenditures, they have increased the volume of foreign aid without any objection on the part of the public. Such an argument is obviously superficial. At most it might suggest that the people and their representatives approve of aid, just as they may approve of increased expenditures for defense. It indicates nothing about the purposes which aid is supposed to serve or about the motives of the people. Even if it were stated formally that aid was being granted on philanthropic grounds, it would prove nothing about the true motives of Parliament. One might note that public opinion polls in several other donor countries bear sad witness to the weakness of public support for foreign aid.[2]

In view of the foregoing remarks, one should not lightly advocate an all-out philanthropic campaign in support of foreign aid. If such a campaign failed, it might have a backlash effect: if the public was led to believe that philanthropy was the only, or the main, motive of our aid policy, if it became conscious of the costs involved and compared foreign aid to other welfare expenditures, and if, as is more likely than not, the public was not made sufficiently aware of the conditions

[2] See G. Ohlin, *Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered*, O.E.C.D. (Paris 1966), 59-63. These polls may, of course, reflect weakness of the philanthropic motive regarding other nations, unawareness of the conditions of poverty in the underdeveloped countries, ignorance of other purposes which aid might serve, objections to using aid for such purposes, or several of these factors.

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of poverty abroad, there might be a reaction against foreign aid that would hamper rather than help the Government's policies. If the Government needed to give aid for political purposes, it might face some difficulty in securing the funds; and if, in certain cases, it did not need to give aid for compelling political or economic reasons, philanthropy, which in a situation of confusion and uncertainty may have slipped through, might be killed outright.

As in other donor countries, the philanthropic motive that may exist in favor of Canada's foreign aid tends to be weakened further by the growing political pressure for relief of poverty at home, together with an increasing realization that the economic development of the underdeveloped countries is bound to be a very long-term undertaking. It is not at all certain that Indians or Pakistanis are "poorer" than large groups of Newfoundlanders or Torontonians. Poverty cannot be gauged by simple measurements of absolute income which in themselves are questionable. Poverty, and its implications for human welfare, involves comparisons, and these are both easier and more painful to make between people sharing a "neighborhood" and the same national and social heritage than between, for instance, the vast majority of Pakistanis and North Americans. Domestic conflicts and anti-poverty motives and policies must partly account for the decline or stagnation of the foreign assistance programs of some donor countries in recent years.

The philanthropic motive, I might also note, assumes that some combination of economic, social, political, and other changes in the underdeveloped countries (usually bunched under the rather simple and often misleading term "economic development") is desirable. However, we do not know much about the rate and pattern of these changes, the other attendant circumstances, and the various goals in addition to growth of income (for instance, nationalism, socialism, population changes) which are desirable or acceptable to the *people* of the less developed countries. For instance, the emphasis on education and communication in these countries, which we have supported rather strongly, may be leading to dissatisfaction and social and political instability or convulsions.[3] Briefly, insofar as the *people* of the

[3] Education and communication, if expanded at an unduly high rate, may increase the needs of the people faster than their ability to satisfy them, or the range of choice faster than the ability to choose. The Pearson Commission found that "better health and wider education are creating greater social problems among more people." Unless these trends are reversed, "instability may defeat the purpose of assistance." *The Globe & Mail*, Toronto, April 5, 1969, p. 9.

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underdeveloped countries are concerned, it is quite conceivable that we are not being particularly philanthropic—at least when the kind of aid which we have hitherto given is considered. The *leaders*, or the small groups which constitute the "effective opinion" in these countries, may of course have different views. But the leaders are important to us politically; to the political purposes of aid I shall turn later.

Finally, the economics of our philanthropy also suggest that this philanthropy may not be the only, and not even the main, purpose of Canada's foreign aid.

I may first briefly clear up the background for my argument. I assume that some increase in the consumption of goods and services in the underdeveloped countries is desirable. However, this does not necessarily imply a high demand for capital. In many of these countries the demand for capital is low, and so is the price of capital. As a consequence, foreign capital will generally not flow to these countries on an economic or business basis.

It is necessary to emphasize these simple facts. Some people still talk about a large demand for capital in the underdeveloped countries, a "shortage of capital" accompanied by a high opportunity cost of capital. They then try to adjust for their confusion by seeing a low "absorptive capacity." Clearly, if the demand for capital were high, so would be the price of capital, and there would be no need for aid, that is, for capital transfers at lower than commercial interest rates. Others see a high demand for capital, but point to risks peculiar to underdeveloped countries which deter the private investor; hence, they reason, there is need for foreign aid in which the donor undertakes to ignore the risk. This argument also reflects confused thinking: if the demand for capital were high, the underdeveloped countries could afford to pay a high price for capital; the advanced countries would only have to pool the risks and charge a small premium, or to aid only to the extent of foregoing the risk premium. The demand for capital tends to be low in most of the world's underdeveloped countries simply because the conditions which create a high demand for capital do not exist in these countries.[4]

I return to the question of the economics of our philanthropy. Foreign aid, as practiced, is not a pure transfer or redistribution of income.

[4] In most underdeveloped countries, there are a few investment opportunities promising a reasonable rate of return. These attract private capital or investment by such institutions as the World Bank. In other cases, the Bank helps in creating the conditions of demand for the capital it lends. The World Bank does not give aid. Aid is requested for the vast number of projects which are not bankable.

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It involves a transfer of income on condition (a) that it be saved by the recipients,[5] and (b) that it be invested only in the recipient country, where the return on capital is not as high as in the donor country or possibly others. The gift, then, involves a misallocation of the world's capital resources, and world income is affected unfavorably. (In addition to the combined income of the donor and the recipient countries, the income of third countries is affected since, other things being equal, the foreign demand for their products will rise less than it otherwise might have.) The economics of pure philanthropy would dictate that we either invest the capital where the return is highest (e.g., in Canada) and transfer to, and share with the people of the underdeveloped countries, the consumption of goods and services, or else, that we donate the capital to these people and allow them to invest it wherever the return is highest—in their country, in Canada, or in any other country—or to consume it. I return to this point later.

I am inclined to conclude from the foregoing discussion that the philanthropic motive might at best allow for governmental foreign aid of modest proportions.[6] It is quite possible that this motive, or the "Sunday school mentality," receives prominence or easy acceptance in discussions of our foreign aid for two reasons. First, it appears noble and unselfish, and can serve in pushing into the background other motives, some of which might be difficult to discuss publicly. Second, it is vague and hence it serves well in our system of government in which it is not always considered necessary or desirable to measure, and fully to inform the public about, the true costs of, and benefits from, various public policies.

I might note that it has sometimes been argued that we extend foreign aid in order to define and project the "Canadian image" abroad. This argument and the goal it refers to are hazy. One interpretation might be that we wish to be recognized as a philanthropic or humanitarian nation. I have commented on the probable role of the philanthropic motive in our foreign aid. The argument might imply also that we wish to advertise our philanthropy and to be compared favorably with other, presumably less generous, nations. This is not characteristic of a true philanthropist; it is doubtful that the vast majority of Canadians are after this kind of publicity. Another interpretation

[5] They may, of course, increase consumption out of their own income.

[6] "Most observers take the view that much less than the present level of aid would result if its sole support came from a simple desire to help poor people in other countries. Certainly, representatives of the people oppose aid when they can see no national interest in it, and the main support comes from exporting interests which may benefit." I.M.D. Little and J. M. Clifford, *International Aid* (London 1965), 78.

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may be that Canadians, through extending foreign aid combined with other related policies, hope to attain recognition as members of a distinctive and admired nation with its own characteristics and culture. But then the question arises as to what are the best economic policies for achieving this goal—whether spending the same amount of money in other ways might not yield a greater return of this kind.

III. Economic Motives

It has been argued that tied foreign aid involves exports of Canadian products. However, these are not exports but gifts, which might have been made in Canada. While therefore aid may in fact subsidize the exports of certain sectors or groups, it does not necessarily promote the national interest. Indeed, to the extent that an increase in imports may be required in order to produce the aid goods or in response to the increase in incomes and expenditures, foreign aid may affect our balance of payments adversely.

It might be suggested, of course, that, even though such tied aid does not increase our exports, it involves subsidization of domestic production and thus serves to boost economic activity. *Prima facie*, it would appear that if there were unemployed resources in a given industry and these were used to produce aid goods, it would involve an increase in employment and income in this industry and other sectors of the economy. However, in each case a number of questions must be answered before it becomes certain that such a policy contributes to the employment and allocation of resources, present and future, that is most desirable from the point of view of the national interest. When the decision to subsidize an industry is incidental and an adjunct to foreign aid decisions, undue license is given to political pressure to subsidize industries or regions in which the expansion of employment and income may not be of the highest national priority. Again, while it may be desirable to help industries in temporary difficulty, aid might go to moribund industries and permit them to retain, or attract anew, resources which should have been allocated to other sectors of the economy. Nor would decisions to boost domestic production, taken in such an incidental manner, discriminate adequately between the desirability of assisting labor-intensive or capital-intensive industries, or those using new technology, or, for that matter, take adequately into consideration the changes in employment and income in other industries which would be caused by the primary changes in the assisted industry. Finally, even if the industry to be assisted is correctly selected,

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it is possible that foreign aid does not provide the best way of supporting it; for example, instead of creating an artificial demand for the product in question, it might be better to subsidize the prices of the productive factors used by the industry. The larger our aid program, the more numerous might be the cases in which the foregoing critical questions would tend to be overlooked.

In some cases, foreign aid might be used as an export lever—as an attempt to induce the recipient country to purchase a larger volume of Canadian goods than the use of our aid can pay for. The export of goods which cannot be sold abroad at competitive world prices is thus subsidized: a larger volume of goods is sold for a given amount of foreign exchange under the pretense that some of these goods are paid for with aid funds. The evaluation of such means to promote exports must be based on a thorough cost-benefit analysis, and is likely to vary from one case to another. The assumption that such promotion is obviously desirable may, in many cases, prove to be wide of the mark. Thus, imports may increase in connection with the production of the exports and the expenditures out of the new incomes, by more than the increase in Canada's exports that are paid for out of the aid-recipient's own exchange resources. With respect to the subsidization of the production of these goods, questions of the kind noted earlier would have to be answered.

It has been suggested that foreign assistance leads to economic development in the underdeveloped countries and hence to new markets for our exports. However, if the same capital were invested in Canada, where it would be more productive, the markets created would be larger. Moreover, since they would be closer and we would know them better, our share in them would probably be greater. It must be emphasized that there are no inherent advantages in foreign over domestic trade—indeed, there are some disadvantages. It should also be noted that any benefits from the creation of new markets in the underdeveloped countries would be so far in the future that the discounted value of these benefits could hardly be expected to approach, let alone exceed, the present cost of aid.

Since Canadian aid funds have been spent largely on Canadian goods and services, it has been argued that foreign assistance serves to make the recipient countries aware of our products and that this should benefit our exports in the future; also, that foreign aid can serve as a "training ground of involvement in international business," where Canadians may acquire knowledge, skill, and experience of foreign countries and markets. However, in the domestic field, prod-

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ucts are seldom given away for the purpose of promoting their sales or training the salesmen, and there seems to be no reason why advertising, marketing, and sales-training methods should be markedly different in the international field. The problem of furthering our international trade should be tackled directly rather than indirectly. That is a separate and important subject, and we should note only that, in trying to promote our exports, we are likely to direct our efforts to *large* and *growing* markets, so that a dollar of, for instance, advertising or export credit subsidization would yield the highest return. It might be better to push further into the markets of Japan, Italy, or Mexico than into some of the underdeveloped countries that we are assisting, for it may take many decades before the latter can develop into significant markets. Promotional campaigns at home, even giveaways, are directed to income classes which offer the best market prospects, not to the needy.

I must concede, of course, that if Canadian foreign aid is desirable mainly for other reasons, it might, as a by-product, help in introducing and advertising Canadian goods in the recipient countries. Taking everything into consideration, this benefit would seem to be quite limited. Also, as I indicated earlier in a related context, the benefit would both be uncertain and lie considerably in the future, so that its discounted value would, in many cases, run far short of the present cost of our aid. Finally, any such benefit would tend to be further restricted as considerable resistance arose in the underdeveloped world to the direct or indirect tying of aid to sources of procurement.

Finally, it has been argued that foreign assistance can help build the infrastructure in underdeveloped countries and thus open up opportunities in their economies for the investment of Canadian capital. However, in most cases, similar or better opportunities may be created if, instead, additions are made to the Canadian infrastructure, and there are considerable advantages to the ensuing business investment being undertaken in Canada rather than abroad. Nor is it at all certain that, if the infrastructure of a given underdeveloped country is expanded with the assistance of Canadian aid, it will be Canadian business investment rather than investment by other nations that will reap the benefits. Many underdeveloped countries have not favored foreign private investment in their economies. If, for some reason, it is considered desirable that Canadian investment abroad be promoted or subsidized, different policies might be preferable.

I conclude that Canadian foreign assistance does not seem, in the main, to serve national economic purposes or interests, and that, if it

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does, it does not serve them as well as alternative uses of the same funds might. If aid is desirable, that is, if the cost of it is justified for other reasons, it might incidentally yield a very modest economic benefit. However, taking only the economic costs and benefits into consideration, our aid entails a loss for Canada. Generally, it would seem that, having decided on and practiced foreign aid, we have tended to develop some economic arguments *ex post facto* in order to justify it, especially when the political arguments might be difficult to present publicly. Support for such arguments has, of course, come also from sectional interests which stand to benefit from our aid.

IV. Political Motives or Purposes

It has often been argued that foreign aid will further economic development in the less developed countries, thereby serving to fight poverty and to forestall political disorder, Soviet penetration, and communism. This is a rather superficial argument. Communism is the result of class struggle, not of average poverty. On the other hand, the pattern of, and relation between, the rates of change of various socio-economic factors (such as education, communication, and urbanization) in many countries that are attempting to accelerate their development may involve serious imbalances leading to the disintegration of the present social fabric, discontent, and serious political instability.[7] If foreign aid has been used in an effort to defend the West against some "isms," this has not been achieved through improvements in the democratic process and the degree of domestic political stability of the recipient underdeveloped countries; rather, it has been pursued through "buying" and boosting the fire-power, domestic or international, of regimes which are set upon fighting such "isms." To this question of buying favors, I shall return later.

It has also been asserted that aid toward economic development contributes to world peace. Specifically, it has been suggested that economic development will tend to be accompanied by greater social and political stability in the underdeveloped countries, and that such stability will contribute to world peace and security. I have just commented on the first leg of this argument. The second is equally tenuous: politically stable regimes are apt to be more demanding internationally than unstable ones. There is no serious evidence that

[7] It has been suggested that it is economic decline, not merely failure to develop, that is likely to result in political instability. I.M.D. Little, *Aid to Africa* (New York 1964), xi. As in the case of economic growth, the outcome will probably hinge on the rates of change of the various socio-economic factors: rapid decline may lead to political instability, while gradual retrogression may not.

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might lend support to this argument. Sometimes it is conceded that the argument might not hold for the short run, and the promised outcome is projected into the longer run. But there is no evidence or logical argument in support of this thesis in the long run either. Rather, this argument, questionable with respect to the short run and nebulous at best in the long run, is often advanced out of ignorance or superficial consideration of its validity, or, as indicated later, thrown in to support foreign aid which serves other purposes that might be difficult to present publicly.

There is another sense, however, in which it might be true that foreign aid serves to promote world peace if peace is defined as the absence of armed challenge to our present control of a certain part of the world's resources. Insofar as a threat to peace may originate in the underdeveloped world, peace depends either on the willingness of the underdeveloped countries to accept the status quo, or, in the case of their being unwilling to do so, on their inability to attempt to change it by force. We cannot rule out the possibility that the underdeveloped countries might put forth a "flag and grab" argument—that Canada and some other countries have through flag and force obtained control of a disproportionately large share of the gifts of nature—and might ask for some redistribution of this control.[8] Such a claim would not find support either in the United States or in the USSR. However, if it gathered momentum, it could become a world problem.[9] Foreign aid may serve as a way of subduing such a cry. As indicated earlier, our gift is made on the condition that it may not be used, at least directly, for the purpose of acquiring control of resources in the donor country. Moreover, since the increase in income to which aid and development may lead will tend to be rather limited, the underdeveloped countries will not be likely to contemplate expanding their control of world resources either through economic or business processes, or through armed aggression. In view of the rather large share of world resources that Canada controls, one may argue that this country should be glad to give aid and should make every effort to induce the other advanced countries to give aid too.

[8] "Before the end of this century, Canadians may have to justify before the world our right to continue to occupy a disproportionate share of the world's living space." Address to Convocation, University of Calgary, by M. F. Strong, Director General, External Aid Office, Government of Canada, May 27, 1968.

[9] The rapid world-wide development of education and communications tends to move the underdeveloped countries to fight against gross inequalities in the distribution of resources. While this change in their attitude will not constitute an open threat as long as it is not matched by ability to fight, a mounting feeling of injustice may in some way or another lead to, or turn into, increased ability to force the issue.

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There may, of course, be some changes in the status quo that the advanced countries might be prepared to countenance—either movements of people, or concessions, to the people living in underdeveloped countries, in the control of resources. In that case, too, foreign aid may play a very helpful role, especially if it is in the form of "technical assistance." Our experts in underdeveloped countries, offering assistance in government, in the organization of business and production, and in the formulation of public and private policies, can exert a salutary influence in getting the people of these countries to improve their understanding of our thinking, actions, institutions, society, and life. As these people get to understand us better and as they develop partly along lines that we comprehend, we should become more ready to recognize somewhat like-minded people and be prepared to share our life and treasures with them.

In international politics, the problem is not usually one of peace or war, however. There are world problems in which we need the support, cooperation, alliance, or vote of certain nations. Financial and technical assistance (with our experts in underdeveloped countries in, or close to, positions of intelligence and decision-making) gives us an opportunity to influence the long-term as well as the everyday policies of the recipient countries and to lead them to rational political and economic developments and a better understanding of our interests and problems of mutual concern. Also, there are numerous cases in which it is easier to "exchange favors" with an underdeveloped country—to give aid on the understanding that something will be done in exchange—than to pay formally for a certain concession or privilege granted by that country.[10] A large part of Canada's aid to Commonwealth nations or, through aid consortia, to allies or would-be allies of the West, reflects such incentives or purposes.

It has been alleged that the United States has often obtained scant support, and may even have earned some enmity, for its aid to certain countries. However, such allegations have not been supported by adequate analysis or proof. But for the aid or similar favors, these countries might have adopted a strongly inimical, rather than a lukewarm friendly, or a neutral, position toward the United States.[11] Others

[10] I am not referring to the argument that, through foreign aid, one can "buy friends." A person's friend is someone who might do something for him in the future. In the text I refer to concessions or privileges given in exchange for the aid in a more or less pre-arranged manner and at a pre-arranged time.

[11] It has been noted that "foreign assistance has been a large item in U.S.A. public expenditure for twenty years now, and development has been among the objects of aid for fifteen years. Yet, the U.S.A. appears to have earned neither new allies nor gratitude, and these were the rewards which the electorate had been led to expect

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have suggested that foreign aid should be separated, indeed insulated, from the rest of our foreign policy. That is both impossible and undesirable. For one thing, it would be foolish for Canada to try to insulate her aid from her foreign policy if, as is probable, other donor countries will not. Not even the recipient countries would be likely to favor such a separation: the underdeveloped countries do not bargain for aid as one body and those countries which can offer favors or privileges would certainly prefer to bargain for more aid in return.

A final note of clarification may be added concerning the philanthropic and political motives in giving foreign aid. While it has often been stated that aid is given out of humanitarian motives, aid has at the same time been presented as an alternative to defense: we can give more aid, it is argued, only if we can reduce our defense budget. Surely, if the granting of aid is due to philanthropic motives, it should be an alternative to consumption expenditures and domestic philanthropy. Our *potential* for increasing foreign aid would be very great indeed, while the urge or *need* to do so would depend on the strength of our humanitarian feelings.

If, on the other hand, our foreign aid mainly serves foreign policy and defense purposes (taking the latter in the broadest sense), our *potential* for increasing our aid budget (through reducing consumption and investment expenditures in Canada) is still very great, but the *need* to do so will depend on the return we get from an expenditure on aid compared to an equal sum spent on defense. It is necessary to draw attention to a certain haziness or confusion in public discussion: reference is made to our *potential* for giving aid in the face of our substantial defense expenditures, but in effect, our policy is based on the *need* to give aid or to produce defense; the potential, as indicated, is ample.[12] As I have noted earlier, aid may be used to induce the underdeveloped countries to accept the international status quo or to change it in our favor, to influence their decision-making in ways

from U.S.A. aid." Little and Clifford (fn. 6), 26. Surely, the manifold influence of U.S. advisers, technical and other, leading to changes in the policies of underdeveloped countries which benefit the interests of the U.S., has been a significant dividend. Like the work of the Defense Department, the State Department, and other U.S. agencies, this cannot be spelled out to the electorate.

[12] Some vocal support for foreign aid among certain groups of the Canadian public originates in their resistance to defense expenditures. Thus, while the argument that our aid potential can be increased only if defense spending is reduced enables some people to justify restrictions in our aid budget, it enables—indeed forces—others to support foreign aid strongly. If the public were given the correct argument regarding the relation between aid and defense and were presented with the full range of alternative expenditures (including domestic expenditures on health, welfare, housing, and urban and regional development), probably no political party in Canada could afford to support much foreign aid openly.

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that accommodate our interests, or to obtain favors from the recipient countries in exchange. "Development cooperation provides the U.S. with an alternative to military involvement for playing a continuing role in the less developed world."[13] To the extent that these objectives can be achieved more cheaply through aid, donor countries would substitute aid for defense expenditures, thus maximizing the political benefit from a given expenditure, or minimizing the total cost of a given benefit.

V. Relations with Other Donors

In the process of planning, negotiating, and extending foreign aid, Canada is developing relations with other donor countries as well as with the recipients. The relation between our policies and those of other donors or would-be donors may be just as important a determinant of our aid program, and of the extent and manner in which our purposes are served, as our relations with the recipient countries—very often it is even more important. In brief, we are no more independent in our aid policy than we are in our defense or foreign policy.

In order to analyze fully Canada's relations with other donors, and the manner and measure in which these relations serve or affect the pursuit of our philanthropic, economic, or political purposes, one would need to have access to confidential information regarding our aid negotiations and the position and role of aid with respect to our foreign and defense policies. One would also have to study thoroughly the motives of other donor countries—for instance the purposes of economic expansion which seem to influence German and Japanese aid, or France's "neo-colonial" policies in the broadest sense as well as her effort to counteract the influence of the United States in the *tiers monde*. While this is not practicable at this stage, a few possibilities may be noted.

Philanthropy. Canada is a rich nation. Consequently, we are obliged to extend assistance when others do. Some countries may grant aid for political reasons; if this is represented as philanthropy, we may also become involved. We would either be philanthropists "quasi-unintentionally," or we would be helping to serve a political purpose while covering up as philanthropists. The amount and terms of our aid are also bound to be influenced by the policies of other donors: we are

[13] *Development Assistance in the New Administration. Report of the President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs*, Washington, D.C., October 25, 1968, pp. 12-13.

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prodded to do as well or better. Again, if other important donors lower their aid commitments to a certain area substantially, we may decide to follow suit, or to cease giving aid, if the achievement of a certain goal calls for a minimum of total aid.

On the other hand, we may at times decide to behave differently from other donors—to aid a certain country when others do not, or conversely. For instance, if we feel that a country is receiving enough aid from other sources, we may turn to helping other underdeveloped economies. Or we may try to outdistance other donors, perhaps in order to boost the "Canadian image." However, we will probably do so only after considering the feelings this might create in other donor countries: we are not independent in our aid policy and perhaps we cannot afford to be accused of "overdoing international philanthropy or yielding to the poor unduly."

Economic Motives. We may decide to go along with other donor countries in promoting economic development and the creation of markets in underdeveloped countries if it is likely that the development and the markets to be created through such a combined effort will be proportionately greater than those which the donors' individual efforts might have created, and/or if Canada's share in these new markets is expected to more than compensate us for foregoing the creation of new markets in Canada. (Of course, these benefits and costs will have to be considered together with all other possible benefits and costs relating to our aid.) I might note that the questions raised are not answered as easily as is suggested by those who proclaim that Canada "is a trading nation," and that therefore the creation of new foreign markets will benefit Canada pre-eminently. The answers will depend on the size and pattern of the additional demand created abroad, the possibilities of expanding Canada's domestic rather than foreign trade, and other related factors.

Policies to extend export credits, export credit guarantees and similar facilities might be included in the concept of aid. Measures of this kind had better be considered as trade promotion. Canada would surely try to counteract such policies on the part of other countries. On the other hand, aid might serve to disguise trade promotion. A country gives aid on the understanding that the recipient country will use part of its own exchange resources to purchase goods from the donor country. Such arrangements do not seem to have been made in any significant measure. If they were to be made, Canada might have to respond with similar, or other, policies. Earlier, I considered the argument that foreign aid serves to advance the donor's

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exports in the future, and concluded that the advantage, if any, was rather small. Accordingly, before deciding to extend aid in order to counteract any such advantage that others might enjoy, we should first evaluate our potential loss (at discounted present values).

Political Motives. There may be numerous cases in which our friends or allies feel that we should extend aid in order to help them in the pursuit of political objectives, such as fighting various kinds of "isms," influencing decision-making in countries that receive aid, or obtaining "favors." In such cases, we may extend assistance partly because we feel that it is in our interest to pursue these objectives, and partly because we wish to "oblige" the other donors and be in favor with them. Furthermore, it may be argued that by being a member of the donor group, Canada might be able in some measure to influence the aid policies of the West—to have a say in how some of the "big" aid money is spent. Finally, and quite importantly, as noted in Section IV, Canada is interested as much as any other country in staving off any possible "flag and grab" cry, and good relations with other donors might enable her to enlist their aid policies and other support for the purpose.

Some people have stated that our aid contribution or policy is "marginal." Oddly enough, the same people often believe that, by being a member of the aid-giving club, Canada exerts an important influence on the aid policies of the West. Surely, these statements cannot both be right; probably, both are exaggerations. It has also been argued that Canada can pull its weight better in aid than in defense. This may or may not be so: defense coordination is more highly developed, and we see ourselves as a cogwheel in a huge Western machine; aid, on the other hand, is not formally coordinated, and we tend to think of ourselves as being independent and important.

VI. The Presentation of Arguments for Aid

A number of arguments or views, then, have been advanced with respect to the purposes or motives of Canadian foreign aid. Some were found to be valid, as stated or with modifications, some appeared to be doubtful or at best unproven, and some were false. One further aspect of our problem remains. Some of the motives of our aid are presented or proclaimed publicly, while others are not, or perhaps cannot be; some are presented in a clear and unequivocal manner that is helpful to the formation of public opinion, while others appear in vague, incomplete, and possibly misleading forms; finally, the presentation of some of our motives or purposes may be useful and advan-

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tageous to Canadian policy, while the publicity given to others may create obstacles or damage our policy. While I cannot be systematic and comprehensive, I wish briefly to draw attention to these matters.

The motives advanced publicly in favor of Canada's foreign aid, varying in the nuances and qualifications attached to them, and in the manner in which they are presented, may influence the effects of our aid policy significantly. The achievement of our purposes depends only partly on the volume and content of our aid. It hinges substantially on the "impression" created in the recipient country. I must emphasize again that there may be a considerable difference between what we think our motives are and what the recipients think they are. This, in turn, depends partly on the attitudes and motives of the recipients and partly on the presentation of our motives and on our actions. A donor country may be quite sincere about its humanitarian motives, but the recipient may interpret the aid differently and respond in a manner which seriously reduces the satisfaction of the philanthropist or affects the aid policy unfavorably. The argument that economic development in the underdeveloped countries will advance political stability in these countries, and hence world peace, is tenuous. Yet, partly because it is vague, it is easy to "sell." It has been used by the leaders of underdeveloped countries to support their claim for aid and development; it has also been used by the West in order to justify aid policies through which we may influence decision-making in various underdeveloped countries, or secure favors. It would seem foolish to drop a questionable argument if it is serving us all well, especially if the benefits it promises can be relegated to the long run.

The motives of our aid that are presented to the Canadian public, and the manner in which they are presented, are an important element of the domestic "public relations" facet of our aid policy: they are significant with respect to the ease with which the Government manages to secure funds for aid. At times, our real motives may not be helpful in an effort to sell a given aid package to the Canadian public. Our aid program can muster greater support from the business community if it is presented as advancing our exports; it would be difficult to present most of the political purposes of aid (noted in Section IV) fully to the public. It is quite possible that the Canadian Government and Parliament have in certain cases given aid for political purposes and have found support among a section of the public on philanthropic grounds—or at least they have met no objection. As I indicated earlier, such concurrence is secured in part because the cost of our foreign philanthropy and the possible alternative uses of the funds are not explained to the public, and because the "effective opinion" in matters

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of aid is that of people who earn higher incomes and know much more about conditions abroad than the great majority of Canadians. It is quite possible to have a majority of the public supporting the aid program, with this majority consisting of three or four small minority groups each of which supported foreign aid for a given reason (such as philanthropy) but would vehemently object to the idea of using foreign aid to achieve some of the other purposes (such as political or economic gains).

This is not an essay in domestic politics. The wisdom of using questionable or vague, and possibly misleading, arguments in order to sell the aid program to the Canadian public must be left to the Government to judge. There may be cases in which such a policy appears necessary. The important thing is for the Government to be aware of the fundamental validity of the arguments used and to stop short of letting a questionable argument influence the formulation and execution of our aid policy: it must, for instance, refrain from policies aimed at shoring up moribund industries simply because foreign aid has been sold to the public as assisting the nation's exports; in the allocation of funds to aid, defense, and related policies, it must adequately discount the promise that aid and development will promote political stability and hence peace.

VIII. Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion it would seem that the motives for Canadian foreign aid are partly philanthropic and mainly political. It would certainly be desirable to emphasize human solidarity and to develop ways and means of boosting Canadian philanthropy toward the underdeveloped world. On the other hand, if Canadians are not inclined to be philanthropic internationally, whether in view of the need to deal with poverty at home or for any other reason, or if, while paying lip-service to the cause, they abhor the taxes required for the purpose, undue concentration by the Government on the philanthropic motive might result in public resistance to foreign aid. Aid can be a very important factor in international politics, and the political motive will probably remain a significant determinant of the size, form, geographical direction, and other features of our aid program. There might well be instances in which Canada must make sure that her aid (its size, content, terms, and so forth) serves its political purpose, rather than insist on its being used in the best effort toward economic development.

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THE POWER OF POSITIVE SANCTIONS

By DAVID A. BALDWIN*

I. Introduction: Positive Sanctions and Political Science

POLITICAL science has made valuable contributions to the progressive clarification of the concept of power since World War II. In view of the attention political scientists have traditionally lavished on the concept of power, it seems fitting that they should help clarify it. Thanks to the efforts of such men as Harold Lasswell and Robert Dahl, many political scientists today are keenly aware of the need to define power in relational terms, to distinguish power relations from power resources, to specify scope, weight, domain, and so on.[1] There is, however, one distinction that is rarely considered by political scientists—that between positive and negative sanctions. The purpose of this paper is to clarify this distinction and show how and why it matters.

It is not that political scientists have said wrong things about the role of positive sanctions in power relations; it is just that they have said little.[2] Most of their discussions of power have focused on severe negative sanctions. Can one influence more flies with honey than with vinegar? Can one influence more Vietnamese with economic aid than with napalm? The literature of political science not only gives few clues to the answers, it often implies that such questions are not even worth asking. Dahl recognizes but understates the problem: "The existence of both negative and positive coercion is sometimes a source of confusion in political analysis, since writers often either confound the two or ignore positive coercion."[3]

Although it is not the purpose of this paper to survey the literature,

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[1] Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950); Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, II (July 1957), 201-15. For a bibliography of the more important contributions to the literature on power see Robert A. Dahl, "Power," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (New York 1968), 414-15.

[2] Although the primary focus of this discussion is political science, other social science disciplines have also underemphasized positive sanctions. The recent *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, for example, contains an index entry for "threat" but none for "promise" and an article on "punishment" but none on "reward." See also James T. Tedeschi, "Threats and Promises," in Paul Swingle, ed., *The Structure of Conflict* (New York 1970), 155-91.

[3] Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963), 51.

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a brief look at the various ways of handling positive sanctions is in order. Among the more common approaches are the following.

1. *Explicit rejection.*—Most political scientists pay so little attention to the distinction between positive and negative sanctions that their exclusion of positive sanctions from the concept of power is implicit rather than explicit. A few, however, have explicitly rejected positive sanctions in defining power.[4]

Two sociologists who have influenced political science have also excluded positive sanctions from their concept of power. Both Talcott Parsons[5] and Peter M. Blau[6] have carefully distinguished positive from negative sanctions and have explicitly defined power in terms of negative sanctions. Blau suggests that Max Weber also excluded positive sanctions from his concept of power.[7] Although Weber's concept of power seems to include both positive and negative sanctions, his concept of *political* power emphasizes the actual or threatened use of force.[8] Such emphasis tends to focus attention on negative rather than positive sanctions in power relations.

2. *Conversion.*—Positive sanctions can be conceptually converted into negative ones. Thus Dahl offers a definition of power in terms of severe penalties and then observes that large rewards "can be made to operate" rather like severe penalties.[9] Similarly, the concept of *B*'s opportunity costs of noncompliance with *A*'s demands blurs the distinction between rewards and penalties.[10] Regardless of whether *A* promises *B* a reward of $100 for compliance or threatens him with a penalty of $100 for failure to comply, the opportunity costs to *B* of noncompliance are the same.

3. *Mutatis mutandis.*—Perhaps the lack of attention to positive

[4] This group includes David Easton, *The Political System* (New York 1953), 143-44; Andrew S. McFarland, *Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems* (Stanford 1969), 13-14; and Gerald Garvey, "The Domain of Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXIII (March 1970), 120-37. In the second edition of *Modern Political Analysis*, Dahl joins this group: Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970), 32-33.

[5] Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, CVII (June 1963), 232-62.

[6] Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York 1964).

[7] *Ibid.*, 115.

[8] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, and edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York 1947), pp. 152-57.

[9] Dahl (fn. 3), 50-51.

[10] John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," *Behavioral Science*, VII (January 1962), 67-80. Throughout this paper, *A* refers to the actor exerting or attempting to exert power, and *B* refers to the actor over whom *A* is exerting or attempting to exert power.

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sanctions is partially explained by an implicit assumption that the distinction between positive and negative sanctions is not worth making. Even those who include both positive and negative sanctions in their concepts of power may believe that all or most generalizations about one are applicable to the other—if the proper assumptions are made.[11] Since the relevance of generalizations about sticks to generalizations about carrots is so easy to see, why belabor the obvious?

4. *Inconsistency.*—One may explicitly include both positive and negative sanctions in his definition of power and then proceed to ignore the positive and accentuate the negative. References to power that are not applicable to positive sanctions are then likely to be passed off as mere "slips of the pen." When Dahl identifies several dimensions useful in measuring *A*'s power, we hardly notice that he includes the degree of *B*'s threatened deprivation and ignores the degree of *B*'s promised reward.[12] When Karl Deutsch defines power in terms of "expected capability to *inflict* sanctions,"[13] no harm is done. After all, one could talk of *A* inflicting rewards on *B*—although one never does. When Felix Oppenheim virtually ignores positive sanctions in his book-length study of power, it is all right because he includes a footnote which mentions "just in passing the promise of reward as another type of influence."[14] When Bachrach and Baratz say that a necessary condition of a power relationship is *B*'s perception of the threatened sanction as a deprivation,[15] or when they observe that the actual application of sanctions is an admission of defeat by *A*[16] (a statement applicable only to negative sanctions), there is no reason for concern, because they have specifically included both rewards and penalties in their definition of sanctions.[17] Any—but not all—of these examples can easily be dismissed as nothing more than unfortunate diction, a mere "slip of the pen." Scholarship pays little attention to "slips of the pen" on the assumption that they are random and tend to cancel out. When pens slip consistently in one direction, however, the effect is cumulative; the scholarly implications are different. In discussing the role of sanctions in power relations, the

[11] Kenneth E. Boulding appears to take this position in *Conflict and Defense* (New York 1962), 253-58.
[12] Dahl, "Power" (fn. 1), 414.
[13] Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York 1963), pp. 120-21; italics added.
[14] Felix E. Oppenheim, *Dimensions of Freedom* (New York 1961), 45.
[15] Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (September 1963), 634.
[16] *Ibid.*, 636.
[17] *Ibid.*, 634.

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pens of political scientists often slip toward negative sanctions and almost never slip toward positive sanctions.

No work published since 1945 has had a greater impact on the way political scientists think about power than Lasswell and Kaplan's *Power and Society*. Here too one finds a tendency to emphasize negative sanctions. Consider the following points: (1) a decision is defined as "a policy involving severe sanctions (deprivations)" (p. 74). (2) Power is defined as "participation in the making of decisions" (p. 75). (3) In differentiating power from influence in general, they focus on the "availability of sanctions when the intended effects are not forthcoming." "Power is a special case of the exercise of influence: it is the process of affecting policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened) severe deprivations for nonconformity with the policies intended" (p. 76). Since only negative sanctions are implemented (or threatened) for nonconformity, it appears that Lasswell and Kaplan are not referring to positive sanctions. (4) The word "deprivations" is often used as a synonym for "sanctions" (pp. 76, 84, 86). It is difficult to believe that they intend to include both positive and negative sanctions in the term "deprivations," since they define a sanction as positive "when it *enhances* values for the actor to whom it is applied," and as negative "when it *deprives* him of values" (pp. 48-49, italics added). (5) Lasswell and Kaplan list control over *B*'s "well-being," i.e., his physical health and safety, as a power base for *A*. Although this would seem to imply *A*'s ability to add to *B*'s well-being as well as to subtract from it, the forms of power based on control of well-being are decidedly negative—violence, terror, discipline, rape, brute force, brigandage, forced labor, and inquisition (p. 87).

The discussion of power by Lasswell and Kaplan is clearly and consistently cast in terms of negative sanctions, that is, until one considers the last section of the chapter on power, the section labeled "Choice and Coercion" (pp. 97-102). This section explicitly incorporates both positive and negative sanctions into the concept of power. There seems to be no way to reconcile this section with the rest of the chapter on power. The value of this immensely useful book would be enhanced more by a frank recognition of this inconsistency than by pretending that it does not exist. Although Dahl[18] at one time viewed Lasswell and Kaplan's concept of power as limited to negative sanctions, he later contended that a "close reading" of *Power and Society* "indicates that they include both negative and positive coercion

[18] Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York 1953), 106.

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in their definition of power, though the inclusion of positive coercion is not obvious."[19] I shall leave it to the reader to decide for himself whether close reading of *Power and Society* reveals obscure inclusion of positive sanctions or outright contradiction. Either way it seems that the handling of positive sanctions in this influential book leaves much to be desired.

The two most important tasks of this paper lie ahead. First, a clear distinction between positive and negative sanctions must be drawn; and, second, the relevance of this distinction to political analysis must be shown.

II. The Concept of Positive Sanctions

Positive sanctions are defined as actual or promised rewards to *B*; negative sanctions are defined as actual or threatened punishments to *B*. Although these definitions appear simple enough, there are both conceptual and empirical difficulties in distinguishing between positive and negative sanctions. Some things take the form of positive sanctions, but actually are not: e.g., giving a bonus of $100 to a man who expected a bonus of $200, or promising not to kill a man who never expected to be killed in the first place. Likewise, some things take the form of negative sanctions, but actually are not: e.g., a threat to cut by $100 the salary of a man who expected his salary to be cut by $200, a threat to punch in the nose, next week, a man who knows he will be hanged at sunrise, or the beating of a masochist. Is withholding a reward ever a punishment? Always a punishment? Is withholding a punishment ever a reward? Always a reward? The answers depend on *B*'s perceptions of the situation.[20]

In order to distinguish rewards from punishments one must establish *B*'s baseline of expectations at the moment *A*'s influence attempt begins.[21] This baseline is defined in terms of *B*'s expected future value position, i.e., his expectations about his future position relative to the things he values. Positive sanctions, then, are actual or promised improvements in *B*'s value position relative to his baseline of expectations.

[19] Dahl (fn. 3), 51. In the second edition of *Modern Political Analysis* (fn. 4), p. 32, Dahl abandons this interpretation and returns to his previous position. No explanation is offered; nor is there any indication that Dahl recognizes the contradictory nature of Lasswell and Kaplan's discussion. The second edition of *Modern Political Analysis* gives even less attention to positive sanctions than the first edition—a seeming impossibility. Compare *Modern Political Analysis* (1963), pp. 50-51 with *Modern Political Analysis* (1970), pp. 32-33.

[20] Cf., John R. P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," in Dorwin Cartwright, ed., *Studies in Social Power* (Ann Arbor 1959), 158.

[21] The concept of the baseline is drawn from Blau (fn. 6), 116.

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Negative sanctions are actual or threatened deprivations relative to the same baseline. Whereas conceptual establishment of *B*'s baseline is vital but not difficult, empirical establishment of the baseline is both vital and difficult.

Three pitfalls await those who would distinguish the concept of positive from that of negative sanctions. The pitfalls concern *B*'s perceptions, time, and conditional influence attempts. As Bachrach and Baratz have reminded us, explanations of power relations should specify from whose point of view the situation is being viewed.[22] In any given power relationship, *A* may perceive himself as employing carrots, while *B* may perceive *A* as using sticks. Although many Americans perceive their foreign aid program in terms of positive sanctions, many recipients perceive it differently. There is also a danger that the outside observer, i.e., the political scientist, will substitute his own baseline for that of *B*, e.g., "if someone gave me a million dollars, I would regard it as a reward."

The second pitfall concerns time and is illustrated by Dahl's discussion of positive coercion. After defining power in terms of negative sanctions, he observes that substantial rewards can be made to operate in the same way: "For if . . . [*B*] is offered a very large reward for compliance, *then once his expectations are adjusted to this large reward*, he suffers a prospective loss if he does not comply."[23] The italicized words indicate that time is not being held constant. Only *after* *B*'s expectations are adjusted, does he perceive withholding the reward as coercive. What Dahl has done here is to use two different baselines. In referring to negative sanctions, he uses the baseline existing at the moment of *A*'s influence attempt, while his references to positive sanctions use the new baseline after *B* has taken account of *A*'s influence attempt. Since the purpose of *A*'s influence attempt is to shift *B*'s baseline, i.e., to cause *B* to change the expected values associated with doing *X*, Dahl's treatment tends to conceal the dynamics of the influence process. In distinguishing carrots from sticks one must be careful to specify not only *B*'s baseline of expectations, but also the point in time at which that baseline was established.

It is important, however, to recognize that the baseline changes over time. Today's reward may lay the groundwork for tomorrow's threat, and tomorrow's threat may lay the groundwork for a promise on the day after tomorrow. Thomas Schelling's[24] discussions of "com-

[22] Bachrach and Baratz (fn. 15), 640-41.
[23] Dahl (fn. 3), 50-51; italics added.
[24] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), 195-99; and Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven 1966), 69-91.

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pellent threats" could be improved by recognition of this fact. The threat that compels, he says, often takes the form of administering the punishment *until* *B* acts, rather than *if* he acts.[25] To call such a conditional commitment to withdraw punishment a "threat" is counter to both common usage and the analysis presented above. Such situations could be more usefully described as ones in which *A* uses a negative sanction (the punishment) to lay the groundwork for the subsequent use of positive sanctions (the promise to withdraw the punishment if *B* complies). What *A* is doing in such situations is using the stick to shift *B*'s baseline so as to make the subsequent promise of a carrot more attractive. *A*'s offer to stop tipping the boat if *B* will row is unlikely to be perceived by *B* as a carrot unless *A* is actually tipping the boat at the time the offer is made. *A* tips the boat in order to shift *B*'s expectation baseline, so that *B* will perceive the offer to stop tipping the boat as a reward. In his discussions of compellent threats Schelling blurs the distinction between positive and negative sanctions. Indeed, he turns the time sequence usually associated with threats around, so that a conditional commitment to punish and a conditional commitment to stop punishing are both called threats. Common usage, however, suggests a difference between offering to pull a thorn out of *B*'s foot and a threat to stick a thorn in.

The third pitfall is associated with conditional influence attempts, i.e., those in which *A* conditionally commits himself to reward or punish *B* for compliance or noncompliance.[26] The problem is that it seems to be easier to distinguish rewards from punishments than to distinguish promises from threats. The possibility that withholding a reward may be regarded by *B* as a punishment tempts one to regard threats and promises as two sides of one coin. The argument runs as follows: "An unconditional commitment by *A* to reward (or punish) *B* regardless of whether he does *X* or not is not a promise (or threat). Thus, a promise to reward if *B* complies *must* imply a threat not to reward if *B* fails to comply. Likewise, a threat to punish *B* for noncompliance *must* imply a promise not to punish for compliance. Thus, all threats imply promises and all promises imply threats; they are simply different ways of describing the same conditional influence attempt." An implicit assumption along these lines may explain why so few political scientists bother to distinguish between threats and promises. An explicit example of such reasoning is found in Schelling's

[25] Schelling (fn. 24), *Strategy of Conflict*, 196; and *Arms and Influence*, 70.

[26] Following Harsanyi, we leave open the possibility that influence attempts may take other forms, including unconditional rewards or punishments (see fn. 10, 71).

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Strategy of Conflict.[27] After considering several definitions and after admitting that the distinction between a threat and a promise is not obvious, he finally concludes that threats and promises are merely "names for different aspects of the same tactic of selective and conditional self-commitment."[28]

The fallacy in this line of reasoning lies in the assumption that withholding a reward is *always* a punishment and withholding a punishment is *always* a reward. If rewards and punishment (and, correspondingly, promises and threats) are defined in terms of *B*'s expectations at the moment *A* begins his influence attempt, it is clear that a conditional commitment not to reward if *B* fails to comply is not *necessarily* a threat. "If you do not do *X*, I shall not reward you" is a threat to punish if—and only if—*B* had a prior expectation of receiving the reward. "No bonus for you tomorrow unless you work hard today" means one thing on the day before Christmas bonuses are traditionally handed out and quite another on the day after such bonuses have been distributed.

In order to distinguish threats from promises so that *A* may promise without *necessarily* threatening, one must identify three kinds of conditional commitments available to *A*: (1) conditional commitment to reward (promise), (2) conditional commitment to punish (threat), and (3) conditional commitment neither to reward nor punish (assurance).[29] The "assurance" would make it conceptually possible for *A* to promise a reward to *B* for compliance without simultaneously threatening to punish *B* for noncompliance. Instead of threatening *B*, *A* may "assure" him (explicitly or implicitly) that he will not be rewarded for noncompliance.

Two advantages of conceptually isolating threats from promises should be mentioned. First, one may thereby distinguish between conditional commitments to deprive *B* of something he expects to have and conditional commitments to deprive him of something he does not expect to have. People respond differently to such situations.[30] Second, it permits a more comprehensive description of the full range of policy options open to *A* in making his influence attempt. This, as Harsanyi has noted, is one of the main purposes for which social scientists use the concept of *A*'s power over *B*.[31] The following table

[27] Schelling (fn. 24), 134. [28] *Ibid.*, 131-34.

[29] In *Arms and Influence* (p. 74) Schelling apparently uses the term "assurance" in this way.

[30] Cf. Elton B. McNeil, "Psychology and Aggression," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (September 1959), 203; and Kenneth E. Boulding, "Towards a Pure Theory of Threat Systems," *American Economic Review*, LIII (May 1963), 426.

[31] Harsanyi (fn. 10), 69.

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indicates some of these possibilities. Note that the table allows for variations in *A*'s behavior along the following dimensions: (1) type of sanction (positive or negative), (2) degree of probability that the sanction will be implemented, and (3) degree to which *A* is explicit in specifying his commitment. Although *A* must at least imply that he will behave differently if *B* complies than he would if *B* fails to comply, *A* may choose from a number of possible combinations. For example, *A* may say to *B*: "If you comply, I guarantee not to punish you and I may even reward you; but if you do not comply, I guarantee not to reward you and I may even punish you." The table makes sense, however, only if one distinguishes clearly between withholding a reward and punishing.

A's Options When Making Conditional Influence Attempt on *B*

If B complies	*If B does not comply*
no indication (you guess)	no indication (you guess)
may reward	may not reward
probably reward	probably not reward
guarantee reward	guarantee not to reward
may not punish	may punish
probably not punish	probably punish
guarantee not to punish	guarantee to punish

A clear distinction between the concepts of positive and negative sanctions can be drawn in terms of *B*'s expectations about his future value position. The possibility of making such a distinction, however, is not sufficient to justify doing so. As Cartwright points out, the study of power relations is already riddled with interminable theoretical distinctions.[32] The remainder of this paper will therefore be devoted to two propositions: (1) that positive and negative sanctions have different behavioral implications, and (2) that the difference is significant from the standpoint of political science.

III. Positive vs. Negative Sanctions: The Difference It Makes

The differences between positive and negative sanction situations are neither trivial nor obvious. Even though some of these not-so-obvious and not-so-trivial differences can be deduced from the logical opposi-

[32] Dorwin Cartwright, "Influence, Leadership, Control," in James March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago 1965), 4.

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tion of positive and negative sanctions, this is rarely done. Deduction, however, can only clarify some of the differences. Although positive and negative sanctions are opposites in logic, they are not opposites in their behavioral consequences.[33] Both *A* and *B* behave differently in positive sanction situations than they do in negative sanction situations. What follows is a survey of the more important hypothesized differences between such situations.

1. *A's burden of response.*—When *A*'s influence attempt is based on a promise, *B*'s compliance obligates *A* to respond with a reward; whereas *B*'s failure to comply calls for no further response from *A*.[34] Thus, a nation using threats will invest time and effort in planning its response to *B*'s noncompliance. Such a nation has little incentive to ponder what it will do if *B* complies, since compliance requires no response from *A*. In other words, threats provide an incentive for *A* to base its planning processes on the assumption that *B* will not cooperate. To the extent that nations (or other political groups) behave as other nations assume (or expect) they will behave, threats would seem to make compliance less likely. This is not a logical necessity, just a psychological probability. A nation using promises need not expect compliance, but it has an incentive to do so. The point is that *A*'s responsibilities and planning processes are different when he uses promises rather than threats.

2. *The role of costs.*—One important consequence of the asymmetry between positive and negative sanctions is that promises tend to cost more when they succeed, while threats tend to cost more when they fail.[35] Thus, threats and promises are related to the probability of success in different ways. The difference can be summarized as follows: The bigger the threat, the higher the probability of success; the higher the probability of success, the less the probability of having to implement the threat; the less the probability of having to implement the threat, the cheaper it is to make big threats. The bigger the promise, the higher the probability of success; the higher the probability of success, the higher the probability of having to implement the promise; the higher the probability of having to implement the promise, the more expensive it is to make big promises.[36] If *A* has doubts

[33] Cf. Thomas W. Milburn, "What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (June 1959), 139; and B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior* (New York 1953), 182-93.

[34] The asymmetry between positive and negative sanctions has been noted by Boulding (fn. 30), 428; and Parsons (fn. 5), 239.

[35] Schelling (fn. 24), *Strategy of Conflict*, 177.

[36] This assumes that other things remain equal. Two especially important assumptions are that cost varies directly with the risk of implementation and that the credi-

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about his ability to calculate the probability of success accurately, he may want to hedge. Whereas, with promises, hedging is likely to take the form of scaling down the promise, with threats, hedging is likely to take the form of building up the threat: too big a threat is likely to be superfluous rather than costly.[37]

3. *Propensity to use and prospects of success.*—Since *A*'s incentive to use promises instead of threats tends to increase as the probability of success decreases, one may hypothesize that *A* is more likely to use positive sanctions when he thinks his prospects of success are poor (*ceteris paribus*). This hypothesis suggests the need to re-examine some widely held opinions about the relationship between positive sanctions and political integration. Whereas the international political arena tends to be associated with anarchy and negative sanctions, the domestic political arena tends to be associated with integration and positive sanctions. Whereas the underworld tends to be associated with mutual distrust and negative sanctions, the overworld (?) tends to be associated with trust, good faith, and positive sanctions. Advocates of increased use of positive sanctions in international politics are often pictured as unrealistic dreamers who want to use influence techniques that are obviously unsuitable in the international arena. The above hypothesis, however, suggests that positive sanctions are more relevant to international than to domestic politics, to the underworld than to the overworld. Since the prospects for success are worse in the international and underworld arenas, the incentive to use positive sanctions instead of negative ones should be greater (assuming, of course, that other things are equal). In a well-integrated domestic polity, however, negative sanctions are more useful. It is only because of the high probability that most people will obey the law that governments can afford to enforce laws with threats. It is much cheaper to punish the few who disobey than to reward the many who obey.[38]

Negative sanctions are often associated with situations in which *A*'s influence attempt, if it succeeds, leaves *A* better off and *B* worse off than they would otherwise have been.[39] The above hypothesis suggests a re-examination. Other things being equal, *A*'s prospects of success are worse when he tries to promote improbable outcomes than when

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bility of a threat or promise is not affected by its size. Although either of these assumptions is questionable in other contexts, they do not seem to be directly related to differentiating between positive and negative sanctions.

[37] Schelling (fn. 24), *Strategy of Conflict*, 177.

[38] Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1968), 17-18.

[39] See, for example, Boulding (fn. 30), 426.

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he tries to promote probable ones.[40] One may also assume that there is a low autonomous probability that *B* will do things that are bad for him and a high autonomous probability that *B* will do things that are good for him. Thus, one may formulate the following syllogism: "The lower the probability that *X* is bad for *B*, the higher the autonomous probability that *B* will do *X*; the higher the autonomous probability that *B* will do *X*, the higher the probability that *A*'s attempt to get *B* to do *X* will succeed; the higher the probability of success, the more likely *A* is to use threats." Threats are most likely to be used in situations in which *A* is trying to make sure that *B* does something that *B* is quite likely to do anyway, e.g., refrain from murder, rape, larceny, or nuclear attack. It is not unlikely that *B* would agree that it is good for him to be deterred from such actions.

In practice there may be a difference between the actual probability that *A* will succeed and the probability perceived by *A*. There is some evidence that *A* will tend to overestimate the probability that his influence attempt will succeed.[41] This would partially explain what appears to be a bias toward using negative sanctions in actual practice.

4. *Indicators of success.*—Empirical observation of influence attempts based on threats and promises is tricky, since the indicators of success for each differ. Whereas a successful threat requires no action by *A*, a successful promise obligates him to implement the sanction. In a well-integrated social system, where the probability that *B* will comply with *A*'s wishes is relatively high, promises will be more visible than threats. In fact, it is precisely because threats are so successful in domestic politics that they are so difficult to detect.[42] One suspects that a lower rate of success makes threats more salient in international than in domestic politics. Let us assume that an equal number of threats and promises are made in the domestic and international political arenas (an unrealistic assumption). Let us further assume that the probability of success is lower in the international than the domestic realm (a realistic assumption). What will the empirical observer see? Whereas domestic life will appear harmonious and tranquil, international life will appear to be a war of all against all. The low rate of

[40] Cf. Deutsch (fn. 38), 26-27.

[41] Cf. Deutsch (fn. 13), 212-13; Ward Edwards, "Utility, Subjective Probability, Their Interaction and Variance Preferences," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (March 1962), 42-51; Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 454-79; and J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (June 1963), 426.

[42] This point has been noted by Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War* (New York 1964), 51-53.

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international compliance will activate negative sanctions and obviate positive ones, while the high rate of domestic compliance will activate positive sanctions and obviate negative ones. Thus, one may formulate the following hypothesis: "Empirical observers will tend to overestimate the role of threats relative to promises in international politics and to underestimate the role of threats relative to promises in domestic politics.[43]

5. *Deterrence.*—The asymmetrical way in which threats and promises are related to success helps to explain the tendency to associate negative sanctions with policies of deterrence. Logically, of course, one could just as well speak of deterring *B* (that is, reducing the probability that *B* will do *X*) with promises as with threats; for example, "I will give you a reward if you will refrain from doing *X*." Time and again, however, writers imply that deterrence is a matter of threats alone, or perhaps threats combined with promises, but never a matter of promises alone.[44] The connection between threats and deterrence is rarely explained, merely implied as a matter of truth—either intuitively obvious or definitional.

How does one explain this propensity to imply a special relationship between deterrence policies and negative sanctions? Consider three possible explanations: (1) Dictionary definitions of "deterrence" usually depict it as discouragement through fear. Such definitions make the concept of a deterrent promise a contradiction in terms. It is difficult to believe, however, that semantics can account for the United States government's reliance on threats rather than promises in order to lower the probability of Russian attack. (2) Talcott Parsons has

[43] There is probably a tendency to overestimate the importance of threats relative to promises in underworld politics also.

[44] For an example of explicit association of negative sanctions and deterrence, see Talcott Parsons (fn. 5), 239-40. Less explicit examples are Blau (fn. 6), 116-17; Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, IV (June 1960), 163-78; Richard A. Brody, "Deterrence," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IV (New York 1968), 130-32; Schelling (fn. 24). Schelling implies the association between threats and deterrence by the scant attention he gives to promises relative to threats. The association is also implied in observations such as the following: "It is a paradox of deterrence that in threatening to hurt somebody if he misbehaves, it need not make a critical difference how much it would hurt you too—*if* you can make him believe the threat." (*Arms and Influence*, p. 36.) This is *not* true of attempts to deter that are based on positive sanctions. It *is* true of all influence attempts based on conditional use of negative sanctions—regardless of whether such attempts seek to deter or compel. Thus the paradox should be called a paradox of negative sanctions, not a paradox of deterrence. A few writers have attempted to link positive sanctions with deterrence policies: See Milburn (fn. 33), 138-45; E. James Lieberman, "Threat and Assurance in the Conduct of Conflict," in Roger Fisher, ed., *International Conflict and Behavioral Science* (New York 1964), 110-22; and Jerome D. Frank, *Sanity and Survival* (New York 1967), 162-63.

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suggested that negative sanctions have more intrinsic effectiveness than positive sanctions in deterrence situations.[45] Parsons produces no evidence and very little argument to support this contention, however. (3) The asymmetrical way in which threats and promises are related to success offers another explanation. As Deutsch has pointed out, the autonomous probability of *B*'s doing *X* when *X* is defined as anything but *Y* is usually high relative to the autonomous probability of *B*'s doing *X* when *X* is defined as a narrowly specific act.[46] In other words, deterrence is usually a matter of promoting a highly probable outcome. As noted above, there is a special relationship between threats and situations in which *A*'s influence attempt is likely to succeed. Thus, the association of threats with policies of deterrence can be partially explained in terms of the broader special connection between threats and attempts by *A* to promote probable outcomes. *A* is likely to use threats rather than promises in attempting to deter *B* from doing *X* because the probability of success tends to be relatively high.

6. *B's immediate response.*—*B*'s immediate reaction to sticks usually differs from his immediate reaction to carrots. Whereas fear, anxiety, and resistance are typical responses to threats, the typical responses to promises are hope, reassurance, and attraction. Three important examples of the difference this can make are as follows: (1) threats cause *B* to feel stress, which is likely to affect (that is, enhance or impair) *B*'s problem-solving capacity, i.e., his rationality.[47] (2) Threats tend to generate resistance by *B*. Cartwright, and French and Raven, have suggested that it is useful to distinguish between opposition to an influence attempt and resistance generated by the influence attempt itself.[48] (3) Whereas positive sanctions tend to convey an impression of sympathy and concern for *B*'s needs, negative ones tend to convey an impression of indifference or actual hostility toward *B*. Cartwright argues that such impressions have a profound effect upon the outcome of any particular influence attempt.[49]

7. *After-effects and side-effects.*—Positive sanctions differ from negative ones not only in their immediate effect on *B*, but in their after- and side-effects on him as well. An important side-effect is the "spill-over effect" on *B*'s relations with *A* with respect to other issues. While positive sanctions tend to enhance *B*'s willingness to cooperate with

[45] Parsons (fn. 5), 239-40.
[46] Deutsch (fn. 38), 26-27.
[47] Singer (fn. 41), 429.
[48] Cartwright (fn. 32), 33-34; French and Raven (fn. 20), pp. 156-57.
[49] Cartwright (fn. 32), 15. On the importance of *B*'s perceptions of *A*'s motives see also Tedeschi (fn. 2), and H. H. Kelley, "Attribution Theory in Social Psychology," in D. Levine, ed., *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* (Lincoln 1967), 192-238.

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A on other issues, negative sanctions tend to impede such cooperation. For example, America's use of negative sanctions to fight communism increases the difficulty of simultaneous cooperation with Communist nations on cultural exchanges, international trade, and air pollution. Whereas the "spill-over effect" refers to the effect on *A*'s *concurrent* relations with *B*, the "scar effect" refers to the effect on *A*'s *future* relations with *B*. If *A* uses positive sanctions today, *B* will tend to be more willing to cooperate with *A* in the future, but if *A* uses negative sanctions today, *B* will tend to be less willing to cooperate with *A* in the future.[50] Today's choice by *A* between positive and negative sanctions affects not only today's response by *B*, but tomorrow's as well. Just as the memory of America's past interventions colors today's relations between Latin America and the United States, so the memory of Russia's intervention will color relations between Czechoslovakia and the USSR for years to come. Likewise, the memory of American influence attempts in Vietnam will play an important part in international politics long after the shooting has stopped.

8. *Legitimation.*—It is usually easier to legitimize demands based on positive sanctions than demands based on negative ones.[51] An example is provided by one of the most important social institutions in the world—the institution of private property. Most societies have one set of rules specifying the conditions under which a man may be deprived of his property and quite a different set of rules specifying conditions under which a man's property may be augmented. In general, these rules make it much easier for *A* to add to *B*'s property than to subtract from it. The man who threatens to deprive *B* forcibly of $10 if he fails to do *X* is likely to wind up in jail. The man who offers *B* $10 to do *X* may not succeed, but he is less likely to be jailed.

The international political arena may be an exception to the general rule on legitimation. It is true, of course, that aggressive warfare is illegal while foreign aid is not. But it is also true that many people would view deterring nuclear attack by a threat to retaliate in kind as more moral than deterring nuclear attack by offering a bribe to the potential attacker. Likewise, the contemporary mores of statecraft seem to make it more moral to drop napalm on a man to prevent him from becoming a Communist than to bribe him to do the same thing.

[50] On the "scar effect" see Cartwright (fn. 32), 35-36; French and Raven (fn. 20), 156-58; Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II (December 1958), 265-79; John R. Raser, "Learning and Affect in International Politics," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 3 (1965), 216-26; and Bertram H. Raven and Arie H. Kruglanski, "Conflict and Power," in Paul Swingle, ed., *The Structure of Conflict* (New York 1970), 69-109.

[51] French and Raven (fn. 20), 156-60; Dahl and Lindblom (fn. 18), 107-108.

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A useful research project could focus on comparing the relative ease of legitimating demands based on positive sanctions in the domestic arena with the legitimation of such demands in the international arena.

9. *Symbolic importance.*—Negative sanctions have become psychologically linked with such characteristics as courage, honor, and masculinity. Soldiers, not diplomats, symbolize masculine virtues. In international politics these psychological links are especially pronounced. The statesman who would use positive sanctions risks being perceived by both foreigners and his domestic public as soft, weak, or lacking in toughness. When the North Koreans seized the *Pueblo*, it was "unthinkable" that President Johnson would offer to buy it back. National honor was at stake. It is "honorable" to fight but "dishonorable" to try to buy one's way out of a fight. My purpose here is neither to condemn nor to condone the symbolic functions of positive and negative sanctions; it is merely to note that there is a difference between their psychological functions in politics.

10. *Human nature.*—The propensity to use either positive or negative sanctions is partially determined by *A*'s view of human nature. It has been hypothesized that those who view man as basically lazy, wishing to avoid responsibility, and desirous of security above all else are more likely to emphasize negative sanctions than are those with a more optimistic view of human nature.[52] Regardless of the viability of this particular hypothesis, it seems worthwhile to explore the correlation between views of human nature and propensities to use positive or negative sanctions.

11. *Efficacy.*—The relative effectiveness of positive and negative sanctions in getting *B* to do *X* has been the focus of much research in psychology.[53] Although the precise conditions under which one type of sanction is more effective than the other have yet to be spelled out, it is quite unlikely that positive and negative sanctions will be equally effective in any given influence attempt. The tendency of po-

[52] Cartwright (fn. 32), 13-15.

[53] No attempt to cite this vast literature will be made here. For interesting starting points and further references see Blau (fn. 6), 224-27; Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Michael D. Cohen, "Threats and Bargaining Efficiency," Behavioral Science, XIV (March 1969), 147-53; Skinner (fn. 33), 182-93; Tedeschi (fn. 2), 162-91; Herbert C. Kelman, "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II (March 1958), 51-60; and Kenneth Ring and Harold H. Kelley, "A Comparison of Augmentation and Reduction as Modes of Influence," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LXVI (February 1963), 95-102. For one of the few attempts by a political scientist to comment on the asymmetrical effectiveness of positive and negative sanctions, see Denis G. Sullivan, "Towards an Inventory of Major Propositions Contained in Contemporary Textbooks in International Relations" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1963), pp. 127-40.

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litical scientists to assume *a priori* that negative sanctions work better than positive ones is not justified.

A more obvious difference between the efficacy of positive and negative sanctions concerns specific types of goals that are attainable by one means but not by the other. A sadist will find it difficult to attain his goals with positive sanctions. Those who seek love, affection, respect, friendship, dignity, or solidarity may find them impossible to attain through negative sanctions. Many kinds of human relationships can be destroyed but not created by negative sanctions.[54]

12. *Systemic stability.*—If *A* rewards *B*, then *B* is more likely to reward *A* when he gets the chance (*ceteris paribus*). He who uses negative sanctions is more likely to have negative sanctions used on him. He who lives by negative sanctions is likely to die by them. George Homans has suggested that the tendency of rewards to spawn more rewards, and of punishment to spawn more punishment, affects systemic stability: "While the exchange of rewards tends toward stability and continued interaction, the exchange of punishments tends toward instability and the eventual failure of interaction in escape and avoidance. . . ."[55] Kenneth Boulding suggests that another reason for the relative instability of systems based on negative sanctions is that harm can be done much faster than good. He adds as a corollary that, over the long run, more good can be done than harm. There is a limit of total deprivation on the extent to which negative sanctions can be employed. After all, *A* cannot deprive *B* of what he does not have. Positive sanctions, however, are different since there is no upper limit on the amount by which *A* may reward *B*.[56]

13. *Surveillance.*—Influence attempts based solely on negative sanctions provide *B* with no incentive to comply with *A*'s demands if *B* can find a way to avoid detection. This fact, together with the relative difficulty of legitimizing influence attempts based on negative sanctions, means that *A* must spend more on specialized machinery for monitoring *B*'s activities when he uses negative instead of positive sanctions.[57]

[54] This paragraph draws on Dahl and Lindblom (fn. 18), 108.

[55] George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (London 1961), 57. Cf. Sullivan (fn. 53), 267-71.

[56] Boulding (fn. 30), 432.

[57] Dahl and Lindblom (fn. 18), 107-108; Ring and Kelley (fn. 53), 95-102; John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York 1959), 105, 242-44. Thibaut and Kelley argue that *A* need not monitor *B*'s activities at all when using positive sanctions, since *B* can be counted on to present evidence of compliance to *A* if *A* is using promises and not threats. This is carrying the argu-

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14. *Blackmail.*—Habitual use of positive sanctions is more likely to encourage blackmail attempts than is habitual use of negative sanctions.[58] If a man has a reputation for buying off those who oppose him, other people have an incentive to place themselves in conflict with him in order that they may benefit by being bought off. It is the belief that positive sanctions are possible and the hope that they will be forthcoming that motivates blackmailers. It is sometimes suggested, perhaps in jest, that poor nations have an incentive to create or maintain an internal Communist threat in order to qualify for foreign aid from the United States. However that may be, there appears to be little or no incentive to try to blackmail someone who has demonstrated convincingly that he is either unable or unwilling to reward the blackmailer. Poor people don't get blackmailed; rich people do.

The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to show that there are a number of differences between positive and negative sanction situations. One can better predict, explain, prescribe, and describe the behavior of *A* and *B* if one is aware of these differences.

IV. Conclusion

The most important question of all remains to be answered: "So what?" Before taking up this question, however, it would be well to clarify what I have *not* attempted to do in this paper. First, I have made no attempt to "prove" that the literature of political science tends to ignore positive sanctions. Although I cited a few examples from important works, these were illustrations rather than proof. For the most part, the bias against positive sanctions in the literature of political science has been assumed. Second, I have offered little in the way of an explanation as to why such a bias exists. Is it due to the influence of Weber, or Lasswell and Kaplan, to a desire to be considered "realistic" enough to look the unpleasant fact of negative sanctions in the eye, to a fascination with violence, or to something

ment too far. Consider first the possibility that *B* may comply with *A*'s demands, yet fail to present *A* with evidence of compliance for any or all of the following reasons: (1) incompetence; (2) misperception of *A*'s intentions and/or of the degree of his own compliance; (3) reluctance to incur the costs of gathering such evidence. Since the credibility of his future promises to *C, D, E,* and *F* is affected by the way *A appears* to treat *B, A* may not want to allow *B*'s compliance to go unrewarded no matter how incompetent or reluctant *B* is to present evidence of compliance. Consider also the possibility that *B* may present *A* with falsified evidence of compliance. Without a surveillance system of his own, *A* will have no way of checking up on *B*'s honesty. Although positive sanctions present *A* with less difficult surveillance problems, they do not do away with such problems altogether.

[58] Cf. Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, XIX (April 1967), 380.

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else? No answer is suggested here. Third, I have not presented systematically gathered empirical findings about the behavioral consequences of using positive or negative sanctions in politics. Indeed, one of the main goals of this paper is to stimulate precisely this kind of empirical research.[59] In the absence of such findings, I have suggested the behavioral differences between carrots and sticks hypothesized above by deduction, by borrowing the findings about nonpolitical spheres of social life from other disciplines, and by intuitive observation. Although the fourteen behavioral differences presented above are often phrased as factual assertions, they should be treated as tentative hypotheses to be tested for their applicability to politics.

Why does it matter whether political scientists neglect positive sanctions or not? After all, we could distinguish between blonde and brunette political actors, but we do not. Additional distinctions mean additional variables, and we already have more variables than we know what to do with. If we treat both rewards and punishments as opportunity costs to *B*, then we have reduced two variables to one, thus providing a more "economical explanation." The problem is that the concept of opportunity costs economizes without explaining. When *B* reacts one way to a promise of $100 if he will do *X*, and another way to a threat to deprive him of $100 if he fails to do *X*, the concept of opportunity costs makes it difficult to explain why. The most important reason why the distinction between positive and negative sanctions ought to matter to political scientists is that it matters to both *A* and *B*. Because both *A* and *B* are likely to behave differently toward positive sanctions than toward negative ones, those who purport to describe, explain, and predict political behavior cannot afford to ignore the distinction between the two kinds of sanctions.

Granted that political scientists ought to consider positive sanctions, why insist that the concept of "power" be broad enough to include them? Why not use the label "power" to refer to influence attempts based on negative sanctions and invent another label for influence attempts based on positive sanctions? Blau and Parsons, after all, do not ignore positive sanctions; they simply exclude them from their definition of power. The problem is that, for political scientists, "power" is not just another term to be defined; it is a term that—whether we like it or not—occupies a unique place in political analysis. For many political scientists, the concept of power is the most funda-

[59] For a concurring opinion that social scientists have said little about the role of positive sanctions in politics, see *ibid.*, 414; and Galtung, "On the Meaning of Nonviolence," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 3 (1965), 239-42.

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mental in the whole of the discipline.[60] Even those who would do away with the term "power" altogether are willing to admit that it is too deeply imbedded in the vocabulary of politics for this to happen.[61] Because political scientists do not and will not regard power as "just another word," it is desirable to define power broadly enough to include positive sanctions. Positive sanctions cannot get separate but equal treatment from political scientists; positive sanctions must therefore be integrated with the concept of power.

The neglect of positive sanctions in political analysis has consequences for public policy as well as for political theory. As Harsanyi has pointed out, "one of the main purposes for which social scientists use the concept of *A*'s power over *B* is for the description of the policy possibilities open to *A*."[62] Today, more than ever before, it is essential that we be able to describe the full range of *A*'s options, not just those options based on negative sanctions, for today the unwise use of negative sanctions may put an end to all life, political or otherwise. The nuclear age has not brought an end to influence attempts; indeed, it appears that man's continued survival will require more and more social control. In such a world there will be an increasing need for "imagination when it comes to inventing positive sanctions."[63] The discipline of political science (but not necessarily each member of that discipline) has a duty to make it clear—to make it unmistakably clear—to policy makers that *A* can often get *B* to do *X* with positive sanctions as well as with negative ones. On this issue the requirements of sound theory appear to coincide with those of sound policy.

[60] Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 1), 75.
[61] See Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton 1962), 141.
[62] Harsanyi (fn. 10), 69.
[63] Galtung (fn. 59), 242. Cf. Skinner (fn. 33), 345-46; and Roger Fisher, *International Conflict for Beginners* (New York 1969).

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THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON

By COLIN S. GRAY*

Definitions and Functions

SINCE the 1850's there has been intermittent but always renewed interest on the part of politicians, academics, and journalists in the particular aspect of interstate rivalry generally termed an "arms race." Despite the longevity of concern and the eclecticism of approach, the prime impetus behind the inquiry that has resulted in this article is the sad truth that aside from somewhat banal and highly questionable hypotheses we really know very little about arms race phenomena. This analysis will attempt a systematic investigation of some of the most important aspects of the subject.

It is organized for inquiry into the following areas: typology, strategies, outcomes, and hypothetical explanations of the dynamic elements driving the phenomenon.

Two observations must preface an attempt at definition. It should be noted that arms races do not occur only between states or coalitions of states. Those whose eyes are firmly fixed on the great issues of interstate politics tend to neglect intrastate violence and preparations for violence. This is probably the mundane yet correct explanation for the interstate focus of practically all writing related to arms races. The concurrent arming of the Ulster and Irish Volunteers between 1910 and 1914 would appear to be as clear a case of a competitive arms relationship as we could wish for. Second, in practice it is extremely difficult to distinguish between decisions taken primarily to have effect upon the external, competitive arms situation of a state and those decisions that are taken primarily for domestic reasons.[1] However, these decisions, whether externally or internally induced, may properly be regarded as being of importance to the arms race. An arms race competitor, seeking a particular state of military balance, will probably not be able to ignore an opponent's activity on the ground that he believes it to be inward- as opposed to outward-looking.[2]

* For their helpful comments upon an earlier draft of this article, I would like to express my thanks to my former colleagues at Lancaster University, England, particularly to Martin Edmonds, David Holloway, Peter Nailor, and David Travers.

[1] This complication is explored in Bruce M. Russett, *What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense* (New Haven 1970), particularly 13, 178.

[2] This point refers to the classic dilemma of intentions versus capability. It would seem to me that, in the current superpower arms race, defense decisions taken to appease domestic lobbies may have the same consequences as if they were unambig-

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At this juncture it is sensible to make a very minimal condition for the existence of an arms race relationship; notably, that there should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a *rapid* rate and structuring their respective military postures with a *general* attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties.[3] In short, actors may march to the beat of their own drums and pursue a logic of military development and deployment that is strictly domestic; but this activity may serve as an arms race "trigger" for other actors. Indeed, it can be argued that a competition may be sustained at a high level and accelerated by the fact that the parties do not share a common strategic logic.

Today the superpowers are locked into a deterrent relationship, the stability of which depends upon their both maintaining a sufficiency of military preparation. However, the Soviet notion of sufficiency may include the deployment of MIRV and ABM technologies for the missions of preemption and homeland defense. American doctrine does not currently list these missions as being desirable. As indicated in the definition, the military preparations of an arms "racing" state will be conducted with a general concern for the activities of certain preselected parties. A rigid pattern in the action-reaction of competitive armament as a limiting definition of the arms race phenomenon should not be implied; such a hypothesis is simply one explanation of the possible reasoning behind arms expenditure.[4]

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uously competitive in the arms race context. A somewhat more optimistic view is provided by N. Petersen, "The Arms Race Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defences," in C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup, eds., *Implications of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems*, Pugwash Monograph II (London 1969), 40.

[3] Alternative definitions may be found in *ibid.*, 40; Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Pre-Requisites and Results," in Carl S. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds., *Public Policy, 1958* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958), 41; Arthur L. Burns, "A Graphical Approach to Some Problems of the Arms Race," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (December 1959), 326; Urs Schwarz and Laszlo Hadik, *Strategic Terminology: A Trilingual Glossary* (New York 1966), 35; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1968/69* [hereafter cited as *SIPRI Yearbook*] (Stockholm 1969), 44. The definitions of these authors are all too exclusive; Huntington and Burns stress the interstate nature of arms race phenomena, Schwarz and Hadik require participants to endeavor to stay ahead in the race, and the SIPRI authors equate an arms race with the "action-reaction phenomenon."

[4] The debate over the various ABM decisions announced by the U.S. Government since September 1967 has drawn attention to the possible role of different kinds of Soviet-American interactive patterns in strategic armaments. The strongest statement endorsing an action-reaction interpretation of the superpower arms race is to be found in George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," *Scientific American*, CCXX (April 1969), particularly the diagram on 24. On the other side, consider-

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There is so much confusion attaching to arms race definitions that it may be helpful to clarify the broad definition offered above by listing the basic conditions for an arms race.

(1) There must be two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism.
(2) They must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, the other arms race participants.
(3) They must compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and/or quality (men, weapons, organization, doctrine, deployment).
(4) There must be rapid increases in quantity and/or improvements in quality.

All four of these factors must be present for there to be any valid assertion that a particular relationship is an arms race.

The question of the genesis of arms races is one that merits some attention. Leaving aside the option of a disarmed neutrality, in seeking national security a state will either pursue supporting alliances or it will seek to amass armaments, essentially within its own territory. This simple ideal typology must allow for two qualifications. First, the choice of roads to the national security is, by and large, a forced one; second, state policy will probably be mixed—that is to say, there will be a measure both of alliance acquisition and of armaments increase. Naturally, this discussion refers to a group of decision-makers who perceive an adversary and decide that measures for defense must be taken. At least in theory, we can conceive of a ruling élite deciding upon the pursuit of a competitive arms policy in order to attain glory, prestige, domestic political tranquillity, or the enrichment of domestic industrial allies. The problem that is in need of empirical investigation is why states have in fact offered and accepted arms race challenges.

It is possible that an arms race might develop without there being any driving political antagonisms. A quite autonomous arms increase may be matched by a fairly disinterested party, solely as a precautionary move, and hence a cycle of close or intermittent armament interactions and previously unappreciated political antagonisms may ensue. Prior to the opening rounds of an arms race, the eventual competitors

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able scepticism concerning the action-reaction cycle may be found in Laurence W. Martin, *Ballistic Missile Defence and the Alliance*, The Atlantic Papers (Paris 1969), 25; William T. Lee, "The Rationale Underlying Soviet Strategic Forces," 142-78, and Richard B. Foster, "The Safeguard BMD Proposal and Arms Control Prospects for the 1970's," 242-77, in William R. Kintner, ed., *Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense* (New York 1969); Jeremy J. Stone, "When and How to Use 'SALT,'" *Foreign Affairs*, XLVIII (January 1970), 262-73.

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are not in a situation of zero armaments. Every arms race opens with a particular ratio of military forces. The importance of existing disparities in arms levels for the decision to engage in a race must await further investigation.

On those many occasions when reliable allies are not available, states have been encouraged either to issue an arms race challenge, or to accelerate previously low-gear arms race activity, following upon an apparent military-technological opportunity. This opportunity may take the form of diminished activity by the rival or, more likely, the successful development of a technology that offers to negate, or render of less significance, an existing quantitative or qualitative imbalance. As examples of this, we could cite France versus England in the 1840's and 1850's; Germany versus England after 1906; and the Soviet Union's missile development and procurement policy in the middle 1950's and from 1963 to 1970.

This last example is a very contentious one. It has been argued that the great increase and improvement in the Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) apparent in the late 1960's reflected decisions taken in the period 1961–1965.[5] Thus, the building programs have reflected a sustained determination to match and perhaps to out-build the United States. A different interpretation would be that the Soviet Union was encouraged to challenge the American lead by the quantitative restraint shown by the Americans after 1964. This latter view is a direct repudiation of the idea that an arms race may be restrained by the operation of a "sympathetic parallelism."[6]

With regard to the functions of a competition, we may choose to view an arms race as an alternative to war, to be planned, waged, and then won or lost—with due reward or punishment. A more apocalyptic view would be that an arms race is not an alternative to war, but is a preparation for war. Thus, instead of an arms race being a bloodless ritual of preparation,[7] it is a race for that measure of military superiority that would allow for the exploitation of arms race victory in war-waging success.

The choice of an overall view of an arms race is directly dependent upon the major empirical referents. The introduction of nuclear

[5] See Lee (fn. 4), 168-71, and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore 1970), chap. 16.

[6] *Ibid.*, 503-504; Lee (fn. 4), 147; Foster (fn. 4), 259-60.

[7] Paul Smoker, "Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathematical Study," in James Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York 1969), 579.

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weapons has made a very considerable difference to the conduct of an arms race. Indeed, one leading interpreter of Lewis Richardson's theory of arms races has developed Richardson's idea of submissiveness, originally applied to the inter-war period, with the argument that nuclear weapons have introduced an unprecedented fear factor into the post-1945 nuclear arms race.[8] However, even if we grant the quantum jumps in the time-scale of contemporary war and the destruction that could be imposed by nuclear weapons, it would still be a gross oversimplification to assert that prior to 1945 arms races were more often than not serious preparations for war, whereas since 1945 arms races involving nuclear powers are essentially a form of diplomatic activity, remote from considerations of the conduct and termination of war. Two vital complications must be noted. First, competition in missiles, since at least 1959, bears an important resemblance to races between land forces prior to 1945. Both kinds of races are what can be termed "damped" or "non-self-aggravating" arms races.[9] In other words, the needed ratio of offense to defense is such that a strategy of militarily exploitable superiority is prohibitively expensive.[10] The traditional ratio required for offensive land force success was 3:1, and the requirement for a successful nuclear first strike has, since the mutual Soviet and American deployments of second-strike missiles, been equally difficult to attain. The relatively low cost

[8] *Ibid.*, 573. Arms races comprise a single class of phenomena in international relations and (with due caution) a comparative analysis of different arms races will yield a measure of general wisdom. With respect to the empirical base of the article, the bulk of the historical illustrations refers to the following arms races: England-France and Russia (naval, 1884–1904, with Italian, German, and Austro-Hungarian complications); England-Germany (naval, Phase I, 1898–1905, Phase II, 1906–1914); England-United States-Japan (naval, 1918–1922, with many complications—principally respecting France and Italy; also, it could be argued that the nature of the Washington Treaty restrictions caused a redirection rather than a termination of the race); Soviet Union-United States (all categories of armaments, from 1946 to the present, with Chinese complications after 1964). Other races are very briefly mentioned in the text. A detailed inventory of arms races, by type, awaits the attention of a further study. As may be deduced from the breadth of the definition offered in the text, the arms race phenomenon is far more prevalent than many students of politics will commonly allow. See Huntington (fn. 3), and Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, II (Chicago 1942), 690. Itemization is dependent upon definition. Huntington's "duel" focus for arms races and Wright's insistence upon the "general" nature of recent races renders the empirical bases of both works somewhat suspect to me.

[9] See Malcolm W. Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," *World Politics*, XIII (July 1961), 515.

[10] Provided the word "exploitable" is qualified, it presents no problems. However, a Senate Report in 1968 referred to the unqualified and mystifying notion of "exploitable superiority." See U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, *Status of U.S. Strategic Power* [hereafter cited as *Status of U.S. Strategic Power*], 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington 1968), 3.

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to the defense of offsetting an offensive build-up has been a stabilizing factor in the superpower arms race.

The second complication is related to uncertainty concerning the arms race views of the Soviet leadership. In the current superpower arms race, the idea of its being more a ritual than a preparation for war has been steadfastly resisted by the Soviet military and also, inferentially, by Soviet politicians. This point is indicated by the kinds of defense preparation the military have been permitted to develop and maintain, and reflects the fact that if the arms race is largely a ritual competition governed by such factors as military-industrial interests and possibly unforeseen technical advances and mutual misperception, then this entire field of endeavor must be labelled wasteful and irrelevant or, at worst, positively harmful to the national security. Consciously or unconsciously, Soviet arms race strategy has stressed preparation for war, even to the extent of pursuing lines of development, procurement, and doctrine that, according to Western theory, could only aggravate the arms race. Examples of this point have been the apparent Soviet indifference to America's "assured-destruction" requirements by the pursuit of active missile and passive population defenses. Also, there is no evidence that Soviet leaders are reluctant to develop and deploy multiple warheads on the grounds of arms race "instability." The basic Soviet position would appear to be that the almost exclusively offensive deterrence doctrine of the United States in the 1960's was a great mistake, comparable with similarly mistaken strategies in the past that stressed a single combination of arms (for example, *Blitzkrieg*). Soviet military doctrine holds that so long as nuclear war is possible, indeed we might say probable, then only a balanced offense-defense strategic-force posture can hope to insure the survival of Soviet society. It is not too extreme to maintain that the Soviet military leadership has never convincingly denied the possibility of victory in a nuclear war.

It may perhaps be granted that the Soviet Union plans to employ its strategic forces only in a defensive mode, that is, in a preemptive or a second strike. However, the ritual view of the arms race does not exclude the possibility that crisis behavior may be influenced by individual perceptions of relative strategic positions, calculated possibly in crude arithmetic, or by feelings that are quite unrelated to prospective success in war. In short, the ritual of war-preparation, though (at least in the West) distant from considerations of the conduct of war, may be far from meaningless.

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An Arms Race Typology

The term "typology" may be the source of some confusion. I do not suggest that there are ten types of arms races. My argument is that every arms race is capable of being analyzed in terms of each category of distinction. Thus the potential number of types of arms race is the number of different combinations of features that can be extracted from the ten categories. This number of types of arms race is greatly enlarged by the certainty that some competitors will have distinctive features in their arms race behavior. For example, one competitor may be racing in only a single weapon category, and another competitor may decide that prudence indicates the value of acquiring a mix of quite distinct types of weapon.

(1) numbers: bilateral/multilateral/bilateral "connected" (open system)/unilateral

An argument given considerable prominence by Samuel Huntington was to the effect that there could be no such thing as a general arms race; that in fact all races were duels.[11] This line of thinking holds that any appearance of multilateral complexity disguises a series of duels. The course of post-World War II international relations, down to the explosion of China's first atomic bomb in October, 1964, inclines the contemporary analyst to a position of sympathy for the bilateral argument. However, the prospect for the 1970's is that the international system will have to accommodate an increasingly tri-polar nuclear balance.[12] Donald Watt has demonstrated convincingly, from the evidence of the 1920's and 1930's, that all arms races are not necessarily bilateral.[13] Even if we use Samuel Huntington's empirical base, the evidence of Britain's naval relations with France and Russia, and the naval relations of France with Italy and Germany in the early 1890's, suggest a complexity of naval building standards that defies an exclusively bilateral interpretation.[14]

The possibility of a bilateral "connected" or open system arms race refers to a situation in which there are only two adversaries, building in the relevant categories of weapons only against each other, whose

[11] Huntington (fn. 3), 42.

[12] This possibility has been well-explored by Harry Gelber, "The Impact of Chinese ICBM's on Strategic Deterrence," in Kintner (fn. 4), 179-206.

[13] Donald C. Watt, "The Possibility of a Multilateral Arms Race: A Note," *International Relations*, II (October 1962), 372-77, 397.

[14] See Sir Herbert Richmond, *Sea Power in the Modern World* (London 1934), 123.

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bilateral competition may be stimulated by a series of trigger-events originating quite beyond the system of their arms competition. This view is easier to sustain if we are analyzing some gross and undifferentiated measure of defense preparedness (for example, percentage of GNP allocated to or expended upon defense functions), rather than one or several categories of major weapon systems. It should be noted that no set of arms race adversaries can conduct their external and domestic policies as if they lived in a "two-person" world. Other conflicts may trigger a preparedness reaction. An interesting development of this argument is the widely acknowledged budgetary phenomenon of "fair shares." Thus, it is conceivable that for the sake of bureaucratic harmony the Air Force might receive a "compensation package" (possibly of arms race relevance) because the Army and the Navy have expanded to fight a distant limited war.

The final possibility among these distinctions of numerical arms race participation is the apparent absurdity of a unilateral arms race. This possibility could refer to a situation in which one side was "spurting" toward a level of strength proclaimed by the other to be sufficient. The unilateral nature of the race would of course be spurious. For a time the party currently ahead could eschew quantitative competition, but might, and probably would, be pursuing a qualitative competition so as to secure a favorable technological and industrial position for the next round. Also, there have been situations in which a power felt bound to compete with an adversary who built to a legally predetermined rhythm and who consistently denied that it was racing. The fixed tempo of building provided by the German Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 and the Supplementary Laws of 1906, 1908, and 1912 placed Great Britain, at least superficially, in the position of conducting a unilateral arms race against an adversary not susceptible to "panics" or "holiday" proposals.[15]

(2) QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE/QUALITATIVE-QUANTITATIVE

Logic requires that the distinction be sharply drawn in theory between quantitative and qualitative races.[16] However, for an analysis to have any contemporary relevance it must be stated clearly that all arms

[15] Among the most helpful guides to Anglo-German naval rivalry are Jonathan Steinberg, *Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet* (London 1965); E. L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (London 1964, first publ. 1935) and Arthur Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, I: *The Road to War, 1904-1914* (London 1961).

[16] See Huntington (fn. 3), 65-79.

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races have had both quantitative and qualitative aspects.[17] A race between rival research and development communities would be no arms race. The 1968 Senate Report, *Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, made this point very forcefully. "Forces in being are required to deter a potential aggressor. Pursuit of R and D to develop options and hedges against future threats is a logical and economical approach to the problem, but such options are only the raw material for the hard decisions on deployment."[18]

The definitions of arms race phenomena that stress the minimum condition of there being a competitive increment in armaments are committing an important error. For example, although a state's ICBM inventory might show no increment over a period of years, as a result of "product improvement," the capability of this inventory might have been very substantially enhanced. This comment is applicable to an analysis of the succession of models of the Minuteman and Polaris missiles. In practice, the quantitative and qualitative aspects of an arms race interact in an intricate manner. It might be argued that a race marked by a rapid succession in generations of weapons is not a qualitative race, but is a series of reasonably distinct quantitative races.[19] However, such an assertion would be misleading in its attempt to understate the importance of technical improvement.

One's view as to the dominance of the quantitative or of the qualitative element in arms races is a direct result of the empirical base selected. The belief of Samuel Huntington that most arms races are likely to be single-weapon races[20] rests upon the fact that there are periods, perhaps lasting several years, in which the design of the most advanced weaponry is in a state of flux, followed by relatively long periods of quantitative competition based upon the qualitative plateau attained. This argument would term Anglo-German naval rivalry from 1905 to 1914 an essentially quantitative race, despite the introduction of the Dreadnought and the super-Dreadnought, with greater displacement, with a heavier caliber of main armament, a different fuel (oil instead of coal), and a greater speed. Similarly, notwith-

[17] "Today's 'arms race' is qualitative rather than quantitative." This comment by Dr. Edward Teller would be endorsed by most contemporary strategic analysts. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs, *Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems*, [hereafter cited as *Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems*], Hearings, Part II, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 517. See also *SIPRI Yearbook* (fn. 3), chap. 2.

[18] *Status of U.S. Strategic Power* (fn. 10), 2.

[19] Huntington (fn. 3), 71.

[20] *Ibid.*, 52.

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standing the disruptive undercurrents of multiple-warhead and ABM technologies, the period from 1961 to 1970 might be characterized as a period of competitive quantitative increase in the second and third generations of the ICBM. Such a lofty disdain for improvements of models and such a one-dimensional view would do considerable violence to history.

A footnote of practical relevance here is that, although it may not stand out in traditional measures of arms race progress, competition in strategic doctrine, and the changes in organization and equipment to which it can lead, has been an almost totally neglected aspect of qualitative rivalry.

A possibility that incorporates features of both quantitative and qualitative rivalry is that of an extended deployment race. In other words, the overall size of the rival arsenals may remain static and the models may not have been improved, but there may be a race to establish, initially, a "presence" in a region, and eventually there may be competitive regional increases in quantities of weapons.

(3) PARTICIPANTS: INTER-ADVERSARY/INTER-ALLIED/INTER-SERVICE/INTER-GROUP

One of the most fruitful questions to ask is, "Between whom are arms races run?" The obvious and standard answer is, "Between mutually perceived potential enemies." It is worth noting that arms race behavior is also discernible in the relations among formal allies, among "sister" services, and among organized groups within the same society.

For the inputs of manpower and treasure required by arms competition, the outputs of goal-satisfaction in competition between allies may be enhanced authority within the alliance, or attractiveness (as opposed to rival, less well-armed contenders) to potential ally-recruiters.

It may be argued that the most unambiguous example of qualitative weapons competition lies not in interstate relations, but in the relations of the development programs of "sister" armed services. In such a competition, the quality of the weapon, admittedly among other less reputable criteria, should result in a budgetary victory reflected in favorable decisions about procurement and operating responsibility.[21] Even a brief glance at the relations between the United States Army

[21] For a case study of just such an example see Michael H. Armacost, *The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy* (New York 1969).

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and Air Force since 1955 provides an abundance of illustration for this argument.

Finally, we should not ignore intrasocietal arms competition, although the data on armaments for this area of inquiry are extremely elusive and difficult to interpret. Interesting examples of competitive arms relationships are discernible in the contemporary United States. Militant Black Power groups and the police have been arming and counterarming for urban guerrilla warfare for several years. Indeed, one study has gone so far as to refer to a racial arms race.[22]

(4) EXPENDITURE: ANNUAL ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP INCREASING/ANNUAL INCREASE IN ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE INCREASING/ANNUAL ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE STABLE/ANNUAL ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE DECREASING

These distinctions offer a different view to the focus upon weapons in most historical studies of arms race behavior. They derive, in part, from the mathematical theory of arms races developed by Lewis F. Richardson. Fundamental to the Richardson argument are the propositions that each side increases its armaments in proportion to the absolute level of the other side, that level being taken as the measure of that state's hostility, and that there will be no time-lag between the perception of hostility and the reaction to it. The effect of perceived hostility upon the rate of increase of armaments will be reinforced by a constant "grievance" factor. In other words, there is an assumption of the interlocking nature of weapons decisions. It may be useful to expand upon the writings of Gustave Le Bon and Harold Lasswell and to characterize Richardson's arms race theory as being descriptive of a form of "crowd behavior."[23] In the Richardson theory, gross, undifferentiated defense statistics—the level of hostility—and trade statistics—the measures of friendliness—are both taken as reflecting predictable psychological reactions to the activities of the adversary.

Richardson's achievements include a series of writings that display both a paramount concern for the scientific, quantitative investigation of the behavior of large numbers of individuals (crowds) and a profound moral concern for the unintended consequences of blind psychological reactions. More specifically, he developed a series of equations that have inspired the inquiries and methodology of a large number of devoted, though critical, followers. Also, he made explicit

[22] Martin Oppenheimer, *Urban Guerrilla* (London 1970, first publ. 1969), chap. 7.
[23] Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd* (New York 1960, first publ. 1895); Harold Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York 1965, first publ. 1935), 63, fn. 10.

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in his model the basic interdependence of arms expenditures, a premise that underlies all writings on arms races—though there is argument regarding the directness and the nature of the reciprocity. Furthermore, he both developed an explicitly dynamic model and sought to cut through the potential looseness of verbal identification and analysis of the variables and parameters by concentrating upon those elements he believed could be quantified.

The theoretically separable categories of arms races identified in this section may be useful for countries whose official statistics are reliable, but they are obviously of far less utility for any analysis concerning the Soviet Union.[24] Furthermore, the action-reaction basis for the Richardson equations is highly questionable as an exclusive explanation of arms races. It would seem that the analysis of total defense statistics is far too blunt an instrument of inquiry to be very useful.[25] It may be interesting to note, for a particular set of arms race adversaries, the facts concerning total increase of armaments and percentage of GNP expended upon defense or per capita military expenditure, but a large segment of the defense budget may be quite irrelevant to the arms race. In other words, "internal" or imperial policing duties may distort a budget that, according to the theory, should be a reflection of popular "major adversary-directed" hostility.

Behind the first two distinctions looms the Richardsonian identification of stable, as opposed to unstable, arms races. An unstable race is one in which the parties move, at an accelerating rate, away from a point of defense-expenditure equilibrium. "The two great European arms races of 1909–1914 and 1933–39 have been called unstable because, the more the contestants spent, the more rapidly they increased their expenditure."[26]

Richardson believed that it is in arms races in which the annual increase in armaments expenditure is increasing that the risk of war approaches the level of a certainty. This conclusion he "proves" by a presentation of the arms race statistics for 1909–1914 and 1933–1939.

As an indicator of threat-perception, the level of expenditure and

[24] See the Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1969-1970* (London 1969), 5; *SIPRI Yearbook* (fn. 3), 198-99; William T. Lee, "Calculating Soviet National Security Expenditures," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Economy in Government, *The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities*, Part 3: *The Economic Basis of the Russian Military Challenge to the United States*, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 932-34; Russett (fn. 1), 8-10, 193-94. For an overview of this problem area see Pertti Joenniemi, "Aspects on the Measurement of Armament Levels," *Cooperation and Conflict*, III (1970), 141-51.

[25] Note the comments on this point in Thomas C. Schelling, "War Without Pain, And Other Models," *World Politics*, XV (April 1963), 474.

[26] Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (London 1960), 74-75.

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its rate of change is a useful though imprecise guide, but there is no substitute for a detailed investigation of the tangled skeins of defense politics. For example, of the three major increases in American defense expenditure since 1945—the Korean rearmament, the Kennedy build-up, and the Vietnam expansion—only the Korean rearmament increase can unequivocally be assigned to a major reassessment of the threat apparently presented by the Soviet Union. The basic inadequacy of the Richardsonian equations and their developments is the fundamental assumption of a close expenditure interdependence—or, in the contemporary jargon, action-reaction. The arms competition was expressed thus by Richardson.

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = ky - ax + g \qquad \textit{and} \qquad \frac{dy}{dt} = lx - by + h^{27}$$

In response to the new conditions imposed by nuclear weapons, Lewis Richardson modified his basic equations so as to take account of the submissiveness or fear-factor mentioned above. The new submissiveness coefficients (s and r) would work to dampen the explosive potential of an otherwise unstable arms race. His new, post-1945 equations took the following form.

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = ky\,(l - s(y - x)) - ax + g$$

$$\frac{dy}{dt} = lx\,(l - r(x - y)) - by + h^{28}$$

The two possibilities identified as stable or decreasing arms race expenditures serve to expose the dangers of a concentration upon ex-

[27] Where t is time and x and y are the respective armaments of two sides, k and l being positive constants or defense coefficients, a and b being positive constants or fatigue and expense coefficients, g and h representing the unchanging level of grievance held by each state against the other. For the basic and comprehensive statement of the Richardson theory of arms interdependence see *ibid.*, particularly chap. II. Important critical analyses of the Richardsonian world view may be found in Anatol Rapoport, "Lewis Fry Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, I (September 1957), 249-99; Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Ann Arbor 1960), chap. I; Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York 1962); Paul Smoker, "Trade, Defense, and the Richardson Theory of Arms Races: A Seven Nation Study," *Journal of Peace Research*, II (1965), 161-76; William R. Caspary, "Richardson's Model of Arms Races: Description, Critique, and an Alternative Model," *International Studies Quarterly*, XI (March 1967), 63-90; Martin C. McGuire, *Secrecy and the Arms Race* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 33-38. Excellent overviews of the whole field of mathematical arms race modelling are provided by Peter Busch's Appendix in Russett (fn. 1), 193-233, and by Thomas L. Saaty, *Mathematical Models of Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York 1968).

[28] See Paul Smoker, "The Arms Race as an Open and Closed System," Paper presented to the 4th Peace Research Conference (Chicago, November 7-8, 1968), 13.

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penditure as a tool for the measurement of the velocity of an arms race. For the United States, the 1960's show a pattern of greatly diminishing expenditure on strategic forces (followed, admittedly, by an increase toward the end of the decade). This pattern does not reflect a loss of momentum in arms race activity; instead, it reflects an increasing attention to "product improvements." The anticipation of the eventual procurement of these improved products, it may be argued, had a considerable effect upon the Soviet Union.

It is probable that most arms race participants will pass through all, or some, of these distinct expenditure phases. The important point is that an apparent quiescence of arms race activity, as reflected in budget figures, may signify only the comparatively low cost of system maintenance and intense research and development activity.

(5) SINGLE-WEAPON/MULTI-WEAPON

It is possible to assert that most arms competitions, at most times, have had as their focus the contemporary dominant weapon, or in General J.F.C. Fuller's words, "the weapon of superior reach or range."[29] There is certainly much justification for the view that simple, easily quantifiable standards of comparison have long been in demand—inventory comparison of a single class of weapons is thus attractive to the analyst.

We might assert that Anglo-German rivalry after 1905 was a single-weapon race: similarly, Soviet-American competition can be presented as a series of races in the latest generation of strategic weapons. There has been a series of qualitative or development races; what is less certain is that the superpowers have raced to deploy the latest generation of weapons. One of the complications, in any analysis that seeks to present Soviet-American competition as a series of finite races, is the fact that these two states have not had a common strategic doctrine. The Soviet Union has sought a balanced posture containing significant offensive and defensive components, whereas the United States has been less constrained in its racing efforts in offensive weapons by the great expense of very extensive air defenses. A further complication, in a study seeking to identify those categories of weapons in which the superpowers have competed, is that the Soviet Union chose, in the mid-1950's, to deploy a very significant continental or regional I/MRBM force, to which the United States has not chosen to respond in kind or in mirror-fashion. The particular mix of offensive and defensive strategic forces and the composition of general-purpose forces

[29] J.F.C. Fuller, *Armament and History* (London 1946), 21.

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may both be viewed in the single-weapon perspective, but the potential trade-offs between different systems contributing to one strategic mission render a multi-weapon approach more appropriate to contemporary Soviet-American competition.

Another example of multi-weapon rivalry is provided by the contemporary Arab-Israeli arms competition: any analysis of this competition would have to examine the balances of both the air (offensive and defensive) and the armored forces. However, we must admit that a limited trade-off between these two categories of armament is possible.[30]

(6) HIERARCHY: SINGLE-TIER/TWO-TIER, "PROXY"/TWO-TIER, INDEPENDENT/MULTI-TIER

This section draws attention to the distinctions among different degrees of third-party involvement in arms rivalry. It is possible to imagine a number of superficially similar, yet distinct, variants of the two-tiered arms race. First, we may identify a situation in which two or more client-states or dependent groups are competing in pursuit of their own objectives. In this context the senior security partners are, probably somewhat reluctantly, compelled to maintain a dynamic local equilibrium.

Second, we might hypothesize an "arms race by proxy," wherein the client-states provide a useful, though perhaps fairly dispensable, outlet for the ambitions of the arms race "parents." The present arms race in the Middle East displays features of both two-tiered arms race models: Israeli-American and Egyptian-Soviet relations provide examples of very different degrees of independence of clients.

An example offering greater complexity of clients, suppliers, and motives is that of the India-Pakistan arms competition. In this case, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union either have supplied or are about to supply both India and Pakistan with major weapon systems. China has provided lesser forms of military assistance to Pakistan. Of the four interested parties beyond the subcontinent, only China has had any interest in the success of one of the competitors, and this interest has been disciplined by a lack of modern weapon systems to supply.

The final point relates to the possibility of there being a multi-tier arms race. This applies very clearly to intrasocietal conflicts such as

[30] A good exploration of Arab-Israeli rivalry (and one that is explicitly concerned with the structure of the regional arms race) is to be found in J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York 1969), chaps. 24-25.

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those in the Congo and in Biafra, for which the arms supply links may be long, tortuous, and, very often, apparently anonymous.

(7) ACTIONS: OFFSET/IMITATIVE/INDEPENDENT

Action-reaction is commonly invoked as the all-purpose, or at least dominant, model explaining the arms race logic of actions that would offset the latest or anticipated moves of the adversary. However, action-reaction will serve equally well, though often with less apparent internal arms race logic, as an explanation of those aspects of arms race behavior whose result is the often futile emulation of adversary action, rather than its neutralization.

An example of such imitative behavior, by one interpretation, would be the increased production rates the United States ordered in 1955 and 1956 for the B-52 in response to the prognoses of a "bomber gap," an activity that may be labelled as foolishly imitative, in that it reflected only a concern for the respective pre-attack inventory quantities of strategic bombers.

The relevance of the distinction between offsetting and imitative behavior rests upon the availability of a "menu" of military-technical alternatives.[31] There may be periods in a single-weapon arms race in which an offsetting action is simultaneously an imitative action, but for the Soviet-American competition, the roads to security are so diverse that decisions can be roughly identified and allocated as appropriate within these categories of action. However, there are some complications. On occasions a reaction may have been intended to be offsetting, whereas in truth it was imitative with no, or very little, neutralizing effect. Second, imitation may be a temptation of differing attractiveness to the two sides.

With regard to the Soviet-American competition, there is no doubt that military-technical development has had a logic of its own—a logic that, within limits, has been equally compelling to both sides.[32] Some of the major limits here referred to are basic doctrinal preference for a particular balance of offense-defense, available economic resources, and the military posture indicated by geographical location. Thus, it may appear that in most categories of weapons the Soviet Union has been imitating the United States, whereas a fairer interpretation would be that very often similar advantages beckoned to each

[31] See C. B. Joynt, "Arms Races and the Problem of Equilibrium," in *The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1964* (London 1964), 34-35.

[32] By way of analogy, it should be recalled that Clausewitz wrote of war: "It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, III (London 1966, first publ. 1832), 122.

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side in turn. This discussion does some violence to the historical record, in that although the two sides have a closely comparable record of the kinds of systems developed, the decisions about sizable arsenal acquisition have been very different indeed.

The third possibility in this section, identified as "independent" actions, is that of arms race moves that may well be reactive, yet neither offset, in a direct way, an adversary's actual or anticipated capability nor emulate his activities. An example in this category might have been the Soviet stress upon high megatonnage in the early 1960's.[33]

(8) EMBRYONIC/ONGOING

Lewis F. Richardson identified the period 1945–1946 as one in which Soviet-American arms competition was in embryonic form.[34] The dilatoriness of Soviet demobilization and the secrecy with which the United States surrounded its atomic program were both unannounced and possibly unrealized bases for an arms competition that would very soon be widely visible. The date taken by Richardson and his followers as marking the opening of the Soviet-American arms race is 1948.

There is much sense in labelling a period of rising political tensions and military moves (in their widest meaning), preparatory to a burst of arms competition, one of arms race "in embryo." An arms race may not begin with the public announcement of an ambitious weapons-building program—a program that both at the time and in retrospect may be seen as an unambiguous arms race challenge, marking the opening of the competition. Instead, in the words of Quincy Wright's *A Study of War*, there will be "acceleration in all countries involved of the rate of armament growth. A larger proportion of the productive energy of states is devoted to military affairs . . . though the boundaries either in time or in space could not be very clearly defined."[35]

Despite the great uncertainty attaching to an embryonic period, further research may indicate that for many races there was a last clear chance for the averting of the competition. I discuss this possibility of an arms race in embryo because it should be emphasized that,

[33] An excellent theoretical analysis of the arms race significance of high-yield weapons is in Colonel Glenn A. Kent, *On the Interaction of Opposing Forces Under Possible Arms Agreements*, Occasional Paper No. 5, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (March 1963).

[34] Lewis F. Richardson, "Could an Arms Race End Without Fighting?" *Nature*, CLXVIII (September 29, 1951), 567-68.

[35] Wright (fn. 8), II, 690-91.

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in the same way that acute international crises and wars do not occur without previous storm warnings, neither do arms races.

(9) PRIMITIVE/SOPHISTICATED[36]

In the recent ABM debate in the United States, the primitive arms race model has been advanced by opponents of the Nixon Administration as best characterizing the decisions for Sentinel and Safeguard deployments. A primitive arms race is one in which each participant reacts to the move of an adversary, with no thought given to the probable effect of this reaction upon the future moves of the adversary; hence, the likelihood of positive feedback is ignored. In contemporary terminology, a primitive action reflects the "fallacy of the last move."[37]

A sophisticated arms race would be one in which all participants recognized that they were in a non-zero-sum game situation. They would realize that the arms race strategies likely to be pursued by adversaries in the next round will depend in part upon the strategies selected for the current round. Among the difficulties that present themselves for consideration are the following: (a) apparently primitive arms race behavior may not be proof of the folly of the adversary, but may reflect an irresistible domestic logic; (b) behavior planned within a sophisticated framework may transpire, in its consequences, to be primitive, because its rationale is insufficiently clear to the adversary. Finally, we should note that the appropriate frame of reference for considering arms race behavior need not necessarily be that of a game situation in which the competitors have common motivations. A sophisticated slackening of military effort (a move guided by the theory of sympathetic parallelism) might be rewarded by a grave military imbalance in favor of the adversary.

(10) DAMPED/UNDAMPED[38]

The principle in this category may be stated as follows: to some important degree, the nature of the weapon(s) in terms of which the competitors are racing will determine the velocity of the race. However, the importance of the damping factor will rest not only upon the nature of the weapon, but also upon the objectives of the competitors.

In a damped arms race any attempt at superiority should be discouraged by its exorbitant cost. In other words, so long as the competi-

[36] Schelling (fn. 25), 476.
[37] Herbert F. York, "Military Technology and National Security," *Scientific American*, ccxxi (August 1969), 26.
[38] Hoag (fn. 9), 508, 515.

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tor who is behind need be outnumbered by three or four or more to one in order for him to stand little chance of survival in war, then the cost of the offense will rise exponentially by comparison with the cost of the defense. Competition in the categories of land forces and ICBM's without individually targetable multiple warheads may be offered as examples of damped arms races. For the purposes of theory, the forces are assumed to be of an approximate competence. In practice, faulty strategic and/or tactical doctrine or a catastrophic failure in command and control might totally upset the expected outcome.

Undamped arms races, in which the required ratio of forces for military victory would not be prohibitively expensive, might be expected to be those involving naval forces and ballistic missiles carrying individually targetable multiple warheads.

Arms Race Strategies[39]

Every arms race must involve a process of interaction, either continuous or intermittent, among a number of arms race strategies. We cannot necessarily infer the intended strategies of participants from the consequent dynamic military balance. One side may aim for a certain ratio of forces favorable to itself and yet be compelled, in the event, to make the best of a definite margin in favor of the adversary.

The strategies pursued by each or some of the competitors may vary over time, not solely as a choice forced by unforeseen circumstances, but also because perceptions may alter and hence the state of the balance identified as desirable may change.

Two terms, above all, have dominated recent arms race discussion: sufficiency and stability. Both are employed very freely and defy satisfactorily precise definition. The determination of how much is enough should include considerations of rival geostrategic responsibilities, the inferred intentions of the adversary, compensating advantages in other areas important to the national security, and, perhaps preeminently, certain domestic preferences for a particular state and composition of the arms balance.

Stability has several unambiguous, though restricted, definitions. For example, in Richardson's inquiry, an unstable arms race is one suffering exponential annual increments of expenditure. In a narrow

[39] A dimension of arms race strategy that (on grounds of space) I have not singled out for separate investigation is the question of the effect on an arms race of the possible different *knowledge-states* of each arms race participant concerning the strategies of rivals. Explicit and vigorous attention to this question may be found in Knut Midgaard, "Arms Races, Arms Control, and Disarmament," *Cooperation and Conflict*, No. 1 (1970), 34-40; and McGuire (fn. 27).

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American military definition, stability may be understood to be the state of a strategic relationship in which the "first-strike bonus" was either nonexistent or extremely low. This definition holds that stability is the product of the maintenance of mutual assured-destruction capabilities. Thus, to link the two terms of the discussion, a sufficiency of assured destruction capabilities insures stability. Unfortunately, as I noted above, the Soviet notion of stability appears to rest upon the maintenance of strategic forces sufficient not only to assure considerable destruction, but also to disrupt an intended surprise attack in a preemptive manner and to defend the homeland in the event of war.[40] Arms race strategies are not devised in a political vacuum; hence, even if both superpowers maintained the doctrine of assured destruction through hostage cities, the military-technical logic of a deterrent-sufficiency would be unacceptable. The very high level of urbanization in the United States should mean that what would be enough to the Soviet Union would be far less than the United States would need to maintain her level of assured destruction. Apart from the counter-force-potential of a great American numerical superiority in missiles, it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would find a gross numerical asymmetry politically tolerable.

A wider interpretation of the term would hold that stability refers to the beliefs current regarding the proximity of war. Thus, quite apart from any armament "improvements," interstate tension might be low following political consultation or good-will gestures. Clearly, such a stability would be extremely fragile. Finally, it might be held that a rapid succession of weapon-generations is inherently destabilizing, in good part because the known and familiar military environment would be changing faster than would the strategic or tactical views of military planners and politicians.

As an interesting addition to the above comments upon sufficiency and stability, we cannot but notice the fact that much contemporary arms race theorizing is conditioned by some aspects of deterrence theory. In the West at least, there is a very wide consensus to the effect that by engaging in a nuclear arms race one is doing so solely with the objective of continuing an effective deterrence of inimical military and diplomatic actions. In short, there is no question of racing to "win" or to avoid the worst consequences of a nuclear war. This means that sufficiency may be identified as that size and configuration of the arsenal that will guarantee unacceptable damage—any margin

[40] Note the speculation on the preemption point in one recent and excellent analysis, Wolfe (fn. 5), 437, fn. 45.

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above the sufficient-for-deterrence level may thus be labelled wasteful and possibly even provocative. Because one important school of deterrence theorists (finite or minimum) has persuaded many that deterrence is a comparatively simple exercise that may be conducted with small and invulnerable forces, the task of those charged with the continuing conduct of the nuclear arms race has been rendered extremely difficult.

The dominant strain of contemporary comment upon the nuclear arms race stresses the folly of the whole enterprise, rather than the need for continued armed vigilance. This opinion might be traced to the justification of the race in the West as deterrence rather than as war or even crisis-waging scenarios.

The terms employed in the succeeding paragraphs are intended to reflect a composite measure of both quantity and quality in categories of weapons. Furthermore, the strategies outlined are meant to refer to the intended direction of increase in armaments to an intended proportional relationship. I suggest that, in theory, the following five distinct strategies may be applied in an arms race: clear inferiority; marginal inferiority; parity; marginal superiority; and clear superiority.

Essential prefatory remarks are, first, that different strategies may be followed in different categories of weapons and, second, that each participant may pursue different strategies toward different adversaries. Third, a participant may not be thinking or planning in such oversimplified terms as parity or superiority. The motive underlying the development of a particular military posture might be to provide for as many contingencies as possible, compatible with alternative resource-allocation demands and the interactive potential of certain kinds of capability. It is possible that no overall judgment upon the relative strategic positions of two arms racing rivals can be given—hence, the rivals do not deliberately race to attain a particular relative position.[41]

(1) CLEAR INFERIORITY

A state or group may prepare as best it can even though, in the test of actual war, it must be defeated. Orthodox arms race thinking would exclude this situation, but by most tests an arms race situation would obtain. Each side, say the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1970's or the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939, would prepare against the other, each structuring all or a portion of its forces so as to capitalize upon the perceived weaknesses of the other. Preparation

[41] See Lee (fn. 4), 175.

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for apparent national suicide may not be a common trait, but it may not be as illogical as it would appear at first sight. The greater power may be deterred by the prospect of resistance, such resistance perhaps being likely to prove embarrassing; futile national resistance may stir some support from states that otherwise would stand aside.

As an historical footnote, it should be remembered that Tirpitz's "risk theory" held that Great Britain could be blackmailed into concessions by the prospect that the probable cost of British naval victory over Germany would render her vulnerable to the combined fleets of France and Russia.[42] The contemporary relevance of "risk-theory" thinking has been outlined by the current American administration. "A very difficult problem that would face us if the Chinese launched or threatened to launch a nuclear attack on the United States has to do with the need for maintaining our deterrent against the Soviet Union. Obviously, if we unloaded most or all of our Minuteman missiles against China, we would be leaving ourselves relatively naked as far as the Soviet threat is concerned."[43]

(2) MARGINAL INFERIORITY

It is conceivable that, in an arms race between two states of unequal economic strength, the weaker may choose to remain behind, but within reach of, the war-waging power of the stronger. The advantage of this strategy could be, first, that the stronger state would be less likely to accelerate its military preparations than it would if parity were sought; although, second, should political relations deteriorate, should the adversary slacken his arms race efforts, or should a temporary military-technical advantage appear, then a lead and possibly diplomatic or war-waging success might be within reach.

It must be admitted that it is extremely difficult to furnish clear and unambiguous examples of the pursuit of a strategy of marginal inferiority. It may be that Imperial Germany was hoping to attain a marginally inferior position to Great Britain in capital ships, once the risk theory was rendered inoperable by the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes. It is possible that the Soviet Union today is seeking a state of military balance that on the one hand can be denied as being a bid for superiority, though on the other hand it insures that a temporary measure of superiority might be attainable should any of the conditions obtain that are suggested above. In the long run the Soviet

[42] Woodward (fn. 15), 11.

[43] U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittees on Department of Defense and on Military Construction, *Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System*, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 59 [Mr. Laird, May 22, 1969].

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Union might aspire to parity, but the continuing, though currently heavily qualified, stress upon a measure of superiority by some important sections of the American defense community renders a Soviet posture of marginal inferiority less provocative.

(3) PARITY

Between nuclear powers, the deficiencies of active and passive defenses make a mockery of attempts to identify, with any confidence, advantages attaching to any arms race quantities.[44] In the triangular Soviet-American-Chinese nuclear relationship, a gross disparity in the numbers of weapons and a not inconsiderable disparity in their quality might be belied by an apparent parity of deterrent effect. In one particular view of the risk-taking propensity of the Chinese, it is probable that the American capability for the assured destruction of China as a functioning society is soon to be balanced by a Chinese capability for the destruction of a handful of cities.[45] The crisis-instability potential inherent in such an imbalance of capability requires no further comment. Should China acquire a substantial arsenal of nuclear delivery vehicles, then a Sino-Soviet or a Sino-American war might seriously erode the pre-war parity that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, as Dr. Harry Gelber has argued, the consequences for superpower deterrent stability that might follow such a war with China would be more important in the realms of popular psychology and governmental determination than in the realm of an eroded weapons arsenal.[46]

Between states conducting an arms race with the continued deterrence of war the objective, parity offers a number of attractions. First, it may serve to appease those domestic critics who measure security by comparison of inventories. Second, parity should deter any arms race acceleration by the adversary, being in itself a declaration of intent that no measure of inferiority will be accepted.[47] Third, parity may facilitate balanced measures of arms control; indeed, the common acceptance of parity may, in itself, have the effect of limiting armaments. If each party were to define parity as being its goal, were to identify the precise quantitative and qualitative meaning it was currently giving to the term, and were to state the dependence of these numbers and characteristics of forces upon certain features of the strategic forces of the other side, then parity could be a norm serving to promote "sophisticated" arms race behavior.

[44] A radically different view is to be found in Foster (fn. 4), 254-55.
[45] *Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems* (fn. 17), Part I, 189-90.
[46] Gelber (fn. 12), 186.
[47] See Richmond (fn. 14), 209.

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In practice it is difficult to give a precise meaning to parity, even within the narrow context of the quantity and quality of weapons. We might argue that the Soviet-American military balance today is best described as being in a state of parity. It could be stated that both parties have pursued similar military technologies and that numerical differences among the relative sizes of particular components of their arsenals are unimportant. On the other hand, we might hold that the United States maintains an important qualitative edge in multiple warhead technology, in missile accuracy, possibly in ABM technology, and certainly in numbers of separate deliverable warheads. Furthermore, it is necessary to recognize that different states acquire their strategic forces with different ends in mind. A weapons parity is not necessarily a parity of diplomatic effect. In other words, the United States as a conservative, status-quo power may feel the need for a measure of superiority in order to counterbalance the perceived (or misperceived) ambitions of more active adversaries.

(4) MARGINAL SUPERIORITY

Although marginal inferiority, parity, and marginal superiority are analytically distinguishable as separate, intended states of a military balance, in practice these distinctions may be blurred beyond recognition. Industrial lead-time delay, domestic politics, and faulty intelligence, among a myriad of other contributory factors, might serve to render an intended parity either marginally inferior or marginally superior.

The introduction of the term "marginal" is intended to identify a short lead as opposed to a long lead, or as some Cold War warriors would have it, a nonexploitable as opposed to an exploitable lead. Also, it must be admitted that today a long lead may be of no more military significance than a short lead. In pre-nuclear arms races, such distinctions as these were of more significance. For example, Lanchester's Square Law holds that a conflict between firing points should conclude with the victor's preserving the number of bases equal to the square root of the difference between the squares of the numbers engaged on each side.[48] Hence, marginal superiority should result in disproportionately light damage in war.

[48] In a battle between two naval forces of 12 and 9 ships, the larger side should emerge with both a meaningful victory and with 7 or 8 ships undamaged (or only slightly damaged). F. W. Lanchester, *Aircraft in War* (London 1916), 28, 36. A useful discussion of Lanchester's ideas is offered by Malcolm W. Hoag, "Increasing Returns in Military Production Functions," in Roland McKean, ed., *Issues in Defense Economics* (New York 1967), 12-14.

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Clearly the law is of no relevance to a nuclear conflict, in which it is possible that even a very small number of weapons could inflict disproportionate damage. Indeed, the dominant French school of nuclear deterrence has adhered to the so-called doctrine of "proportional deterrence." This doctrine recognizes the absolute difference between the destruction that might be visited upon France by a Soviet strike and the destruction that the *force de frappe* might effect upon the Soviet Union, but it concludes that the small French assured-destruction capability would be disproportionate to the "worth" of France as a destroyed wartime target to the Soviet Union. The contrast to Lanchester's pre-nuclear arithmetic could not be clearer.

A state may prefer to be slightly ahead in an arms race so that if a promising line of military-technical development were to beckon, it would be in the best position to gain an advantage and obtain a lead that could be turned either to diplomatic or to war-waging advantage. So difficult is the task of relative strategic assessment, that it is not inappropriate to comment that marginal inferiority, parity, or marginal superiority exist essentially in the eye of the beholder.

(5) CLEAR SUPERIORITY

Statesmen may feel that, although unacceptable damage would be visited upon their country in the event of war, an undeniably large military margin could be of diplomatic utility. In the first place, it might be reasoned that politicians and their attentive publics are impressed with naked arithmetic. Military superiority is much despised in contemporary strategic literature as being illusory or meaningless, but for those fairly unsophisticated in strategic matters the effect of feeling behind or ahead should not be dismissed too readily. Second, it may not be true that any large measure of superiority is bound to prove only temporary; indeed, this may be a clear case of the self-fulfilling prophecy. Undoubtedly the most sufficient of arms race positions is to be comfortably and permanently ahead of all rivals.

Analogies between different pairs of states at different periods are bound to be perilous, but it may be instructive to note that some observers believed that German Dreadnought construction tended to "increase or decrease in inverse ratio to that of Great Britain."[49] Similarly, one interpretation of Soviet-American competition in the late 1960's might be that the Soviet Union was encouraged to make her successful bid for numerical superiority in land-based ICBM-launchers by the determination, on November 5, 1964, of a cut-off figure of one

[49] Woodward (fn. 15), 242, fn. 1.

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thousand for American Minuteman deployment.[50] A development of this argument would be that the economically stronger power would be well-advised to state, unequivocally, that it will maintain a clear numerical superiority in the most advanced military hardware. Such a declaratory policy might serve, in the long run, to reduce the costs of the competition for all parties.

However, many assumptions are implicit in this argument, and the notion of cost is multidimensional. The basic assumption of this section is that clear superiority is the desired state of the military balance —in which case, resting upon a favorable asymmetry of economic resources, the state that is ahead might be able to restrain the competition and also to reduce the risks inherent in a military environment of very active competition, by an unambiguous public adherence to a continuing doctrine of superiority. The disadvantages of such a doctrine might take some of the following forms: (a) the adversary grows desperate at its inability to attain even parity, and hence is induced to try a very high-risk shortcut to a better military balance (Khrushchev's Cuban missile gamble); (b) the political cost of clear inferiority to the adversary is so high, both domestically and internationally, that no option is believed open other than to strain all resources to attain a better military balance; (c) in a situation characterized by widespread disapproval of "wasteful" expenditure related to the arms race, in which the security advantages of superiority cannot convincingly be demonstrated, a strategy of clear superiority provides much ammunition to critics at home and abroad.

As an arms race strategy, the striving for an unambiguous superiority of numbers in strategic weapons is defensible on very traditional grounds. First, such a strategy should provide a wide range of damage-limiting options for central war; second, on the one hand there is a very great deal of uncertainty respecting the intentions of the arms race adversary and, on the other hand, strategic intelligence, though vastly improved by satellite reconnaissance since 1961, is still less than perfect. Thus, a comfortable margin of superiority may serve as a hedge against the unforeseen. For illustration of these two points I quote the thoughts of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1969 and Lord Grey of Falloden in 1909:

> They [Speakers Rayburn and McCormack] cautioned me, that if I were to make any mistakes while I was on that committee

[50] *Status of U.S. Strategic Power* (fn. 10), 12; Wolfe (fn. 5), 432-33.

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that I err on the side of the national security of this country. I thought that was pretty good advice.[51]

While we pay every regard to declaration of intention . . . we cannot build upon them . . . we are obliged by the most simple and elementary requirements of precaution to act as though the present intention of Germany may peradventure be subsequently modified. . . .[52]

The record of Soviet-American strategic interaction since 1957 shows that the difficulties of guessing the future rate of deployment of weapons, the requirements of domestic politics, and the opportunities thrown up by technology have all served to confound the arms race intentions of both sides. Even in the unlikely event of both sides deciding (a) upon complementary strategies (for example, parity: parity; marginal inferiority: marginal superiority), and (b) upon identical definitions in both qualitative and quantitative respects of such terms as parity or marginal inferiority, it is equally improbable that the military-industrial establishments of the two sides would actually produce a close approximation of the intended forces, on the predetermined dates. Therefore, a slippage or unexpected ease in research, development, test, evaluation, or full-scale production, in only one of the competing countries, will place both in unintended arms race positions.

Arms Race Outcomes

Much journalistic alarmism concerning the details of arms race termination might be avoided if a systematic investigation were undertaken of the ways in which history demonstrates arms races to have ended and logic deduces arms races could end. This section analyzes five possible arms race outcomes.

(1) war

"Above all, it [the arms race] kept alive the anachronistic idea that wars were inevitable."[53]

". . . the most dangerous result of the arms race—the mounting fear or 'tension' which it creates."[54]

There is no proven relationship between arms races and wars. How-

[51] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Intelligence and the ABM*, Hearing, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 63 [June 23, 1969].
[52] Quoted in Woodward (fn. 15), 235.
[53] Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race* (London 1958), 74.
[54] *Ibid.*, 78.

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ever, the *Study of War* investigators were convinced that the broad single races of modern times were "generally" terminated by a balance-of-power war. We suspect that this conclusion was induced by the very broad scope of Wright's understanding of the nature of recent arms races.[55] A more restrictive view, both as to dates and as to participants, does not yield this broad conclusion.

The baleful effects of an arms race would seem to fall in the following areas. First, heavy and sustained expenditure upon armaments by rival parties will result in a fueling of existing predilections to impute hostile motives. In short, suspicions will mount, the tension will grow, and instability will result—instability being defined as the believed proximity of war.

In this connection, the following comment upon the arms race and the tension-war nexus by Lewis Richardson is appropriate: "There is some evidence that diplomatic relations become, during the tacit mutual threats of an arms race, such a strain that the outbreak of war is felt as a relief."[56] Harold Lasswell has also subscribed to this argument: "Dangers to the safety, the material claims, and the deference demands of the 'we' group can be tolerated no longer; these interminable provocations must cease; the incessant alarms of recent years must come to an end. . . ."[57]

"Relief" on the outbreak of war does not prove that by some mysterious process it was the desire for such relief that was the immediate cause of war.

Second, an arms race may result in war because of the belief of one party that the military balance will move against it in the future—the "now-or-never," preventive-war syndrome. A slight variant upon this theme is the possibility of a state's choosing war rather than risk the domestic economic and political consequences of continued competition. In this connection, we might with advantage recall the Russian rationale for the installation of the Doomsday Machine as a cut-price deterrent in *Dr. Strangelove.*

Third, a rather simple-minded view of the contemporary superpower competition is that the risk of technical accident is increasing with every succeeding weapons generation.[58] There is no steady in-

[55] Wright (fn. 8), 690-91. Single, general arms races were identified as occurring between the following dates: 1787-1815; 1840-1871; 1886-1919; and 1932-1941 (date of writing).

[56] Richardson (fn. 26), 61.

[57] Lasswell (fn. 23), 64.

[58] Albert Wohlstetter has replied to this view very effectively in U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *Planning-Programming-Budgeting, Defense Analysis: Two Examples,* 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 5 [September 10, 1969].

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crease in risk over time; indeed, Samuel Huntington's argument that war is most likely in the opening, nervous rounds of an arms competition, though not particularly convincing, is at least as tenable a hypothesis as its journalistic alternative.[59] Common sense suggests that armaments, in themselves, are only one element likely to contribute to a decision to go to war. The contribution of armaments to the likelihood of an outbreak of war, will (by the narrow American definition) be a function of the contemporary "first-strike bonus": this will vary over time, but it will not necessarily vary in the direction of a steady or even an intermittent increase.

(2) BANKRUPTCY-EXHAUSTION

This is a strictly hypothetical possibility; I could find no example of one, two, or more parties recoiling in economic ruin from an armaments competition: a conclusion also reached by Lewis Richardson.[60] To the extent that an arms race raises tensions and focuses public attention upon an adversary, the boundary of toleration of taxation can prove remarkably elastic. The years 1949 through 1953 in the United States showed a bewildering succession of authoritative statements upon the subject of "what the economy can stand."[61]

Arms race competitors are rarely in a position of approximate equality regarding the resources that may be invested in the military dimension of the national security. Each competitor will have different domestic circumstances and different foreign commitments. For example, despite an approximate equality in national incomes, Germany spent roughly only half as much as did Great Britain on her navy from 1910 to 1914:[62] Britain did not have two land frontiers to defend. With regard to the contemporary nuclear arms race, the estimated GNP's of the United States and the Soviet Union for 1968 were $861 billion and $430 billion respectively. For 1968 the respective estimated defense expenditures were $79,576 million and $39,780 million.[63] The American figure is inflated by approximately $25 billion because of Vietnam; the Soviet figure refers only to declared defense expenditure and is questionable because of the uncertainty regarding the proper exchange-rates of rubles for dollars. Furthermore, there is some evidence that in the category of strategic delivery systems, the Soviet

[59] Huntington (fn. 3), 63-65.
[60] Richardson (fn. 26), 61.
[61] See the three studies in Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York 1962).
[62] Wright (fn. 8), I, Tables 58-59 on 670-71.
[63] The Institute for Strategic Studies (fn. 24), 1, 5, 57. Also see Joenniemi (fn. 24).

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Union was, by 1968–69, spending twice as much as was the United States.[64] The important point here is that although a particular idea of sufficiency, hopes for a sympathetic parallelism, and competing military and nonmilitary demands have served to depress America's strategic-forces budget, severe economic strain should occur first in the Soviet Union if both sides were to decide upon a great acceleration in their strategic-forces programs.

In general, it is likely that, short of a situation of great mutual alarm, one side will have more to spend or one side will be prepared to spend more. In either event the probable outcome would be an arms race victory for one side or a war launched by the prospective arms race loser.[65] These dramatic possibilities will be heavily dependent upon the nature of the competition. In a qualitative-quantitative race, defeat in one phase might be avenged by victory in the next.

(3) VICTORY/DEFEAT

In the same way that wars and crises can be won or lost, so arms races may be won or lost. However, history provides very few examples of a party's being unambiguously defeated and then sinking back into a position of sullen and near-permanent inferiority. Indeed, the conventional notion of victory or defeat must really be adapted to the particular strategies that were being followed. I mention the possibility of clear victory or defeat because it provides a limiting case, not one frequently encountered. Anglo-German naval relations from 1898 to 1914 would appear to provide a good example of an arms race victory: the German navy never succeeded in passing through its "danger zone."[66] Some members of the American defense community were persuaded that the failure of Premier Khrushchev's Cuban gamble and the "three environments" Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 marked a decisive and possibly enduring arms race victory for the United States. The statistics of ICBM and SLBM deployment since 1966 have demonstrated the premature nature of such a belief.

There is no evidence that the Soviet Union accepted the victory/defeat labels. However, the post-1963 Soviet build-up in ICBM's (SS-9, SS-11, SS-13) and SLBM's (deployed in the new "Y"-class nuclear

[64] See Johan Hölst and William Schneider, Jr., eds., *Why ABM?* (Elmsford, New York 1969), chap. 7; Lee (fn. 4), 173; Foster (fn. 4), 248; Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT," *Problems of Communism*, XIX (September–October 1970), 1-3.

[65] The imagery of bankruptcy continues to stalk the halls of arms race rhetoric: "If we do not adopt more discrimination in choosing these many weapon systems we are going to bankrupt the country." So said Senator Symington in *Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems* (fn. 17), Part I, 57.

[66] Woodward (fn. 15), 431.

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submarine) would suggest that it did not deem the 1964 missile imbalance tolerable. The 1964 ICBM comparison was as follows: U.S.A. 834, Soviet Union 200.[67] An unambiguous example of American convictions regarding the state of the arms race was provided early in 1965 by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: "[The Soviet leaders] have decided that they have lost the quantitative race, and that they are not seeking to engage us in that conflict. . . . There is no indication that they are catching up or planning to catch up. . . . There is no indication that they are in a race at this time."[68]

Arms race victory and defeat may be recognized either tacitly or formally. A tacit recognition might take the shape, as did the German one after 1912, of a denial of any competitive relationship, or it might take the shape of a treaty. A somewhat ambiguous example of the latter possibility would be the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, fixing the capital ship tonnage ratios of the great powers. Force-ratio agreements may, on occasions, be intended as preventive measures as opposed to termination measures: the Anglo-German Treaty of 1935 might be seen in this light.[69]

If one state is challenging another that is already powerfully armed, an appropriate definition of victory might be to secure a position (a) not greatly inferior, or (b) not inferior when in combination with another state. Finally, it is a near certainty that over time the aims of each arms race participant will alter, and what would constitute victory might be redefined.

(4) AGREED TERMINATION AT PARITY

Even should two or more states desire to halt or severely restrict their competition, an appropriate definition of parity may be extremely difficult to reach. The background to this difficulty has found no better expression than that by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: "Parity in the instruments which constitute naval strength is a mathematical possibility but a strategical absurdity since it does not take into consideration the conditions under which those instruments have to be used, or the facilities which subserve their needs and without which they cannot be used."[70]

Arms race termination at parity is possible, provided that a very

[67] The Institute for Strategic Studies (fn. 24), 55.

[68] Quoted in *Status of U.S. Strategic Power* (fn. 10), 2.

[69] Sir Herbert Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power* (London 1946), 293. It would be only fair to assert that for Germany this treaty was more a "hunting license" than a restraint.

[70] Richmond (fn. 14), 257-58.

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restricted definition is maintained concerning the military instruments that are to be precisely balanced. For example, the Anglo-American equality of tonnage agreed upon in Washington in 1922 may be taken as the outstanding, if not totally happy, example of the "one-power standard." Parity, as a likely arms race outcome, has attracted considerable attention as a result of accelerated Soviet missile deployment in the late 1960's and the American arms race move of deploying a limited ABM screen. Indeed, it is probable now that the Soviet Union will negotiate an arms-limitation package on the basis of nothing short of an acknowledged parity. For the negotiation of an agreed freeze upon numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles, the rival delegations to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks would have to consider, as best they could, the performance parameters and growth potential of each separate delivery system. Also, they would have to be informed of the missions that each side desires its various systems to be able to accomplish. The difficulty with mathematical parity, as suggested above by Admiral Richmond, is that it must ignore such disturbing parameters as geostrategic location, asymmetry of dislike, and imbalance of strategic intelligence provision.

(5) RESOLUTION OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES

Like an old soldier, an arms race may simply fade away. Historically, the classic example of the outcome of political resolution is provided by the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian ententes of 1904 and 1907. To lay great stress upon this highly desirable outcome is to deny one of the central paradoxes of contemporary international relations; namely, that an arms race is not necessarily very sensitive to a lessening of interstate tensions. The other side of the coin is that an arms race may not be accelerated by an increase in tensions.[71]

Soviet-American relations have outgrown their Cold War phases and are now in a state of not untypical great-power rivalry. However, although great-power rivals must always be watchful of the military preparations of others, not all great-power rivalry reaches the pitch of intensity in military preparation that would warrant definition as an arms race. Here it should be stressed that there is no clear dividing line between a situation of attention or concern and one of arms race. The "atmospherics" of détente in the 1960's do not constitute, or even approach, such a resolution of political differences as was exemplified

[71] See the comments of Marshall Shulman on the desirability of decoupling political relations from the issues of strategic confrontation in "The Effect of ABM on US-Soviet Relations," in Abram Chayes and Jerome Wiesner, eds., *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System* (New York 1969), 158.

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by the "diplomatic revolution" of 1904. It might be held that arms control must precede and contribute to a lessening of tensions, leading to a further braking of the arms race and thence to more fundamental political argreement. This question of "arms first" or "tensions first" has been well attacked by Philip Noel-Baker and J. David Singer.[72]

Arms Race Dynamics

Despite the thin trickle of arms race speculation that may be traced to Kant and certainly to the nineteenth-century English liberals of the Cobdenite school, post-1945 interest in arms race workings has been minimal and has only recently been galvanized by the debate over the ABM in the United States. Most scholars, politicians, and journalists have been content with the sure knowledge that there is a superpower arms race. It is only over the ABM, where the liberal opposition has been compelled to make explicit its assumptions concerning the logic of superpower interaction, that analysts have begun to realize that we are certain of remarkably little in the region of arms race dynamics. This comment applies particularly to the principles believed to underpin Soviet decisions upon strategic forces.

There are a considerable number of hypotheses regarding arms race dynamics that contend for analytical priority. Broadly, the hypotheses fall into two distinguishable, though far from mutually exclusive, doctrinal camps. These camps are here labelled action-reaction and domestic process.

(1) action-reaction

At the basis of action-reaction thinking is the belief that an arms race situation constitutes a system—that is, "a set of components with identifiable attributes, among which patterned relationships persist over a period of time."[73] By contrast, those sceptical of the systemic nature of the arms race phenomenon are both unconvinced that many of the attributes have been adequately identified or understood, and convinced that the relationships are far from being patterned. One crisp example of the action-reaction world-view is that offered by Paul Smoker when he says that an arms race is "a cybernetic set of interacting sub-systems."[74] The action-reaction model may be termed

[72] See Noel-Baker (fn. 53), chaps. 6-7; J. David Singer, "Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II (March 1958), 90-105.

[73] Andrew Scott, *The Functioning of the International Political System* (New York 1967), 27.

[74] Smoker (fn. 27), 173.

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either "tight" or "loose," depending upon the assumption made respecting the nature of the system, whether it is open or closed. This is not an abstruse distinction, for central to any investigation of a particular arms race, within the action-reaction framework, is the question of what triggers a reaction.

It is important to remember that any study of the action-reaction mechanism must be informed of the theoretical possibility of two temporally distinct forms of reaction and of four identifiable classes of triggering or fueling events. The temporal distinction has been labelled sequential/anticipatory by Johan Hölst.[75] He proceeds to demonstrate the considerable contemporary relevance of this distinction. The sequential reaction is simply that which succeeds an adversary action to which some counter is felt to be appropriate, either of an offset or of an emulative nature. The anticipatory reaction has prompted some observers to comment that the superpower arms race works by an action-overreaction dynamic.

The four distinguishable classes of triggering events may briefly be listed as follows: (1) a military-technological trigger *internal* to the arms race system; (2) a political trigger *internal* to the arms race system; (3) a military-technological trigger *external* to the arms race system; (4) a political trigger *external* to the arms race system.

To date, for the contemporary superpower arms race, attention has focused upon the military-technological triggers both internal to the arms race system and relevant to the configuration of the strategic-force postures of the adversaries. Indeed, an extreme development of this view would hold to an interpretation of the arms race that would emphasize the technological autonomy of strategic interaction.[76] The high priest of action-reaction by superpower military-technological trigger has been Robert McNamara:

> Whatever be their intentions—whatever be our intentions, actions—or even realistically potential actions—on either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side.
>
> It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race.[77]

[75] Hölst and Schneider (fn. 64), 162.

[76] See Milton Leitenberg, "The Present State of the World's Arms Race," *Cooperation and Conflict*, No. 3 (1970), 188-89.

[77] Remarks before United Press International Editors and Publishers, San Francisco, Calif., September 18, 1967, Appendix 4 in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Military Applications, *Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of*

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It would seem prudent for the student of arms races to investigate the possibility of political trigger-events as well. For example, a change or prospective change in leadership might alter one side's view of the strategic-force posture desirable for the future; diplomatic activity might prompt a revision in the estimate of the policy guidelines being followed by the adversary.

The action-reaction triggering potential of activities filtering into the arms race system from its environment must be given some attention. The question arises as to whether the allies of the arms race principals should be considered as being internal or external to the arms race.[78] No general answer is possible. Allies may, by their own behavior, stimulate the arms program of the adversary. Also, allies might successfully generate demands for arms that are additional to those believed to be essential by the principals. In these ways the actions of allies should be viewed as being external to the arms race system. Allied contributions may also be substitutes for armaments that would otherwise have to be found by the principals—to that extent it is reasonable to view them as being internal to the system.

One side or the other may feel compelled to develop and deploy weapons and devise organizations that, primarily, are responsive to threats perceived in diverse parts of the world, quite apart from any direct machination by the rival. These developments might serve to improve a state's arms race position. Such external threat from beyond the system could be of a military or of a political nature, probably of both.

(2) DOMESTIC PROCESS

It seems not unfair to suggest that those persuaded of the reality of a reasonably tight pattern of reciprocal interaction are likely to find it. Persistent, though variable, time-lags in reactions can be explained away as being the product of an inevitable bureaucratic inertia.[79] It may well be that the United States is more prone to the anticipatory reaction or overreaction than is the Soviet Union, in good part because of the asymmetry of information available to the adversaries respecting each other's weapons development and deployment intentions. However, the action-reaction interpretation of America's arms race behavior has been overstressed. Similar interpretation has been made

the United States Antiballistic Missile Programs, Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1967), 107.

[78] Note Watt's criticism of Huntington on this question (fn. 13), 374. Also see Russett (fn. 1), chap. 4.

[79] Shulman (fn. 71), 154-55.

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of some Soviet activities—largely because of the paucity of reliable knowledge regarding the Soviet defense decision-making process. A model of tight strategic reciprocity has the advantage of a comprehensible and familiar strategic logic, and it cannot easily be challenged. Whichever view of the superpower arms race is the more accurate, it is apparent that more detailed studies are urgently required of the defense politics of both countries. This is a task for the political scientist rather than for the strategic analyst.

If taken to the extreme, the domestic process hypothesis would deny the existence of an arms race. One statement of this hypothesis would be that to understand the progress of a particular arms race, we should focus attention not upon threat perception—that is, upon triggers beyond the states in question—but upon domestic processes, strategic doctrines, moods, bureaucracies, and interests that interact to produce defense decisions.[80] Once an adversary has been identified, a close watch will be kept upon his shifting capabilities and intentions, but the major pressures for change in force structure will be internally derived. This hypothesis holds that interstate interaction is bound to occur, but that the majority of interstate arms races will involve states of roughly parallel technology and with bases of resources adequate for most phases and levels of expenditure.[81] The participants will be almost certain to be following, or at least considering, similar lines of military-technical development. Furthermore, belief in a close pattern of action-reaction would underrate the significance of the different responsibilities, world views, and problems of the participants.

The most important domestic influences on arms race behavior may be identified as being (1) inertia, (2) technological momentum, (3) interest, (4) epidemiology, (5) absolute planning, (6) strategic doctrine, (7) government, its structure and the balance of power between its agencies, and (8) geographical location.

The inertia factor refers to the explanation that activity related to the arms race will be pursued by political and military bureaucracies as an ongoing and expected aspect of their daily lives, that is, until there is some dramatic change in the world-view and eventually in the basic policies of the incumbent administration.

Technological momentum refers to the fact that scientists and engi-

[80] One of the most persuasive statements of this view is provided by Steinberg (fn. 15), Introduction. Steinberg's comment upon Anglo-German naval rivalry is applicable to the 1960's. "The treadmill aspect of the Anglo-German arms race was not caused by the technology but by the politics of the participants" 24.

[81] Any resource disparity may prove significant if all competitors are equally alarmed. However, the evidence would suggest that alarm is unlikely to persist. Thus, economically weaker states are not necessarily priced out of a competition.

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neers will produce a new generation of weapons, regardless of their contemporary arms race relevance, simply because it is their task and because the frontiers of knowledge beckon the inquisitive. In other words, expensive research and development activity, may, by "sunk costs" and dependent-industry arguments, foreclose upon nondeployment decisions. So long as modernity in weapons is favored and research activity is well funded, weapons scientists will continue to develop new and improved models. Decisions about timing and size of production-run may bear no precise relationship to the contemporary activity of the rival. It will be sufficient to know, probably in a general way, that the adversary is working along similar lines of technical development.

The argument of interest states that necessary arms race reaction rationales for many major defense decisions are merely rationalizations for the domestic interests of the decision-makers. These interests could be the health of a political constituency, the prestige of an armed service, or the continued vitality of a center of industrial excellence.

The epidemiological argument holds that an arms race should be seen as two or more nationwide diseases.[82] Once aroused to an external danger, irresponsible politicians, soldiers, industrialists, and journalists can tap the national "preparedness syndrome." Naval scares, bomber, missile, and security gaps can be invoked for electoral advantage. The inherent uncertainty regarding adversary intentions, and the difficulty of predicting the scale of weapons deployment over time, lend a certain plausibility to every identification of a future year of maximum danger.

Another factor worthy of attention is the one I identify as absolute planning. We may suppose that a state observes the probable course of military policy of its rival, identifies an appropriate force structure and then builds according to its own blueprint—insensitive even to fairly large changes in the rival's programs.[83] Economy of production should be facilitated, a sense of stability engendered, and possibly an ease of annual parliamentary approval of expenditure assured. Furthermore, regularity of building tempo might discourage rivals. Such an interpretation could not explain the totality of a single state's behavior in an arms race, but it does contain more than a germ of truth for some phases of most arms races.

Those who believe that an approximate symmetry of military

[82] See Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (fn. 27), Part I, chap. 3; Lasswell (fn. 23), chaps. 3-4.
[83] See Huntington (fn. 3), 50-54.

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forces, both qualitative and quantitative, is required before an arms race can seriously be restrained, must confront the fact that each party will hold to different notions concerning the best deterrent to war and the most effective way to conduct military operations. Strategic dialogue may lead, not to a convergence of doctrines, but rather to a recognition of different strategic principles. The ideology of one party might lead it to expect a surprise attack by the war-mongering "adventurists"; such a belief could be a parameter for military preparation. Hence, a preemptive capability, despite its effect on positive feedback to the adversary, might appear to be a necessary precaution. Historical experience, in combination with a strong belief in the probability of war, might cause a party to seek a balanced offense-defense structure in its strategic forces. This preference could be impervious to technological developments, to periods of détente, or to warnings concerning instability in the arms race.

There can be no question but that defense decisions are influenced in their substance by the organizational structure and the decision-making processes involved in their consideration.[84] The degree of autonomy of the armed services and even the traditional supremacy of one particular branch of them might direct the verdict on a particular issue. A somewhat extreme view of the superpower arms race might be that bomber and artillery emphases are to be detected, respectively, in American and Soviet strategic doctrines. Civil-military relations is another aspect of the domestic process that might influence the substance of decisions important to an arms race. Civilian command over the scale and direction of defense expenditure will differ from country to country and from time to time. The degree and nature of such control is a crucial variable influencing arms race behavior.

The final domestic factor to be considered is that of geographical location. Location will influence, though not determine, choice of allies and is very likely to offer quite distinct strategic opportunities. The continental location of the Soviet Union has profoundly conditioned its strategic doctrine and has allowed for the deployment of medium-range weapon systems that could exploit the close proximity of areas whose territorial integrity the rival believed to be vital. The geographical consideration could be expanded so as to include the dis-

[84] Russett draws attention to the difficulty of controlling military expenditures in a political system that ensures a wide dispersion of authority. The degree of Cabinet or Politburo control of expenditure is limited in any executive structure by the plurality of strong vested interests. However, the U.S. government offers an extreme example of how an institutionalized balance of power may frustrate attempts to brake arms racing activity (fn. 1), 184-91.

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tinct resource-base of an arms race competitor, its population distribution, and the defense problems that such distribution imposes.

It must be understood that these domestic factors will interact to produce a stimulation to the arms racing incentives perceived to be imperative because of the external threat. The factors most commonly linked are technological momentum, the competition in funds and prestige between the armed services, and the interest of the defense corporations in the selling of their products. As a subject for comment, the arms race offers much material for a polemic. I hope that the complexity presented in this article might serve to discipline the very narrow focus of much contemporary criticism—for example, that the superpower arms race is an instrument of "outdoor relief" for an amorphous but sinister "military-industrial complex."

Thus far, I have suggested two broad theses concerning arms race dynamics, action-reaction and domestic process. However, if our understanding of the arms race phenomenon is to improve, the need is for synthesis. It is unfortunate that many American politicians and academics seem to have taken their stand upon the issues of the ABM and multiple-warhead deployments and then have adhered to the appropriate thesis concerning the dynamics of the arms race. The majority of those speaking upon national security affairs in the Johnson Administration, and the liberal opposition to the Nixon Administration's ABM decisions, have adhered overwhelmingly to a fairly exclusive action-reaction interpretation of the arms race. On the other hand, the Nixon spokesmen on national security and the more conservative of strategic analysts are far less satisfied with action-reaction.

There must be a measure of action-reaction, or there would be no arms race at all. In other words, arms race participants must maintain a general attention to the developing military posture of their rivals. The argument between an autonomy of separate military development and a close reciprocity of action-reaction must be resolved into an understanding that action-reaction can be either close or distant. The arms race rival(s) provide vital, though possibly intermittent, flows of data that serve to trigger arms race reactions.

However, the domestic processes of a state will determine whether there are to be reactions or not, whether there is any available reaction that would be both expedient and relevant, and also the scale and timing of a reaction. Each state will have its own problems and its preferences as to the best way of solving those problems. Thus, it can be said that the American Sentinel and Safeguard decisions were of a category that would be considered by the Soviet Union as potentially requiring

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an arms race reaction, but to predict the Soviet reaction or nonreaction, an analyst would have to have mastered more detail concerning contemporary Soviet defense politics than would appear currently to be available in the West.

Most of those convinced of the preeminence of action-reaction give passing reference to the fact that there are also other factors driving the arms race. Having given a passing reference, they then offer little serious or prolonged analysis that might substantiate the claims for the priority accorded action-reaction. For example, George Rathjens, in his excellent study, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," both records that there is "a considerable debate" concerning the role of action-reaction and that action-reaction has been "a major stimulant" to the arms race.[85] Both of these statements are appropriate and beyond question, but it is not unreasonable to wonder what the other major stimulants have been and how important a role they have played.

The argument of this article is that there has been so little systematic study of arms race behavior that we cannot reasonably assume the dominance either of action-reaction or of domestic process explanations. We cannot refer to "the basic laws" of the arms race,[86] because it is almost certain that different factors have been of preeminent importance to each competitor during different phases of the race and that different factors are accorded different weights in each country.

Arms Race Study: The Way Forward

Apart from the requirement for a refinement and revision of such a structure for inquiry as that outlined in this article, the way forward to a more complete and useful understanding of arms races should be marked by the following steps: (a) a full and critical guide to the relevant literature; (b) a series of case studies of particular arms races; (c) a comparative analysis of arms races. Although the separate case studies should be concerned with asking very general questions, the following questions should be the explicit concern of a comparative analysis of arms races. This list is by no means exhaustive, and some particular questions have already been raised and briefly discussed above.

Genesis. Why have there been arms races? What has been believed to be the attractions of this particular road to security?

[85] Rathjens (fn. 4), 19.

[86] One group of authors has referred to such "laws." See Union of Concerned Scientists, *ABM:ABC*, in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture, FY 1970*, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington 1969), 2140-54.

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Function. Once an arms race is begun, regardless of the original motives, what functions has the conduct of such a race performed, both for the participants and for the international system?

Typology. What kind of arms races have there been?

Strategy. What arms race objectives have guided competitors? What is the relationship between the nature of the weapons and the strategies pursued? What impact have different "knowledge-states" concerning the programs of rivals had upon the subsequent course of an arms race?

Outcome. How have arms races ended?

Dynamics. How have arms races "worked"? What has been the balance between external and domestic driving factors? To what extent have these factors been mutually supporting?

These studies should be pursued by, or in concert with, students of the domestic politics of the countries concerned—not solely by those fascinated by the logic of strategic interaction.

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ON MARXIAN THOUGHT AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By R. N. BERKI

MY argument is that the very existence of international relations poses a serious, and perhaps intractable, *problem* for Marxism. This is easy enough to see on the level of empirical politics, and even on the level of ideological controversy, but it is a still too little appreciated issue in the context of a thoroughgoing theoretical analysis of Marxian thought. I would like to offer some tentative remarks on this latter plane. My suggestions are not as conclusive as I would like them to be, but they may at least raise some important and topical questions. Briefly, it is my intention to show that since international relations presuppose the horizontal division of mankind into nations or states, and since Marxian thought postulates the absolute unity of mankind as its ideal, problems relating to horizontal group diversity are much more centrally relevant to the Marxian doctrine than it is usually thought. Not only is there a clear moral argument in Marxian thought against group diversity as such, but the very central tenets of Marxism have a direct, though implicit, reference to the relations between horizontal groups such as nations. I believe, further, that these aspects of Marxian thought have been lost sight of and confused or underemphasized over the years, partly by Marx and Engels themselves at the very start, and partly by their political followers, and (later) academic critics. There are fairly obvious historical reasons for this gradual process of dilution, and it is not my intention to play down the importance of living, political Marxism, the system of thought and concrete guide to action into which Marx's original ideas have turned. Nevertheless, it may be of some value to attempt an analysis of Marxism and international relations from the standpoint of the original vision, or insight—especially as this has become, in the last few decades, the major preoccupation of commentators on Marx who are tackling other aspects of his thought.

I

To make clear the distinction between the central, though covert, message of Marxian thought, and its one-sided, conventional understanding, I shall begin by referring to an important theoretical work on

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international relations, K. R. Waltz's *Man, the State and War*.[1] Professor Waltz addresses himself to one of the most pressing problems of international relations, the phenomenon of war. He distinguishes between three sorts of answers that have been given to questions inquiring into the causes of war. The first answer is in terms of human nature; the second is in terms of the internal structure of states; the third focuses on the existence of an international "system" characterized by the absence of legal and political unity and an overriding community of interest. It is the second "image" that interests us here. This postulates, according to Waltz, "that the internal structure of states determines not only the form and use of military force but external behavior generally."[2] He argues further that "Marx and the Marxists represent the fullest development of the second image."[3] The evidence he adduces to show this consists of the well-known and well-worn propositions of historical materialism, supplemented by a consideration of the attitude of some notable Socialists to war and international relations in the period preceding the first World War. On the face of it, on this particular level of abstraction, the pronouncements of Marx, Engels and other prominent theoreticians certainly appear to confirm Waltz's thesis.

The status that overt, conventional Marxism affords to war and international relations is clearly secondary and derivative. The theory starts out from the concept of production which is seen as the basis, and the overall determinant, of social forms and the forms of human consciousness at any time and any place. The historical dynamic of human societies is supplied by contradictions between the smooth development of productive forces and the uneven, angular changes in productive relations. Within the latter, the underlying contradiction appears as a struggle between social groups, classes, which are defined in terms of their relationship to the means of production, ultimately reducible to the division of labor. Classes then, and not nations or states, are the basic units in history, and the struggle between classes, instead of interstate conflict, occupies the center of attention. In more concrete terms, the Marxian theory conceives of a definite historical sequence leading through successive stages of society thus determined by conflict: Asiatic, ancient, feudal, capitalist, and finally to socialism (non-antagonistic society still based on production) and communism (society of plenty). The "present" for Marx and Engels is capitalist society, the last historical form of the antagonism between groups in the productive process. Its basic features are private property of the means of production in the

[1] Kenneth R. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York 1959).
[2] *Ibid.*, 63. [3] *Ibid.*

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hands of the bourgeois class, universal market relations, the development of machine industry, the vast expansion of world trade, and the presence of a formally "free" propertyless group, the proletariat, who maintain themselves under conditions of exploitation by the sale of their labor-power. This capitalist society is historically condemned to a more or less violent death, occasioned on one level by the secular development of the forces of production for which at one point its anarchistic, necessarily expansionist, and profit-based productive relations appear as "fetters," and on another level by the conscious political actions of the proletariat who put an end to the "exploitation of man by man" and inaugurate socialism.

It already emerges from this rather crude and simplified summary that, for Marxism, international relations and conflict inhabit a world at a second remove from relations and conflicts that are really significant. Domestic politics itself, together with the political forms of the class struggle, and all types of ideological consciousness such as religious beliefs and national identities, belong to the "superstructure." The modern sovereign state, the supreme politico-legal authority over a certain part of the earth's territory and a certain number of the world's population, is itself the emanation of the class struggle in its capitalist phase. Internally, the state's function as the "managing committee of the ruling class" is to maintain the system of exploitation; externally, its main preoccupation is to facilitate the economic expansionism of its own bourgeoisie. The ceaseless endeavor to expand is itself made necessary by the position of the bourgeois class in its own territory, as a class whose power vis-à-vis the proletariat is maintained, inter alia, by its ability to enhance its productive potential through the acquisition of ever larger "markets." This competition for markets by a self-divided bourgeois class turns from time to time into open, violent conflict, i.e. war. Thus the whole paraphernalia of horizontal diversity derive from the one basic vertical conflict between classes. As Marx puts the question rhetorically: "Is the whole inner organization of nations, are all their international relations anything else than the expression of a particular division of labour? And must not these change when the division of labour changes?"[4] Again, "The relations of different nations among themselves depend upon the extent to which each has developed its productive forces, the division of labour and internal intercourse. . . ."[5]

Nations themselves, in Marxian theory, are not absolute, but histor-

[4] Letter to P. V. Annenkov, December 28, 1846. Reprinted in Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Moscow n.d.), 174.

[5] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, trans. by R. Pascal (New York 1947), 8.

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ical, and hence ephemeral, units. The emergence of nations in Europe is explained as being cotemporaneous with, and engendered by, the appearance of the bourgeoisie as the dominant class. With the further development of the capitalist mode of production, national diversity itself is gradually eroded. Industry destroys "the peculiar individuality of the various nationalities."[6] Also, "the intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature."[7] Thus, while on the one hand capitalism retains horizontal divisions (a reflection of the character of the bourgeois class itself on the domestic level) and perpetually engenders international conflict that is liable to turn into armed clashes, on the other hand its expansionist, economically progressive character prepares the world for the final overcoming of national and state divisions, and the establishment of socialism which is necessarily internationalist in character. The proletariat—at any rate as seen by Marx and Engels in the heady atmosphere accompanying the mid-nineteenth century social upheavals—is the first truly international, truly human class, without national ties and allegiances. The *Communist Manifesto* declares optimistically: "The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got."[8] And so, after the overthrow of capitalism, the victorious proletariat sets about to replace the antagonistic relations of the market with the "conscious organization of production" to the benefit of the producers. The ending of conflict between classes inevitably brings about its elimination in the wider area of international relations. The toil, strife, division, and enmity of today give rise to tomorrow's peace and brotherhood of all the toilers.

II

At this point, however, we encounter a stumbling block, and I again refer to Waltz by way of illustration. Marx and Engels, Waltz contends, are ambiguous as to what they precisely mean by the absolute dependence of international antagonism on domestic strife. The equations and logic at first appear straightforward: war is conflict between states; states are coeval with capitalism; socialism is the negation of capitalism; *ergo*, socialism has no room for the state; *ergo*, socialism knows no war. But the point is that Marx and Engels fail to show, in

[6] *Ibid.*, 57.
[7] Marx and Engels, *Communist Manifesto* (Moscow n.d.), 49.
[8] *Ibid.*, 76.

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the first place, that there is an absolute coincidence between capitalism and the state, and second, they fail to demonstrate that the *capitalist* state (with its *internally* antagonistic character) is the only possible form of political authority that still allows *external* diversity; hence the possibility of international conflict even in a hypothetical post-capitalist world. Thus Waltz's question is legitimate: "Is it capitalism or states that must be destroyed in order to get peace, or must both be abolished?"[9] The distinction between these two phases, or tasks, is certainly warranted in point of theory. And in the realm of empirical politics it acquires a special relevance as soon as the tasks cease to be remote ones but appear more imminent. Waltz sees the question as assuming special importance later in connection with Marxist revisionism: the attempt to square certain parts of the dogma with a sluggish and recalcitrant political reality. "For Marx the international political problem will wither away only as states disappear. For the revisionists the problem will wither away not as states disappear, but as the separate states become internally more perfect."[10] I do not intend to go into detail on this particular point beyond noting that in my opinion the Marxian ambiguity regarding the disappearance of states is even more impenetrable than Waltz makes allowances for. It seems, further, that the belief that the "internal perfection of states" (that is, their transformation into Socialist communities) is itself a guarantee for the non-recurrence of international conflict, has not been confined to "revisionists," but is shared by the most radical groups among Marx's followers. I shall have more to say about the latter point below.

As regards Marx's ambiguity, it is essential to see that in orthodox, conventional Marxism, in the mature writings of Marx and Engels, the point is not resolved in an explicit form at all. The problem, to repeat, is whether the disappearance of the "state" after the overthrow of capitalism refers only to its internal character as an agency maintaining oppression and exploitation of one class by another (to expect this, by Marxian standards, is surely most reasonable), or also to its external function, which can be defined as organizing and promoting the interests of a group of people distinguished by their permanent occupation of a certain geographical area. It does not matter, of course, whether now one calls it "state," or "nation," or "community," or the "administration of things" (Engels' renowned phrase from *Anti-Dühring*), as long as what is meant is a plurality of these units. In other words, are socialism and communism envisaged as the completely unified society

[9] Waltz (fn. 1), 127.
[10] *Ibid.*, 155.

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of the human race or a society where group diversity continues to exist, albeit in a non-antagonistic form?

The Marxian corpus, particularly in Marx's early writings, contains a few references, some explicit, some oblique, especially with application to the ultimate goal of communism, that postulate a complete unity of mankind. But elsewhere Marx and Engels seem to recognize the existence of "nations" as distinguished from "states," and although nations appear in their theory as historical categories, Marx and Engels are aware of their enduring character. Consider, for example, the sentence following directly the statement quoted above from the *Manifesto*: "Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must raise itself to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word."[11] To begin with, that is, the forces that are supposed to create unity in the future are to become confirmed in their diversity. Engels remarks in a letter to Bebel in 1875: ". . . as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist. We would therefore propose to replace *state* everywhere by 'community' [*Gemeinwesen*]."[12] Note the adverb "everywhere" which indicates a multiplicity of "communities." Or consider the highly significant (and amusing) story related by Marx to Engels about a meeting of Socialists in France, where some radicals were arguing that nations were "antiquated prejudices," to be abolished forthwith. Marx contemptuously calls this "Proudhonized Stirnerism" (anarchistic individualism) and records his rejoinder: "I suggested that by the negation of nationalities he (Lafargue) appeared, quite unconsciously, to understand their absorption into the model French nation."[13] As we shall see, Marx's insight here casts an ominous shadow over the whole career of Marxian thought. The point is that whether or not the ultimate goal is the complete unity of mankind, the separateness of nations is *given*, and as long as this separateness lasts, for instance, in the form of linguistic diversity and separate identities, a demand for unification is tantamount to a demand that small nations be absorbed into, and ruled over by, big ones. Hence, in part, Marx's and Engels' later insistence on "national" self-determination as a goal that is not only compatible with, but essential to, the realization of socialism. Incidentally, the belief in the eventual

[11] *Communist Manifesto* (fn. 7), 76; emphasis in original.

[12] Reprinted in Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Moscow n.d.), 42; emphasis in original.

[13] Marx to Engels, June 20, 1866, in Marx and Engels, *Correspondence 1846–1895* (London 1934), 208. Parts of the letter are quoted with approval by Lenin, who also supplies his own paraphrasis. See V. I. Lenin, "On the Right of Nations to Self-determination," *Selected Works* (Moscow 1935), IV, 275.

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eclipse of the political state and in the future harmony of "liberated" nations was shared by most representative liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century, including John Bright and Mazzini.

The recognition of national diversity is based on sober, realistic considerations, and it is held not only by Marx and Engels, but by practically all the leading exponents of Marxism. In their attitudes as reflected in their writings and policies, this leads, if not always to contradictions, to an unresolved tension, a constant vacillation between two positions. These are a final goal and ideal in terms of a complete unity of human society, and an intermediate goal (sometimes turning into an ideal itself) postulating non-antagonistic diversity along national lines. This vacillation, as I have said, is a necessary corollary of the doctrine's coming to terms with reality, and for this reason it ought to be viewed with sympathetic understanding. However, the interesting question is: can Marxism *afford* this compromise? Does it make sense, in terms of Marxian thought, to talk about non-antagonistic diversity? Can Marxism at all entertain the idea of liberated but separate nations living peacefully side by side, without thereby losing its coherence as a philosophy of man and society? Although conventional interpretations, of which Waltz's "internal structure of states" model is an example, usually assume that such an eventuality is in full accord with the meaning and intention of Marxian thought, it is at least arguable that the separate existence of nations, in principle, negates the very essence of Marx's original ideas. Before plunging into analysis, however, I propose to survey, very briefly, the subsequent history of Marxism in relation to the problem of national diversity.

III

The rather complicated story of Marxist attitudes to this question in the intervening hundred-odd years can be approached by noting two important factors that have succeeded in modifying its original import. The first is the intrusion of strategic considerations, by which I mean the adoption of certain positions as means to an end, as goals which derive their value from what they are seen to be promoting. The second is the appearance of political realism in the wake of success—as a result, in a sense, of the successful employment of the strategic considerations themselves. Realism here means the identification of the original ideals with the viewpoint and interests of particular countries. The two factors, of course, the extension and the modification of the Marxian doctrine, can very rarely be disentangled in practice. Both have

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tended to reinforce an attitude that is increasingly sympathetic to diversity. Although the ideal of complete unity was never entirely lost, there has been a growing feeling of pessimism regarding its realization.

As a strategic weapon, national self-determination was considered indispensable by Marx and Engels. They were living in a Europe dominated objectively by the repressive regimes of multinational empires, such as England, Austria, and Russia, and subjectively by the growing feeling of national identity and, hence, demands for national self-determination. Even though national feelings were thought by Marx and Engels to stem (at least in part) from false consciousness, they were acknowledged to be there and to be giving rise to demands more pressing and more immediate than any desire to overthrow capitalist society. These national feelings had, therefore, to be harnessed to the chariot of socialism. As Engels put it in his 1892 preface to the *Manifesto*: "Without restoring autonomy and unity to each nation it will be impossible to achieve the international union of the proletariat, or the peaceful and intelligent cooperation of these nations toward common aims."[14] Two oppressed nations especially engaged the attention of Marx and Engels: Ireland, on account of its proximity to Marx's and Engels' working locality, England; and Poland, chiefly because of the fact that it was being oppressed by Tsarist Russia, the country they believed (to some extent erroneously) to be the central bastion of European reaction. Irish independence, Marx thought, was necessary to enable not only the Irish, but also the English working class—which itself was participating in the oppression of Ireland through false consciousness—to start on the road towards liberating itself from the capitalist yoke. For the English workers "the *national emancipation of Ireland* is no question of abstract justice or human sympathy but the first condition of *their own emancipation*."[15] Engels, in the strategic vein, regards national independence as the means to social revolution. It is the first task to be achieved: "to fight, one must first have the ground, air, light and elbowroom."[16] And, "two nations in Europe have not merely the right but the *duty* to be national before becoming international: the Irish and the Poles."[17]

Even though the character and position of Marxism have changed, the purely strategic aim of using nationalism and national self-determination as weapons with which to fight capitalism again looms con-

[14] *Communist Manifesto* (fn. 7), 39.
[15] *Correspondence* (fn. 13), 290; emphasis in original.
[16] Karl Kautsky, *Aus der Frühzeit des Marxismus. Engels Briefwechsel mit Kautsky* (Prague 1935), 68.
[17] *Ibid.*, 69; emphasis in original.

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spicuously in our own age. Now it is the United States that is regarded (and this time with more justification) as the mainstay of capitalism in a worldwide context; accordingly, all aspirations to national independence and freedom from the domination of international finance capital receive both verbal and material encouragement from Marxist countries. The process of decolonization as a means to weaken Western capitalism in its dependencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been utilized by Communists to further their own ends ever since the 1920's—not always with success, it should be added. It is also of some interest to note that whereas the Communist espousal of anti-Western nationalism might sometimes ring hollow, as in the case of the Middle East, Communist hostility to nationalism in the service of reaction is both genuine and logically fully consistent with Marxism. Here the most conspicuous examples are Pan-Slavism in the nineteenth century, and Zionism today. At the present age the anti-colonialist slogan is only the major theme in this context. Less noticeable but scarcely less important is the Marxist attempt to use nationalistic feelings, and in particular the fairly widespread anti-American sentiment, to drive wedges between the advanced capitalist countries themselves. Thus the nationalist aspect of Gaullism has been embraced by the French Communist Party, and arguments and slogans couched in patriotic terms now belong to the essential armory of Marxists in Britain, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, and Japan.

It would, however, be a gross mistake to reduce all Marxian arguments favoring national diversity to conscious Machiavellian ruses. The strategic considerations are there at every turn, but policies, at first of Marxist parties and later of Marxist states, have also been modified by what I have called political realism, the gradual process of coming to terms with the given reality of the separate identity of nations. Here the focus is not so much on the masses yet to be redeemed and converted, as on the feelings and consciousness of those who are already members of the Marxist community—either in the spiritual sense, as adherents or sympathizers of Marxist parties, or in the political sense, as inhabitants of Marxist states. Consequently, the dilution of Marxian thought by arguments that accept national diversity tends to become more important the better and the more securely and extensively Marxism is established in the world of politics and power. One can, it seems, put one's finger on this growth of heterogeneity in Marxian thought by reference to five significant landmarks, amounting to traumatic changes in the Marxist consciousness that punctuate the history of Marxism.

The first is the European war of 1914–1918 which effectively shat-

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tered the naive illusion of Marxists that the workingmen in capitalist states really "have no country." European social democracy, as is well known, became deeply divided over the issue of patriotism, and the breach, of course, has not been healed by the subsequent theoretical concessions of radical, "internationalist" Marxists to national feelings. The second landmark is the establishment, in the 1920's, of "Socialism in one country" by the isolated and bitter Bolsheviks whose earlier expectations of a worldwide proletarian revolution had come to nought.

The third is the conscious resuscitation of Great Russian nationalism by Stalin in the late 1930's, partly as a means of consolidating his own Party, and partly as a weapon to be used in the conflict with Germany in the second World War.[18] Obviously, national feeling is not the kind of skeleton that one can put in and out of a closet, and postwar European communism, the revolution exported by the Russian army, was for a considerable time colored by the ruthlessly russifying nationalistic policies of the Soviet Union (for instance, the imposition of "Socialist realism" in the Zhdanov era, prescribing, as it did, classical Russian literature as the model for socialist writers). The fourth landmark, national communism and polycentrism, begins with Yugoslavia's "own road" in 1948, moves through the dislocations accompanying de-Stalinization in the fifties to the virtual independence of Marxist parties in opposition, with their own separate national roads to socialism, and on to a schism and bipolarity within the ruling Marxist camp itself, with the involvement of national feelings on all sides (Chinese xenophobia being only the most obvious example). The fifth and most recent landmark is the dramatic reappearance of romantic radicalism on the left flank of conventional Marxism, lurking in the background ever since the rediscovery of the young Marx, but making its power-political debut only with the abortive French revolution of 1968. The impact of this trend on the Marxist attitude to national diversity would, of course, be as yet well-nigh impossible to gauge, though the prominence given to anti-colonial heroes like Guevara and Fanon, and the near-anarchistic stress on "self-governing communities" would indicate that this influence again is in favor of accepting and even idealizing diversity.

Regarding the substantive issues—world unity as a goal, the nation,

[18] The extent of the change from internationalism to nationalism has really been striking. Stalin, who in 1905 rejoiced in the defeat of the Tsarist armies in the Russo-Japanese War, in 1945 claimed that Soviet victory over Japan wiped out the "dark stain" of defeat by Tsarist Russia. See E. R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York 1960), 92. For further interesting details see a recent study of changes in Soviet historiography, Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship* (Chapel Hill 1969), esp. chap. 4.

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self-determination, national feeling, and so forth—a quick glance through some of the more interesting pronouncements of Marxists should be instructive. It reinforces our expectation of an unresolved tension extant in Marxism since Marx's time. Uncompromising internationalists, such as Rosa Luxemburg, might declare: "Speaking of the right of nations to self-determination, we dispense with the idea of a nation as a whole."[19] But attitudes of this kind have been the exception rather than the rule. Lenin, whose position is sophisticated and who fully grasps the implications of the "givenness" of national diversity,[20] upholds the ultimate goal of "the eventual amalgamation of all nations,"[21] at the same time declaring his support for "the absolutely direct, unambiguous recognition of the full right of all the nations to self-determination,"[22] as well as his belief in the "complete equality of all nations."[23] Stalin, the original Bolshevik "expert" on nationality, is even more categorical, both on diversity and unity: "the right of self-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the right *forcibly* to interfere in the life of the nation. . . ."[24] But then, "the question of the rights of nations is not an isolated, self-sufficient question; it is a part of the general problem of the proletarian revolution, subordinate to the whole. . . ."[25] He defines his goal as a "single world economic system."[26] For Bukharin, "all peoples constitute a great, single-minded family of work,"[27] and he and Preobrazhensky call for the eradication of national enmities and "for the organization of a single world-wide economic system." They go on to say, "if national prejudice and national greed oppose the internationalization of industry and agriculture, away with them, wherever they may show themselves and under whatever colour they may sail."[28] But again, the 1919 Bolshevik Party Program declares: ". . . it is necessary to abolish all privileges of any national group, to proclaim the fullest equality of all nationalities. . . ."[29]

[19] In her untranslated Polish article, "The question of nationality and autonomy," quoted in J. P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg*, abridged edition (London 1969), 507.

[20] Cf. Marx and Engels, *Correspondence* (fn. 13).

[21] Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxism* (Moscow 1965), 284.

[22] "On the Right of Nations to Self-determination" (fn. 13), 271.

[23] *Ibid.*, 293.

[24] Iosif V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (Moscow 1935), 18; emphasis in original.

[25] Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow 1943), 52.

[26] *Ibid.*, 56.

[27] Quoted from Nikolay Bukharin, *Das Programm der Kommunisten*, in Theodore Denno, *The Communist Millennium: the Soviet View* (The Hague 1964), 66.

[28] N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism* (London 1969; first ed. 1921), 244.

[29] See Jan F. Triska, ed., *Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules* (San Francisco 1962), 138.

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The most recent manifestations of Marxist thinking on these issues show no important changes in outlook, except, perhaps, to the extent that unity now tends to be presented as a goal only dimly visible in a distant, misty future. For example, the new Party Program adopted by the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in 1961 (a most significant document in other respects) still sees the eventual establishment of a "world Communist economy regulated by the victorious working people according to one single plan."[30] This, however, is a distant "tendency." In the meantime, the "Socialist world system" is a community consisting of separate, diverse units. "The distinctive features of the relations existing between the countries of the Socialist community are complete equality, mutual respect for independence, and sovereignty and fraternal mutual assistance and co-operation."[31] Amongst them, "a new type of international division of labor is taking shape. . . ."[32] But, ". . . the obliteration of national distinctions and especially of language distinctions, is a considerably longer process than the obliteration of class distinctions."[33] The pessimism is echoed in other sources. A *Pravda* editorial in 1963, for example, refers to Lenin's teaching that "national and state differences among peoples and countries would continue for a very long time even after the establishment of proletarian dictatorship on a world-scale."[34] It reaffirms, further, the curious double commitment to unity and diversity: "We are obligated to inculcate in the people a love not only for their own country but for the other Socialist countries as well, so that each person will feel that he is a patriot both of his own country and of the entire world Socialist commonwealth."[35] Mao Tse-Tung, not surprisingly, says: "Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, be at the same time a patriot? We hold that he not only can but must also be one. . . ."[36] And, "The principle of integrating internationalism with patriotism is practised in the relations between [the Socialist] countries."[37] Finally, we should note that, even if the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, is deemed to have been a clear manifestation of "great power imperialism," the point is that it has not been justified in terms of "unity." The significance from our point of view of even the infamous "Brezhnev doctrine" is that it still upholds the principle

[30] *The New Soviet Society. Final Text of the Program of the CPSU, July 1961. Adopted by the 22nd Congress* (New York 1962), 238.
[31] *Ibid.*, 49. [32] *Ibid.*, 52. [33] *Ibid.*, 193.
[34] See Alexander Dallin, ed., *Diversity in International Communism; A Documentary Record 1961-1963* (New York 1963), 770.
[35] *Ibid.*, 779.
[36] Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works* (London 1958), II, 201.
[37] Speech, November 1957. In *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking 1966), 178.

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of national "sovereignty." Brezhnev, in his Warsaw speech of November 12, 1968, is adamant in asserting the "strict respect" for sovereignty held by the Socialist countries, and his tone becomes almost apologetic when he declares: "Naturally an action such as military assistance to a fraternal country designed to avert the threat to the social system is an extraordinary step, dictated by necessity."

IV

Now to return to analysis. The above illustrations from Marxist texts have been cited to demonstrate the continuing vacillation in Marxian thought between world unity and national diversity. The tendency is to afford more and more implicit recognition to the ideal of a non-antagonistic world community consisting of separate national units. It has to be emphasized that this ideal is not fully accepted by orthodox, institutionalized Marxism, and one cannot say with any degree of certainty whether or not it ever will be. My concern in the following is to indicate why I think that the question should receive more attention than it has up to now. First, a case against diversity as such seems to be contained in Marx's early works. Second, I believe that the concepts with which Marx criticized capitalist society can be profitably utilized in a criticism of an international society consisting of separate units, whatever their "internal structure."

The first point to grasp about Marx's thought is that the Marxian analysis of class society, in particular the arguments about the contradictions of capitalism and the exploitative, inherently antagonistic character of the institution of private property, does not originate in a conceptual vacuum, and is not formulated in abstraction from deeper-lying philosophical conceptions. Although Marx—to a large extent correctly—claimed to have demonstrated the further fate and necessary demise of capitalism scientifically in his mature works on economics, his scientific empirical premises rest firmly on his fundamental assumptions about man, human society and human destiny. Questions such as why, after all, private property, or the division of labor, or the extraction of "surplus-value" from the worker are *antagonistic*, do not get a reply in terms of scientific propositions about the law of the falling rate of profit and the like. Those propositions, however, assume this basic antagonism from the very start. The meaning, let alone the validity, of this major basic premise, in turn, is by no means self-evident. If we are interested in knowing the ultimate rationale for

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asserting this antagonism, we are led on to the *fons et origo* of the Marxian system, Marx's concept of man. A world in which the means of production are owned by one group of people, to the exclusion of another group who belong to the community only negatively, producing its wealth by their labor-power but not sharing its enjoyment, and whose labor-power is therefore sold on the market as though it were a product ("commodity" in Marxian terminology) is an antagonistic world *per se*. The Marxian argument, basically, has nothing to do with living standards, though obviously the palpable misery of the industrial working class in Marx's time served to corroborate and visibly underline Marx's thesis.

A society of this kind is antagonistic, because in it the laboring human being is *alienated*. Marx's early concern with "alienation" is not only logically compatible with his later doctrine of historical materialism, but it bestows on the latter its ultimate philosophical meaning. Alienation is the basic condition, and from it follow the more directly empirical manifestations of antagonism in society.

To take the more immediately relevant dimension first, alienation is man's severance from other men, his becoming a mere "individual," an impoverished, one-sided being, with his private worries and concerns, private vices and virtues, isolated sorrows and inwardly perceived happiness. Marx pours a lot of scorn over the "solitary" and "calculating" individual, the hero of early liberal philosophy. Now Marx's point is that the self-regarding individual, the inhabitant of capitalist, private-property oriented society, is "alienated," "estranged"; that is, as he sometimes puts it, "not at home." The question is therefore, where, or what, is man's true "home"? Marx's answer, on this plane, is that man's home is the "species." The restricted individual appears "alienated" to Marx only because he conceives of man as essentially a "species-being." Man's true home, his true world is the whole of mankind: alienation makes him something less than he truly is. Ideally, "man is a species-being . . . because he treats himself as the actual living species; because he treats himself as a *universal* and therefore a free being," ". . . a being that treats the species as its own essential being."[38] But conditions in actual society negate this. Here "estranged labour estranges the *species* from man. It turns for him the *life of the species* into a means of individual life."[39] The estrangement from nature thus means "the estrangement of man from man."[40] Man in

[38] Marx, *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts 1844* (Moscow 1961), 74, 75; emphasis in original.
[39] *Ibid.*, 77; emphasis in original.
[40] *Ibid.*

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this society is not merely severed from his essence, not merely a piece apart, but *fragmented*, broken up, crumbled, lost in a chaotic hostile world of antagonistic productive relations. In this world he is no longer a "universal" being, but an "individual" (self-centered) and also "particular" being, with sectional, restricted group-loyalties and allegiances. Marx's vision of communism is the total, final "negation of the negation," the cancellation of man's existence in the capitalist, individualist wilderness. Communism is "the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e. human) being . . ."; ". . . the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species." It is "the positive transcendence of all estrangement—that is to say, the return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his *human*, i.e. *social* mode of existence."[41]

Now, disregarding the philosophical terminology (copied from Feuerbach), which Marx undoubtedly shed and even ridiculed in his later development—without, however, moving an inch from the underlying assumptions—the relevant point of all this for our purposes is Marx's dialectic of "universal" and "individual," the single human being and the species. His assertion, translated into simpler language, is that man's ultimate satisfaction is found only in a union with his fellow human beings. What we must concentrate on here, of course, is not the over-debated, trite problematic of "individualism versus collectivism." I think it can be safely assumed that Marx is a certain kind of collectivist—not, of course, in the sense of "subordinating" the individual to society, but on the grounds of believing (rightly or wrongly) that the individual is a *social* being, i.e., a social being in and for a genuinely human, that is, unalienated, society. Our concern is with the *extent* of the collective unit—with the precise limits, for Marx, of this ideal "society." In this respect Marx's emphatic assertion of the essential "oneness" of man and his species, and his corresponding total silence (in this context) on lesser, intervening collectives such as the nation, the region, the race, and so forth, are instructive—though not, of course, conclusive. Marx's attention is obviously centered on vertical fragmentation and not on horizontal diversity. His condemnation of vertical divisions and group-loyalties in society is total and unambiguous. (The oft-quoted Marxian call for a "proletarian class-consciousness" might mislead us here. In truth it is, as it were, a strategic device intended to bring about the abolition of all

[41] *Ibid.*, 102-103; emphasis in original.

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classes in society). Does Marx, however, feel equally strongly about national and state divisions? Or, alternatively, can anything be inferred from his earlier theoretical conceptions in this respect?

On the first count, evidence is only indirect. Marx and Engels, like everybody else, were aware of existing differences between nations and races, and freely employed these differential notions in their correspondence and other writings in a lighter vein—speaking, for example, about the difference between English and French materialism,[42] the undesirable qualities of Jews and Slavs, and the superiority of German philosophy. I think, however, that it is easy to show that insofar as these criticisms are meant seriously by Marx and Engels, they derive their force from an association of ideas, i.e., Jews are identified with the spirit of capitalism, Slavs with political reaction, and German philosophy with the dawn of proletarian consciousness. On the whole, Marx and Engels are emphatic in holding that "national narrow-mindedness is everywhere repellent."[43] Further, Marx holds that "the egotism of the nation is the natural egotism of the general state system. . . . The supreme being is the higher confirmation of the general state system, that is, again the nation. Nevertheless, the supreme being is supposed to curb the egotism of the nation, that is, of the general state system. . . ."[44] Statements of this kind (others occur in Marx's early writings devoted to a critique of Hegel) can, with some legitimate attempts at projection, be construed to suggest that Marx, in truth, is in possession of a higher, more refined conception regarding international society than the view Waltz attributes to him. Marx's connecting of the "nation" with the "state system" in this way indicates that his thought in reality approximates Waltz's "third image." At the least, his pronouncements show a strong dislike of national diversity *per se*.

On a deeper level, the Marxian critique of the capitalist state, put forward most forcefully in his early polemics with Bauer over Jewish emancipation, is revealing. The overt context—political society in the bourgeois era—is of course a restricted one, but this restriction is not such as to make it impossible for Marx's arguments to be extended. On the contrary, an extension to cover the whole world of bourgeois

[42] Cf., ". . . the difference between French and English materialism follows from the difference between the two nations. The French imparted to English materialism wit, flesh and blood eloquence. They gave it the temperament and grace that it lacked. They civilized it." Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family* (Moscow n.d.), 174.

[43] *German Ideology* (fn. 5), 99.

[44] *Holy Family* (fn. 42), 161.

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political societies is demanded by the thrust of the Marxian critique. Marx's point here concerns Bauer's confusion of "political emancipation and universal human emancipation."[45] Political emancipation, of course, is the great achievement of the bourgeoisie, and in the bourgeois state all are "citizens," free and equal before the law. "*Political* emancipation certainly represents a great progress. It is not, indeed, the final form of human emancipation, but it is the final form of human emancipation *within* the framework of the prevailing social order."[46] What is the nature of bourgeois freedom? It is, in the first place, the freedom of the impoverished restricted individual. This "liberty as a right of man is not founded upon the relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation of man from man."[47] Also, this freedom is the freedom of reified entities, such as religion, property, and the state, these being opposed to the interest of man as a species-being. The bourgeois state provides freedom of religion, but Marx wishes for freedom from religion. The fact that in the modern secular state political emancipation could go side by side with the continuing practice of Judaism, with continuing particular group-loyalties within the community, shows that "*political emancipation* itself is not *human* emancipation."[48]

I want to suggest that here we should pay attention to the wider implications of Marx's onslaught on bourgeois society. The Marxian distinction between "political" and "human emancipation" has an all-important horizontal dimension. The "state" represents not merely class divisions, but also national divisions; the bourgeois "citizen" is separated not merely from his fellow-citizens, but also, and even more, from the citizens of other states; the "prevailing social order" refers not merely to capitalism, but, over and above that, to the all-round separation and division between the peoples that alone makes capitalism possible. Horizontal separation is not a sufficient, but certainly a necessary condition of the bourgeois order of society, the latter being, in a sense, a minute replica of the former. Moreover, I would like to suggest that the Marxian vision of man as a species-being is so advanced and so radical that in comparison even such modern ideals as "internationalism" and "cosmopolitanism" appear timid and inadequate. For the internationalist, nations still count as real entities. The cosmopolitan, though rising above national distinctions, is still a

[45] "On the Jewish Question," reprinted in Marx, *Early Writings*, trans. and ed. by T. B. Bottomore (London 1963), 8.
[46] *Ibid.*, 15; emphasis in original.
[47] *Ibid.*, 25.
[48] *Ibid.*, 21; emphasis in original.

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"citizen," a separate individual, and thus alienated. For Marx, however, in the last analysis all group-identities issue from reifications. All these lesser entities—the state, the nation, the tribe, the family, and even the class—stand between "man" and the "species." Patriotism of any kind, therefore, will appear as a particular form of alienation.

V

These considerations, of course, only show that in Marx there is a strong suspicion attached to any kind of diversity, and that, for Marx's original humanism, separation and, *a fortiori*, political or national separation, appear abhorrent. However, the aforementioned early Marxian position still leaves open the question whether horizontal diversities are necessarily antagonistic—in theoretical terms, as opposed to moral ones. Now I do not think that such a universal necessity is postulated in Marx's doctrine, early or mature. It is, however, possible to show that the necessity of horizontal antagonism *in certain circumstances* can be inferred from the main propositions of Marxism. To see this we have to go back to "alienation."

The more important sense of alienation is that it is the severance of laboring man from nature. It means that man is no longer living in harmony with nature, his own "essence," but is leading a falsified, distorted, estranged "animal existence," prostituting his creative energy in working for a price, a wage, a mere shadow of his full potentialities. This aspect of alienation signifies the exclusion of the worker from what ought to be his inalienable possession, namely inanimate nature which is the necessary milieu of his life activity, labor. Nature is indispensable to labor's fulfilment. The worker's exclusion from nature does not mean that nature is now independent or rules over the worker —though sometimes Marx's words suggest that this is the case. In truth, the alienation of the worker from nature means that nature is now owned by another man, in this case the capitalist. "The relationship of the worker to labour engenders the relation to it of the capitalist. . . . *Private property* is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of *alienated labour*, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself."[49]

Private property thus is something more than the capitalist's basis of domination over the worker, although it is this latter dimension that receives special emphasis in Marx's later works. It reflects, as we have

[49] *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* (fn. 38), 80; emphasis in original.

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seen, man's dehumanization, his severance from his genuine environment. The point, however, should be grasped concretely, not in relation to any abstract transcendental notion of "man." Marx does not base his denunciation of alienation and private property on any conception of "natural right," in terms of which man, as man, would be seen to have a categorical claim to nature. In the first place, man lives in a community, and thus deprivation and exclusion are measured in terms of the community's aggregate potentialities. The ideal is human equality towards nature, a community where nature's random distribution of resources is cancelled out by the conscious organization of production. Second, with reference to more advanced societies, the Marxian emphasis is on the *worker* who produces for his society, and who, most importantly, does this in association with his fellows. Thus the social aspect of private property appears as usurpation, the exclusion of precisely those who are indispensable for the creation of property in the first place. In other words, private property expresses the fundamental *asymmetry* of social relations in societies where it is found: wealth is created by the "associated producers," the whole of the productive community, and yet it is the effective possession of a restricted group who constitute merely a part of that society. For our purposes it is immaterial whether this restricted group of property owners dominate through the ownership of land, or capital, or military power; what is crucial is that they are always merely a part of the whole. The basic contradiction of such a society, therefore, is not between two classes appearing side by side, but between a totality (society organized for production) and an abstracted, elevated section of that same totality (i.e., the owners of the means of production). In Marx's economic theory all this is expounded in detail, with the employment of sophisticated tools of analysis, like the Labor Theory of Value. I cannot, of course, go into this, but I can try to analyze the notion of private property further, in a direction relevant to our concerns.

It seems evident to me that although Marx's emphasis is on domestic societies where the antagonism of private property appears in the form of enmity between classes, there are compelling reasons why his analysis ought to be extended to cover a wider area where, in certain circumstances, it will be seen that the *same* antagonism that results in vertical conflict within a society now appears as a horizontal conflict among societies. Only two shifts in the theory are needed, and these are merely clarifications of doctrine and not alterations of substance. In the first place, the basic unit should now be the "whole,"

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meaning not a particular "nation," or "community," or "society," but a *whole world* of societies, where these lesser groups live side by side and are aware of the existence of one another. This "world" is still not necessarily coterminous with the objective category, the human race, though in the modern age the two would be seen to coincide—indeed, this is one of the essential traits of modernity.

The second and more important clarification concerns the concept "private," especially as understood in the term "private property." I think this term, in its Marxian usage, should be understood to mean "part of a whole." It refers not to an entity, but to a *position* in society. "Private property" thus may mean property owned by an in-



as this group is less extensive than the community where the property owned by it has its effect. Capitalism does not cease to be capitalism when the individual entrepreneur is replaced by the joint stock company. "Private," to put it another way, refers not so much to the nature of the entity that owns, but to the fact that it is an entity, a unit whose ownership of nature (in the form of resources or the product of labor) signifies the exclusion of others from this ownership. The "internal structure" of this ownership is not only immaterial from the point of view of an analysis of its wider, social significance, but, as Marx insists, it is the social position of this owner, as owner, that determines its internal characteristics. A capitalist might be a "good man" in some vague psychological sense; to the extent that he is a capitalist, an owner of property, he is necessarily an exploiter. In principle, the same applies in the case of any other owner, of whatever size or other superficial characteristics.

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work it is interesting to see how the basic contradiction is played out between an ideal seen exclusively in terms of a domestic situation and an analysis in terms of a total world community. Engels' concern is with putting a Marxian gloss on the anthropological theories of Lewis Morgan, whose *Ancient Society* was published in 1877. We can disregard here the more problematic aspects of the original theory of Morgan as well as Engels' interpretation. The significant point is this. Engels stresses the fact that, in prehistoric society, property was held in common by the "gentes," matriarchal tribal groups. The absence of private property there meant, indeed, the absence of antagonism within these groups. Engels' tone in describing the quality of life in the gentes is bordering on plain adulation.[51] "And this gentile constitution is wonderful in all its childlike simplicity. Everything runs smoothly without soldiers, gendarmes or police: without nobles, kings, governors, prefects or judges; without prisons; without trials. All quarrels and disputes are settled by the whole body of those concerned. . . ." "There can be no poor and needy—the communistic household and the gens know their obligations towards the aged, the sick and those disabled in war. All are free and equal—including the women."[52]

A blueprint for the Marxian future? Perhaps, *mutatis mutandis*. It is, at any rate, instructive to see how this idealized picture of the happy, peaceful character of human relations in the "communistic" gentile world is dealt a fatal blow as soon as attention is focused on the nature of *intergroup* relations found in this world. Engels, having devoted a few pages to unqualified praise for the gentes, now admits that "this is one side of the picture. . . ." "Where no treaty of peace existed, war raged between tribe and tribe; and war was waged with the cruelty that distinguished man from all animals. . . ."[53] ". . . war was as old as the simultaneous existence alongside each other of several groups of communities."[54] And what was the cause of warfare? None other than the same old Marxian explanation used to account

[51] It is true that Marx's own pronouncements on primitive society are not tinged with the same kind of idealization. Indeed, Marx seems to maintain, in his scarce references to the subject (e.g., in *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*), that "Asiatic" society was also antagonistic. However, I don't think that there is evidence to show that "until his death Marx upheld the Asiatic concept" [K. A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven 1957), 373]. Marx's remarks were written in the 1860's whereas Morgan's *Ancient Society* appeared in 1877. Engels claims in the preface to *Origin of the Family* that he is executing Marx's "behest."

[52] *Origin of the Family* (fn. 50), 159.

[53] *Ibid.*, 161.

[54] *Ibid.*, 249.

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for all kinds of antagonism: "The wealth of their neighbours excited the greed of the peoples who began to regard the acquisition of wealth as one of the main purposes in life."[55]

Obviously, such a simple model cannot be directly applied to modern society, and certainly not in terms of the Marxian doctrine for which the unilinear development of human history is a fundamental truth. On a more concrete level, it would be absurd to attempt to transfer the ignorance, barbarity, and primitive living conditions of the prehistoric world to the civilized human community of the capitalist and post-capitalist stages of development. However, it is by no means the case that all the secular differences between a gentile world and a world of separate nations point in the same direction. Certain changes, such as the growth of culture and the emergence of a common human consciousness, might indicate that, in the latter case, "greed" will not invariably lead to the cruelty of "perpetual warfare."[56] But these, we could say, are changes involving merely the subjective side of human life, and, in terms of Marxism, what should count is the objective basis. And on this level the changes might show the presence of factors leading to the increase of antagonism, not its abatement. In the gentile world the gentes lived "side by side." In the modern world nations live not only side by side, but in an *integrated* community, where the requirements of livelihood of the separate units have created universal economic interdependence. Here it is essential to see that Marx unequivocally welcomes this interdependence, and his ideal of socialism is the very opposite of the romantic-anarchistic vision of autarchic "self-governing communities" replacing the world economy of capitalism. In such an integrated world the random distribution of natural resources does not merely lead to the development of differentials in living standards, wealth, armed strength, and, in turn, to warfare and ultimately relations of domination among the separate units—as was the case, *ex hypothesi*, in the primitive prehistoric world. Economic interdependence means that in such a world the differentials are augmented and aggravated by relations of *production*. Here, therefore, these relations of domination also reflect the exploitation, by the owners of the means of production, of those who have, in the last resort, nothing but their labor-power to sell. The conclusion appears unavoidable: an economically integrated world still consisting of separate nations is, whatever the internal structure of these nations, a *capitalist world*.

[55] *Ibid.*, 270. [56] *Ibid.*, 154.

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How, then, should a consistent Marxist look upon "nations?" While analogical reasoning has its rather obvious dangers, and while the Marxian analysis of capitalism can obviously not be extended indefinitely, there are certain phenomena, especially in modern images of the nation, that ought to be taken into account. Here I am referring again to some of the concepts used conspicuously in present-day Marxist utterances on the subject of international relations. On closer analysis these concepts, e.g., "sovereignty," "equality of nations," "fraternal assistance," "international division of labor," reveal themselves to be notions uncannily reminiscent of the terms well known from Marx's critique of capitalism.

Take "sovereignty." In modern usage, this concept has come to signify the nation's absolute supremacy to conduct its relations, external and internal, according to its own will and without any obligation to a higher, more comprehensive community. Most significantly, it refers also to the nation's unlimited right to use and dispose of its material wealth, natural resources, scientific know-how, skill, manpower, and so forth. It confirms, in other words, the position of the nation as *owner*—owner of property which, in the context of a community of nations, appears as "private property" pure and simple. In Marx's words, "the right of property is . . . the right to enjoy one's fortune and to dispose of it as one will; without regard for other men and independently of society. It is the right of self-interest."[57] Does not the "fortune" of nations, in the shape of fertile soil, mineral wealth, access to the seas, as well as a higher state of productive development, belong essentially to the same category? Then, take the supposed "equality" of nations. Nations, whichever way one looks at them, are much less "equal" than individuals, and Marx, for one, certainly did not commit the fallacy of taking unequal individuals to be equals. He accepted human inequality as a fact (naming the division of labor as the cause),[58] and his ideal was the progressive equalization of human beings. But whereas it makes sense to envisage the equalization of individuals, nations cannot be subjected to the same process. Individuals can be defined in terms of their potentialities and it can be held that they are all inherently equal in respect of these potentialities, but nations, as inert, immobile, earth-bound entities, can only be

[57] "On the Jewish Question" (fn. 45), 25.

[58] Cf., "In principle, a porter differs less from a philosopher than a mastiff from a greyhound. It is the division of labour which has set a gulf between them." *Poverty of Philosophy* (fn. 4), 123.

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defined in terms of their assets, their existing possessions.[59] There may be a thoroughly egalitarian ideal of "man." Such an ideal applied to the "nation" would be a palpable absurdity.

Capitalist society, for Marx, is a society inhabited by "sovereign" property owners and formally "equal" partners in the exchange relationship, where the owner's capital is exchanged for the worker's labor-power. The situation is essentially the same in a "Socialist" community where nations are sovereign and assumed equal, and where their economic relations are conducted with a "strict respect" for their sovereignty. I am not denying that "Socialist cooperation" and the "new Socialist division of labor" might not be accepted as higher and more humane than the purely competitive, anarchistic relations among capitalist states. But, again, the relevant comparison here is not between two types of international relations, but between relations within a confined group, and relations among the groups themselves. It appears to me that the "fraternal assistance" and "mutual aid" allegedly informing the relations among Socialist states do not essentially change the character of these relations, but leave them, in Marxian terms, fairly and squarely at the level of typical capitalist relations. After all, capitalism for Marx is not literally the law of the jungle, but an "orderly" society with universal laws, rules for conduct, a more or less genuine regard for the (alienated) "person," and even organized welfare services, either by the state or by private charity. Such features of a capitalist society, of course, do not fundamentally alter its essence, the raison d'être for the antagonism contained in it, viz., the institution of private property. Likewise, genuinely friendly understanding among Socialist countries, treaties like the COMECON agreement, can certainly mollify (like progressive taxation in capitalist countries) the antagonism created by the differences of existing and potential wealth, but they cannot eradicate it—short of the abolition of its mainstay, the sovereignty of nations. It makes no difference that Socialist nations are all "fraternal" and concerned "with the vital interests and tasks of the harmonious and all-round development of all Socialist states. . . ."[60] The point is that nations *cannot help but be* self-regarding, as long as their position is that of owners of property in a wider community characterized by economic interdependence.

[59] I am adapting here C. B. Macpherson's insightful comparison of the individualist and Marxist conceptions of human nature. See his "The Maximization of Democracy," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, Third Series (Oxford 1967).

[60] The words of the Polish Prime Minister, Jaroszewicz, expounding the "Fundamental Principles of International Socialist Division of Labour," in the course of the meeting of COMECON, Warsaw, June 1961.

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VII

In this light, then, it affords some amusement to consider a few of the more explicit pronouncements of heretical or reformist Marxists on this vital issue. The unresolved tension between "sovereignty" and a "world economic system," between "patriotism" and "internationalism," is apparent even in the case of such mainstream figures of Marxism as Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Brezhnev. There are, however, also new departures, and while we may with good reason regard these as desirable, in accordance with the requirements of peace and stability, and based upon a better recognition of the nature of human society, it would be sophistical to regard them as "Marxist" departures, whatever sense of Marxism we have in mind. Edvard Kardelj, for example, realistically perceives that there are contradictions specific to socialism, one of these being "the necessity for relationships between one Socialist country and another to be founded on interstate relationships, which makes possible tendencies towards a desire to dominate others, to national egoism and like phenomena. . . ."[61] If what Kardelj says is true, I submit, socialism should be redefined as the "highest stage of capitalism." (This redefinition would, as a matter of fact, also be warranted on the basis of other features of "socialism," irrelevant in the present context. And such a redefinition, of course, does not imply a pejorative view of socialism.) Alexander Dubcek, in the ill-fated 1968 Action Program of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, declares that his country's foreign policy "will continue, on the basis of mutual respect, to intensify sovereignty and equality, and international solidarity."[62] The intensification of sovereignty, one may say, certainly does not lead to the original Marxian goal, whatever else it it may lead to. Finally, Milovan Djilas, talking about Yugoslavia, states: "There is no equality among nationalities without human freedom, or without the genuine right of each national community to secession, the right to a *self-contained economy*. . . ."[63] In emphasizing the need for a "self-contained economy," Djilas might be said to be drawing a logical conclusion from given facts. But this ideal, of course, is directly opposed to the vision of Marx.

Now let me address myself to the vital question: is the problem presented by the separate existence of nations such that Marxism, as

[61] Edvard Kardelj, *Socialism and War: A Survey of Chinese Criticism of the Policy of Co-existence* (London 1961), 189.
[62] Reprinted in H. Lunghi and P. Ello, *Dubcek's Blueprint for Freedom* (London 1969), 207.
[63] Milovan Djilas, *The Unperfect Society* (London 1969), 153; emphasis in original.

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a *theory* of man and society, can extricate itself from it in the foreseeable future? I would tend to answer in the negative. The dilemma certainly appears inescapable. In practice and in propaganda it might be obscured with greater or lesser temporary success, but it is bound to reassert itself continually for a long time to come. One horn of the dilemma is provided by the necessarily capitalistic, antagonistic character of a world community that consists of separate units. The centripetal pull of radically centralist Marxist aspirations, therefore, certainly appears legitimate in terms of the ultimate ideal postulated by the Marxian doctrine. But is centralization the right answer? Would the abolition of national sovereignty, the replacement of, say, COMECON by centralized, fully supranational planning by a socialist community really achieve complete unity? And would this unity be desirable, in terms of the very same Marxian ideal? Here we again meet a stubborn obstacle that was noticed a long time ago by Marx himself, viz., the *given fact* of separate nations. This is the other horn of the dilemma. As long as separate national identities exist, unity inevitably means hegemony. As is being recognized with increasing openness by Soviet spokesmen, national differences are more enduring than class distinctions (and can we really see the end of class distinctions yet?). My conclusion, then, must be presented in this disjunctive form: the Marxian ideal of socialism appears either in the shape of hegemony, as the domination of strong nations over weak ones; in this case it is no longer tinged with the features of capitalism, but neither is it the realization of a higher human freedom. Or, it appears in the shape of a community of independent nations, in which case it may come to represent freedom and progress over capitalism proper, but remains a system still visibly bearing the birthmarks of capitalism.

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Review Articles

ON THEORY AND PRACTICE AMONG ARABS

By CLEMENT HENRY MOORE

Douglas E. Ashford, *National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, 439 pp., $10.00.
Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, New York, John Wiley, 1964, 287 pp., $9.95.
Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1969, 349 pp., $8.75.
William B. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968*, Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1969, 313 pp., $8.95.
John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study in Segmented Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, 368 pp., $10.00.

THE fact that most Arab countries recently celebrated the centenary of Lenin's birth with varying degree of fanfare only underlines their relative impermeability to his teachings. The fanfare was not in all cases inversely proportional to the country's implementation of practical ideology, but the latter is in scarce evidence. Few of the leadership groups have assimilated the Leninist prescription to unite practice with theory, much less devised or adapted an ideology which is "practical" in the sense of legitimating particular political strategies or tactics in a logical and systematic way. Nor have they, except possibly in Tunisia, developed the necessary concomitant of practical ideology, namely a durable political organization which articulates and implements it.

Most opposition groups, even Marxist ones, share their rulers' failure to coordinate words with organized action. The flow of ideological utterances is heady and incessant, but their relation to political practice is usually fortuitous. Most Arab ideology is expressive rather than practical. Its functions are to reassure both articulator and audience, to engender solidarity, and to resolve problems of personal or group identity. Practical ideology can also fulfill these functions, but it does the practical work which expressive ideology cannot do—of systematically relating ideological goals to political means. Arab na-

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tionalism, as has recently been observed, is "secure from the glare of empirical reality . . . precisely because it is not compromised by identity with any specific Arab state."[1] It recalls the Sorelian myth of the general strike, which, counterpointing Leninism, is the perfect illustration of expressive ideology.[2]

The student of Arab political development must ask why practical ideology—whether of the Marxist-Leninist, Muslim fundamentalist, or any other variety—does *not* flourish, if only because durable organization is less likely to develop without it.[3] Recent discussions of ideology in new nations are of little help because they blur the crucial distinction; Clifford Geertz, for instance, sees "cognitive maps" in what we would consider to be expressive as well as practical ideologies. Aristide Zolberg, closely following Geertz's analysis, concludes of selected West African party-states: "Political ideology becomes an incantation which genuinely transforms reality, *even if nothing else happens*, by changing men's view of it."[4] But when "nothing happens," the ideology, like Sorel's myth, is clearly expressive, not practical. And when nothing happened, did not the incantations give way to military drills? There may, even in West Africa, be a relationship between practical ideology and legitimacy—and hence the ability to withstand military coups—which Zolberg's analysis overlooks.

The Arab-Islamic world can, as Leonard Binder observes of an even wider area, "be delimited for scholarly purposes because of the cultural unity prevailing therein" (p. viii). Though it is still a virtual desert for political science, numerous historical, legal, philosophical, and theological works on Arabs and Islam offer a fertile field for the analysis of ideology. Binder's book is reviewed here, though some of its essays were published more than a decade ago, because he relates traditional materials to contemporary ideology and social theory. Given the relative cultural unity, it seems fair to ask whether, and in what senses, the political culture impedes the emergence of practical ideology in this part of the world. John Waterbury and William

[1] Richard H. Pfaff, "The Function of Arab Nationalism," *Comparative Politics*, II (January 1970), 158.

[2] Clement H. Moore, "The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York 1970), 53-56.

[3] Thus, predictions about the imminent rise of mass political parties in the Arab world would seem premature, but see William Polk, *The United States and the Arab World* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969), 228.

[4] Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order* (Chicago 1966), 65; emphasis added. See Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York 1964), 46-76. Cf. Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (New York 1961), 125 and note 10.

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Quandt offer contrasting hypotheses, while Richard Mitchell provides a case study of a practical ideology that failed. Before discussing these works, however, I will try to defend the significance of the inquiry, because the distinction between practical and expressive ideology is not usually made by non-Marxists.

I

Douglas Ashford presents the case for practical ideology and its relevance for development by comparing the Tunisian with the Moroccan and Pakistani experiences. By "national development" he usually means "a process whereby the citizen begins to reconstruct the value placed on the nation in such a way as to enhance his chances of leading a more productive life and living happily in a more complex environment" (p. 13), or "a process by which government and nation are brought into some kind of harmony" (p. 9). The definition, intended to apply to most new nations, assumes that "national identity has indeed been firmly internalized as the evidence suggests, but only as a value bereft of operational meaning and content" (p. 8). Governments concerned with development, then, must introduce widespread social change which puts nationalist fervor to use by giving citizens concrete tasks and channels for participating in the process. In this perspective Ashford examines the efforts of the three governments to build local authorities, engage in economic planning, redistribute land, carry out public works in the countryside, reform the administrative and educational systems, convert Islam to modern needs, and draft constitutions.

Actually, Ashford's assumptions are misleading in the context of the Arab-Islamic world. National identity may be "firmly internalized" in Mexico, at least in its towns of over 10,000 inhabitants from which Almond and Verba derived the evidence Ashford cites.[5] But does the nation supersede all other loyalties for Jordanians or Iraqis? Or, for that matter, for most Pakistanis and Moroccans? Even assuming that most parochial peasants and tribesmen have acquired emotional attachments to wider communities,[6] the new effective identifications are more likely than in other new nations to transcend the borders of their

[5] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963), 101-22, cited by Ashford on page 8.

[6] For suggestive evidence to the contrary for transitional, rather mobile Moroccans, see Driss Ben Hamed Charhadi, *A Life Full of Holes*, recorded, translated (or possibly imagined) by Paul Bowles (New York 1964). Even if the book is a fake, Bowles has lived many years in Morocco and is in closer touch with the type of person who ostensibly wrote it than most Westerners or educated Moroccans.

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respective regimes. Arab and/or Islamic symbols may be dissonant with "national" ones. Hence any particular Arab-Islamic government may find it difficult to elicit "nationalist" fervor, much less to put it to use. It must either neutralize or express within its limited jurisdiction its citizens' wider loyalties. Unfortunately Ashford has too readily assumed popular identification with the nation-state and hence paid only brief attention to the "affective vortex" of Islam and to "international substitutes for national action" (pp. 304-38). Islamic and foreign issues are viewed as distractions from the concrete tasks of development because the fervor they generate is "difficult to translate into affective [*sic*] action at the local level" (p. 321). But isn't this a difficulty inherent in development? Leaders must enlist volatile mass emotions if they are to alter popular values. In Tunisia, for instance, Bourguiba needed a crisis with France over Bizerta in 1961 (though he miscalculated its magnitude) in order to make his party cadres swallow economic planning.

Ashford's conception of development is nevertheless extremely useful for our purposes. Much political rhetoric in the Arab world is empty, yet development requires that concrete meanings be attached to expressive symbols. For better or worse, however remote from the citizen it may be, government is the essential "arbitrator" of the developmental process because "it does in fact make the critical decisions about how the society will be reconstructed" (p. 8). Furthermore, there are linkages between critical decisions, characterized by Ashford as the "political orientations" of the respective regimes. Each regime has displayed a distinctive approach in the various specific areas where choice and policy-making are compared. The Pakistani military bureaucracy was professional and out of touch with the people, while the Moroccan monarchy stimulated great popular emotions but little carry-through. Only the Tunisians have been both generating popular emotion and translating their abstract slogans into sustained efforts of social change. Thus Tunisia's practical ideology ("Destour Socialism") gets the highest marks, but unfortunately political choices here are constrained by the single-party system's survival requirements. Ashford therefore seems at times to be more critical of the "overly cautious" Tunisian policy-makers who try to control the pace of social change than of the scattered Moroccans or impotent Pakistanis.

His conclusion about Tunisia is unexceptionable: "Mobilization of a government should not be confused with mobilization of a populace. . . . The real test of the regime will be its ability to absorb and ac-

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commodate the more articulate and responsive citizen now beginning to assert himself" (p. 238). The analysis is flawed, however, by excessive reliance upon theory derived from American clinical experiments in cognitive psychology. Government "orientations" and "attitudinal change" are viewed in psychological rather than political perspective. Citizens are viewed as abstract bundles of attitudes—in the absence, incidentally, of any survey research, despite the fact that attitudinal changes are the subject of the concluding 85 pages of the book—rather than as members of concrete and categoric interest groups. Government policies, too, are abstracted from the complex social bases upon which the respective regimes rely for support. For comparative purposes, more explicit attention should have been given to sheer differences in size: it is obviously more difficult to relate central planning to basic democracies in Pakistan than to Moroccan communes or Tunisian municipal councils.

Basic regime "orientations," if extended to details, may describe but not explain government policies. The "affective" nature of the Moroccan monarchy, for instance, does not explain why it has failed to tackle agrarian reform. However, the nature of the regime, analyzed in terms of its legitimating principles and social bases, will yield explanations. Ashford intuitively reaches for such explanations, but psychological theories distract him. His account of failure in the Moroccan countryside would have been more convincing had he recognized the monarchy's increasing reliance, since 1960, upon the Ministry of Interior to coordinate rural clienteles—at the expense of various technical agricultural agencies. So also in the case of Tunisia, a more rigorous analysis of the Destour Socialist Party's bases of support might have helped explain both its caution and occasional recklessness in promoting social change. Surely it was a sign of political sense, not cognitive rigidity, to extend municipal councils slowly, as far as possible to areas where the party might effectively operate them. Ashford, incidentally, misunderstands the import of party reforms in 1963. They were designed to tighten up the party-state apparatus by strengthening the governors, not to loosen it in response to growing social complexity. If anything, there were fewer horizontal transactions after 1963, until the planning minister's downfall in 1969.

The emergence and extension of practical ideology is really synonymous with what Ashford calls development, but his psychological approach both minimizes the complexity of its social context and, what is worse, obscures the connection between ideology and development. Endowed with the politically naive anti-Fascist legacy of *The Authori-*

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tarian Personality, the cognitive psychologists and their disciples in political science view ideology much as Marx did, essentially as a distortion of the truth, inducing rigidity, prejudice, and the like, hindering one from developing cognitive skills or engaging in responsible political activity such as voting. They fail to make a distinction between practical and expressive ideology and therefore lose sight of a conceptual tool which may relate people, as Ashford desires, to wider constellations of civic activity.[7] Drawing upon clinical findings and, implicitly, upon out-dated end-of-ideology literature, he charts "conceptual articulation" and "manifest ideology" as inversely related curves along a developmental continuum from pre-national to national to post-national periods. In this model, individuals are expected to display an increasing level of manifest ideology *and therefore* a decreasing level of conceptual articulation in their attitude as they move into the nationalist age. Then, as society becomes more complex, manifest ideology declines and conceptual articulation increases (p. 370). Ashford even goes so far as to plot the respective positions of Pakistanis, Moroccans, and Tunisians (p. 379), but without basing his impressions on any data or even specifying whose attitudes are so organized. He realizes that manifest ideology may play "a critical part in getting the individual to widen the scope of his perceptual world" (p. 373), but his model excludes the possibility of a practical ideology that sustains affective awareness and commitment while simultaneously attaching cognitive content to emotive meanings.[8] It is in this sense that Tunisian elites and their followers, educated by the party, have experienced greater development than the fragmented and politically sterile Moroccan elite. In Morocco the cacophony of emotive symbols has cognitive content only for local connoisseurs of political ballet; little more than "God, King, and Country" gets through to the masses. The salience of ideology seems greater in Tunisia. But more important for development than salience is the kind of ideology articulated—whether or not

[7] Thus John P. Diggins, in "Ideology and Pragmatism: Philosophy or Passion?" *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (September 1970), 899-906, rightly criticizes on historical and philosophical grounds the distinction made by Giovanni Sartori in "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems," *APSR*, LXIII (June 1969), 399, between "ideological" and "pragmatic" politics. Sartori is only one of many who ignore the distinction we are making between practical, or "pragmatic," and expressive ideologies. For another recent example, see A. James Gregor, *Contemporary Radical Ideologies* (New York 1968).

[8] On page 377, Ashford cites Ulf Himmelstrand for support, apparently without realizing that the latter's work is elaborating the precise distinction at issue here between expressive and "instrumental" or practical ideology. See his *Social Pressures, Attitudes, and Democratic Process* (Stockholm 1960), and also his article, "A Theoretical and Empirical Approach to Depolitisation and Political Involvement," *Acta Sociologica*, VI (1-2, 1962), 83-110.

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it is practical, that is, whether it serves as both an affective spur and a cognitive guide for action.

II

Thus, though in response to a slightly different psychologizing of politics, Leonard Binder states that ". . . it is difficult to attribute irrationality to Middle Eastern revolutionaries, except insofar as they grossly overestimate their resources. The real problem is not that of coping with irrational reactions to misplaced separation-anxiety, but the more rational one of functional adaptation to environmental changes" (p. 142). Binder shares my concern with practical ideology: "The problem of Arab nationalism is not that it has no ideology, but that the link between abstract ideas and identity sentiments has not been fully forged" (p. 92). He virtually admits that his book is misnamed, in that there has been little, if any, "genuine intellectual inspiration," and ideological changes have been "almost wholly derived" from changes in material circumstances (p. 84).

Since the Arab-Islamic world constitutes a cultural system of sorts, it should be possible to provide cultural explanations for the relative absence of practical ideology (and concomitant organization) among Arabs. Binder's essays, though somewhat disconnected and occasionally obscure, have the merit of placing the ideological problem within the more universal context of nationalism. In fact, he dismisses, perhaps too easily, the problem Sir Hamilton Gibb and many of his disciples have raised concerning the compatibility of Islam with modern nationalism.[9] Preferring Louis Gardet,[10] he concludes that "The Islamization of nationalism proceeds, . . . and it is possible to look forward to the eventual accommodation of Islam and the nation-state" (p. 137). Unlike Malcolm Kerr,[11] Binder is less concerned with the manifest political thought of Muslim reformers than with how their ideas can be used. Thus he shows that Mohammed Abduh reinterpreted Muslim history, necessity, freedom of the will, and social solidarity in ways that would be compatible with romantic European nationalism, though he personally was neither a nationalist nor a systematic thinker and in fact borrowed many leading ideas without acknowledgment from Ibn Khaldun (see pp. 67-72).

If Arab ideologies remain primarily expressive rather than practical,

[9] Hamilton A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago 1947), 115.
[10] Louis Gardet, *La Cité Musulmane* (Paris 1961), 226.
[11] Malcolm H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1966).

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it is because they suffer from "the weaknesses of all nationalisms, caused by the intrinsic duality of identity and community, of subjective sentiment and the conventional order of human society" (p. 93). Binder traces these weaknesses back to the ambiguities of Rousseau's general will: is the polity to be based on nature, that is, shared historical experience, or on the rational convention of a social contract? Whether or not one accepts such a formulation, the Hegelian synthesis of romantic nationalism resolved problems of identity, but usually failed, as Marx pointed out, to make theory practical. Thus Binder might have argued that nationalism was more nearly a politicization of philosophy than a philosophizing of politics (cf. p. 110). In his own words, "it is not at all self-evident that the romanticism involved in the rejection of recent history and the rationalism whereby that history is to be changed are ideologically compatible" (p. 93). But there were pre-Marxist sources of practical ideology.

Ideology in the West derives from the Puritans, as exemplified in both the English and French Revolutions and, more successfully, in Calvin's Geneva. Binder's comparative baseline should be seventeenth, not nineteenth-century Europe. For the Puritans were the first in the West to translate theological concerns into practical yet radical political activity—just as they were the first modern "militants" to sustain prototypes of political parties.[12] From the standpoint of practical ideology, the interesting historical question, ignored by Binder as well as by Kerr and Gibb, is why Puritanism has apparently failed to take root in the Arab-Islamic world although it succeeded, at least for a time, in Geneva, Cromwellian England, Jacobin France, and Leninist Russia. Posed in this way, the question has a relatively straightforward answer, suggested by Ernest Gellner.[13] The central religious tradition in the West was Roman Catholicism, an appropriate target under conditions of social upheaval for eliciting a Protestant attack upon tradition, whereas the central Islamic tradition was already protestant. Islam does not await a Reformation; it was born reformed, and, to carry the analogy further, the Prophet Mohammed was the first Puritan radical outside the Judaic tradition to translate the word of God into practical political activity. Islamic orthodoxy could absorb

[12] See Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), and also, concerning political parties, H. G. Koenigsberger, "The Organization of Revolutionary Parties in France and the Netherlands during the Sixteenth Century," *The Journal of Modern History*, XXVII (December 1955), especially 335-36.

[13] See his article, "A Pendulum Swing Theory of Islam," *Annales de Sociologie*, 1968, 5-14; reprinted in Roland Robertson, ed., *Sociology of Religion* (Harmondsworth, England 1969), 127-38.

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subsequent protestants without undergoing a basic alteration, while coexisting with peripheral Catholic elements (saints, Sufi orders, Shi'ites) that were relatively self-contained and innocuous, alleviating their mundane grievances by means of divine intermediaries and human hierarchies.

The orthodox ulama inherited a practical ideology but divested it of programmatic significance, much as Soviet Party priests allow their ideology to "erode" or, more accurately, become ritualized in expressive symbols. Though all generalizations about ulama are bound to have exceptions, Binder's descriptions stimulate further observations about orthodox Islam, at least among Sunni Arabs. In theory, Islam does not admit of any distinction between religion and politics; ideally, it is equally a religious and a political system, and Islamic theology cannot accept any tension between the two. But in practice, as Binder points out, "the 'religious' ulama are deeply aware of the dangers of too close an involvement with the political institution. Indeed, the position of the 'religious' ulama is highly ambivalent. On the one hand they recognize that favorable attitudes on the part of the political leaders will further their cause, but on the other they realize that too close an association with the political authorities may corrupt the religious institution" (p. 39). Fragmented by selective favors from the rulers and divided into diverse schools, the ulama were too weak to translate the Islamic vision into political practice but were unwilling to admit the *de facto* dualism of religious and political affairs to which they had accommodated themselves. The resulting tradition of political discourse they articulated tended to be expressive, defending the status quo, rather than practical, instigating fundamental change. Given their great prestige, they could, as in eighteenth-century Egypt, constitute an important link between rulers and populace, sporadically mobilizing the latter in political demonstrations,[14] but they lacked the ideology and organization characteristic of Puritans in the West. To maintain the integrity of their Islamic vision, they had to detach it from the corrupt politics that they were unable to purify.

Apparently this traditional mode of thinking persists among Arabs today. Binder's prime example is the all but defunct Ba'ath Party. Although in the early sixties it was ostensibly the most dynamic and progressive non-Communist political organization in the Arab Middle East, the Ba'athist vanguard articulated an expressive, never a practical

[14] See Afaf Loutfi el Sayed, "The Role of the Ulama in Egypt during the Early Nineteenth Century," in P. M. Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London 1968), 266-70.

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ideology.[15] Indeed, its chief ideologist, Michel Aflaq, distrusted rational theorizing because it might divide the Arab Nation (p. 161). Arabism is love, faith, will, yet transcends all these empirical qualities. Like G. E. Moore's goodness, it is an objective but indefinable quality and hence secure from all empirical questioning or testing. The Ba'ath has a mission: to fulfill the potentialities of Arabism. Thus the vanguard party is legitimated, but the mission itself is never spelled out. Militants are given a sense of identity, but no direction. Much like the classic vision of the orthodox ulama—or Sorel's general strike—Arabism could generate solidarity while justifying any political course of action. The very vagueness of its symbols permitted their expropriation by Syrian and Iraqi military desperadoes.

Nasserism, too, permits a dissociation of words and deeds. Ideologically, Nasser was under "no compulsion to do any specific thing at a specific time" (p. 201). His Arab, subsequently "scientific," socialism seemed to most observers to constitute an *ex post facto* justification for policies conceived on nonideological and usually tactical grounds rather than a rational guide for action. The concomitant organizational vanguard was also lacking. While one may agree with Maxime Rodinson that Egypt under Nasser was a rational regime in Binder's sense, the French writer's efforts to infer a coherent ideology from Nasser's speeches and actions since the mid-fifties are not convincing.[16] Whereas Aflaq was committed to a world view which had to be preserved from mundane contamination, Nasser committed himself to specific actions out of which others could manufacture a fashionable "ideology."

Are we to conclude that Arab-Islamic orthodoxy as articulated by the ulama constituted an expressive political culture that continues even today to deflect Arab intellectuals (including Christian secularists like Aflaq) from practical ideology? The ideological congruence and growing convergence between Islam and Arabism suggests such a hypothesis; but there are, after all, countervailing subcultures within Islam. From the standpoint of practical ideology, the most significant is that of the Muslim fundamentalists. As Binder indicates, they reject

[15] Though the issue has become academic, Samuel P. Huntington would have been better advised to place his bets on Nasser than the Ba'ath for this very reason. See his "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 429.

[16] Maxime Rodinson, "The Political System," in P. J. Vatikiotis, ed., *Egypt Since the Revolution* (London 1968), 87-113. Rodinson refers to the concepts developed by Binder in *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962), 37-45. I would agree with George Lenczowski, however, that "Egypt's National Charter of 1962 impresses one as a coherent document rather remarkable for its consistency." (See his "Radical Regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq," *Journal of Politics*, XXVIII [February 1966], 56.)

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the dualist compromises of the orthodox ulama and, for that matter, of most nationalists. "In their rejection of the dualism of society and government the fundamentalists become modern despite their verbal predilection for the reestablishment of the classical caliphate" (p. 40). In fact they try to be practical ideologists, radicals in the Puritan tradition.

III

Richard Mitchell presents an authoritative study of the most important of these groups in the Arab world, the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. At its peak in 1948 the Society could boast a highly articulated hierarchical organization of some half million Egyptians grouped in intensely active "families" of five to ten members each, together with some 40,000 paramilitary "rovers" and an elite "special apparatus" for terrorism. In addition, the Society managed a network of schools, dispensaries, and various economic enterprises that virtually constituted a state within the state, for practicing its Islamic ideal. There is some question, however, as to whether the agglomeration of ideas it so insistently propounded through its ultra-modern communications system actually constituted a practical ideology. Mitchell suggests that it failed to provide "any reliable intellectual road maps" (p. 324), but his careful description of the Society's ideology and organization is evidence against Nadav Safran's less balanced view that the Brothers "had no clear idea of the intricate problems of a modern state and a modern society."[17] Mitchell's evidence also suggests, at least to me, that the Muslim Brothers were more akin to the practical, this-wordly Puritans than to the medieval chiliasts to whom Manfred Halpern, citing Norman Cohn, compares them.[18]

Practical ideology, as I have characterized it, legitimates particular strategies or tactics in a logical and systematic way. The paradigm is Leninism. Particular courses of action are justified as means to the hierarchy of ends posited by the ideology. These ends involve God,

[17] Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge, Mass. 1961), 231. Mitchell, it is true, reiterates this rather commonplace view of the Brothers on page 324: the Society was "ill-informed about the dynamics, both of its own Muslim society and of that of the West." But his descriptions of their ideas and activities are sound and dispassionate. He avoids pulling their writings out of context and twisting their meaning as Safran does on page 241, for instance, interpreting Muhammad al-Ghazzali as recommending that "power and the sword decide what is right," when he was in fact criticizing morally indecisive Muslims. See al-Ghazzali, *Our Beginning in Wisdom* (Washington, D.C. 1953), 20.

[18] Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton 1963), 136. Cohn's book, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, discusses these utopian movements to which the Puritans were a startling contrast.

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or His functional equivalent, in that they are matters of ultimate concern, yet they also constitute a vision of social order. The practical ideologist is not content to contemplate, but must implement the vision, and he accepts that there is only one "correct" (or "scientific") way. In addition to a pure theory that expresses ends, practical ideology contains a doctrine relating abstract ends to concrete means. Further, such an ideology presupposes the existence of an authority for interpreting the doctrine correctly and an organization for expressing and implementing it.

To the uncommitted observer there is, obviously, no one "correct" doctrinal interpretation of Islam, Marxism, or, for that matter, of the King James Bible. But the Brothers, under Hassan al Banna, acquired such authority in the eyes of numerous Muslims, just as Lenin did for at least an important minority of Russian Marxists. Banna's doctrine seems no less plausible or out of touch with the modern world than Lenin's, much as the skeptic may question the respective postulates, logical derivations, and internal consistency of each. Mitchell demonstrates that Banna was seeking a government and social order inspired by Islam, not a reactionary carbon copy of the seventh-century Muslim state. Mitchell takes "essentially at face value the view attributed to Banna . . . that the [then] existing constitutional parliamentary framework in Egypt, if reformed, would satisfy the political requirements of Islam . . ." (p. 235). Nor was the Society's demand that the shari'a (Islamic law) be fully enforced inconsistent with Egyptian political and social realities, given the Brothers' imaginative exegesis of the law. Actually, most extant legislation was acceptable (see p. 241). In fact it is tempting to conclude that they were too ready to compromise with existing realities to provide any real direction for change.

But Banna's doctrine was rigid and intolerant of any deviation by "free-thinkers," even if the Islamic theory inspired by Mohammed Abduh was sufficiently amorphous to legitimate as Islamic virtually everything but bars and brothels. Banna was not a theorist or theologian; he preferred deed to idea, program (*minhaj*) to ideology (*fikra*). The Society's program displayed relative coherence and consistency over the years, and in Leninist fashion Banna could assert that it had been derived from an identifiable set of texts which it was the duty of all Brothers to study zealously with help from their Supreme Guide. If the texts in fact provided few guidelines for building Islamic society, the same could be said of Marxism for Communist society.

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Banna provided the guidelines and, so far as conditions under the monarchy permitted, implemented them through an organization that is proof against the contention that the Brothers failed to appreciate "the mechanical side of politics."[19] If politically the ultimate objective was an Islamic one-party state (see p. 261), the society was moving toward its goal by educating dedicated cadres and perfecting their organization. Economically, its enterprises (including an advertising agency which presumably catered to the appetites of a consumer society), demonstrated the possibility of an Islamic approach to economic affairs, awarding profits to the membership and dignity to labor. The psychological objectives, as with Maoism in China and Bourguibism in Tunisia, were the most fundamental: "Eject imperialism from your souls, and it will leave your land" (p. 230). To form a good Muslim society presupposed forming good Muslims; spiritual *jihad* took precedence over, but was no mere substitute for, the political and military *jihad* (holy struggle) against unbelievers. "Family" life within the Society offered the required psychic discipline.

If, ultimately, the Brothers failed to impose themselves on Egyptian society, it was not for a lack of practical ideology. There is even some evidence to suggest that the doctrine became more consciously scientific and substantive, articulated by modern professionals, after Banna's assassination in 1949 (see p. 189). But the Society, no longer held together by the force of its founder's oratory, personality, and organizational skills, was incapacitated by internal schisms. Preposterous as it seems, the divisions were so intense among the qualified candidates for the succession that they could agree only upon King Farouk's favored choice, a mild-mannered provincial judge who had never been an active member of the Society. Thus, in the decisive years between 1951 and its suppression in 1954, the Society was virtually leaderless. The terrorism practiced by its small and dissident "special apparatus" signified political and moral bankruptcy but did not, in its final and uncontrolled stages, derive logically or inevitably from the Society's rigid intolerance and exclusiveness. Mitchell's dispassionate study should mitigate the "convulsive image of conservative radicalism" which he feels "will probably remain the image of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in history" (p. 331).

From this full-length study, however, we learn little—and that only as an apparent afterthought in the last four pages of the book—about the Society's social composition. Its leadership was predominantly urban and white-collar, the so-called *effendiyya*; indeed, one Brother

[19] Safran (fn. 17), 239.

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claimed as early as 1935 that the active membership was predominantly *effendi*, in order to distinguish it from lower-class dervish Sufi orders. Mitchell's tentative conclusion from his personal observations is that by the early fifties the Society largely represented "an emergent and self-conscious Muslim middle class" (p. 330). He cites the Society's programs as added evidence, designed as they were to appeal to the bulging Egyptian bureaucracy and salariat. Furthermore, while enjoying some trade-union support, the Society mobilized its most disciplined and active following among the university students, whose unions it controlled by 1952. Were the most active Brothers upwardly mobile social misfits? Could the inner circle of "fanatical believers," as Binder suggests (p. 45), be considered "marginal to the reference groups which they aspired to join," and suffering from "a fundamental cultural insecurity"? Or were they, as Walzer has suggested of the analogous Puritans, among the "sociologically competent?"[20] Unfortunately, Mitchell does not address himself to these questions.

Less excusable is his omission of any systematic treatment of personal and political relationships of the leading Brothers among themselves and with the Palace and other political forces. He does not even let us know the fact, mentioned in Halpern's much briefer treatment, that Banna's successor was married to the sister of the private chamberlain of the royal family,[21] much less discuss the variety of personal links with other Islamic groups and political parties, as well as the Palace. Quite possibly they exacerbated divisions within the Society and hence can contribute to a fuller explanation of its ultimate failure. To pursue the discussion of practical ideology in more general terms, the major obstacle may be cultural, not in the sense of an uncongenial intellectual heritage, but in the sense of deep-rooted reflexes that condition political behavior.

IV

Waterbury's scholarly yet delightful book on Moroccan politics propounds precisely this hypothesis. Moroccans, indeed Arabs more generally, are victims of their political culture as expressed in concrete patterns of behavior of which the actors are not necessarily even aware. Waterbury is not concerned with overt value or belief systems, which vary with regime, ideology, or whatever typology one cares to employ for comparing different Arab political systems, but with the underlying phenomenon of factionalism and immobilism that he takes to charac-

[20] Walzer (fn. 12), 309.
[21] Halpern (fn. 18), 149.

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terize Arab politics. Thus, in Morocco, "political groupings are ever on the verge of waging war amongst themselves or against the Palace. . . . Yet in the end almost nothing happens. Tension goes hand in hand with stalemate, and the recognized need for action is paired with a pervasive lack of initiative. It is my contention that this state of affairs can be explained by a common Moroccan attitude towards power and authority" (p. 5). He is ready to extend his analysis to other Arab countries; Morocco can be more meaningfully compared to Algeria, for instance, than to Iran (p. 3). So also in the Middle East, Egypt and Syria, "whose politics are ostensibly very different from those of Morocco, have revealed a continued propensity for factional tension and stalemate" (p. 321).

The problem with this sort of analysis, of course, is that it is too general and could equally well apply to Iran where factionalism and rather similar attitudes toward power and authority exist also. For Waterbury, Moroccans are defense-minded and hence constantly building up alliances, starting with members of their own family. "A man must have a group, for otherwise he is without defenses . . ." (p. 76). Actually he tries to have many groups or potential alliances which he may activate whenever necessary. The cement for building and maintaining alliances is financial and moral debt. The Moroccan spends much of his time buttressing his alliance system and correctly assumes that other Moroccans are doing the same thing. In fact, he must always be on his guard, for "covert machinations, dissimulation and trickery are accepted as the fact of political life, and a man's ostensible motives for a given action cannot be trusted" (p. 77). There are compensations: he "takes an expert's delight in playing the game" (p. 77). The same might be said of many peoples. The most readable case study known to me, apart from Waterbury's, is *The Godfather*, about a Mafia gang in New York.[22]

Possibly more Arab than Sicilian, however, is the restraint with which Moroccans in a dominant alliance will exercise their power and press their victories. The gains of the game are always marginal, never decisive, for equilibrium between alliance systems is always restored, and one's enemy is usually a potential ally and vice versa. If Waterbury is right, he has pointed to a major cultural barrier against practical ideology among Arabs. There can be no permanent out-groups. In his paradigm of zero-sum conflict, the members of a given alliance system "must remain ambivalent toward out-groups and towards their own; their enemies and allies being chosen accord-

[22] Mario Puzo, *The Godfather* (London and New York 1969).

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ing to their own advantage in a particular system. This makes for (although of course never achieves) value neutrality regarding group membership, with an often-ignored ease of movement of individuals among groups . . ." (p. 66).

The paradigm is that of segmentary tribal society.[23] Somehow, the Moroccan political elite internalized the patterns of political behavior associated with the tribal structure, though the elite is no longer predominantly tribal. Waterbury somewhat questionably extends the segmentary pattern to include the traditional urban as well as rural society (p. 7), making his hypothesis of "behavioral lag" (p. 5) more plausible, in that most of the elite are sons of traditional urban notables. Given the fluid interpenetration of rural and urban structures in traditional Morocco, coupled with the continuity, due to the relatively late and selective colonial penetration, between traditional and contemporary Morocco, Waterbury's assumptions seem defensible for his own research. Indeed, he has validated them in that the paradigm has explicitly shaped an absolutely first-rate description of contemporary Moroccan politics. But is his model really as applicable to other Arab societies as he thinks?

Actually, the special intervening conditions that make it fit Morocco prevailed in some of the other Arab countries, but the conditions can explain political tension and stalemate independently. In this connection Waterbury's analysis of the political elite is helpful, though neither systematic nor definitive. He defines it as "a group of Moroccans who, for diverse reasons, have an actual or potential influence on decision-making and the distribution of spoils and patronage, and who articulate, occasionally or persistently, their demands" (p. 82). Thus the elite "is broader than the government and contains the government's opposition." It "breaks down somewhat as follows: 100 army officers; 450 administrators of the Ministry of the Interior; 300 high-ranking officials in the rest of the administration; 130 prominent politicians and union leaders; 100 important members of economic organizations, independents, and 'ulama"—for a total, considering the "high degree of overlap between categories," of under one thousand members (p. 86, note). To all intents they are the political system, and they increasingly monopolize wealth as well as social status.

Waterbury stresses "the astonishing extent to which the members of the Moroccan political elite personally know one another" (p. 86). They usually went to the same elite schools and have married into each

[23] See Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (London 1969), and also E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (London 1949).

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other's families. Their very involutedness means that "all is possible in the[ir] little world . . . , and elite factions are so many interchangeable parts without any fixed political connotations" (p. 124). Tension and stalemate are partly due to the fact that their political undertakings are always subverted by personal rivalries and complicities. But Waterbury's impressionistic analysis also suggests a more substantive explanation for stagnation.

Traditional social status plus modern education provide elite status in Morocco. The two are closely related, given the relatively late and selective colonial experience: "The social composition of the educated elite is probably not much different than it would have been had the protectorate never been established" (p. 85). Nationalist militancy and modern education were not, as in Algeria or Tunisia, independent sources of elite status, for most educated Moroccans and nationalist leaders enjoyed high traditional status, and leading traditional elite members who had "guessed wrong" were rehabiliated by the king after independence to neutralize the nationalists. Thus the new elite consists essentially of the same families that dominated the Moroccan political system before 1912. There was no opportunity for any "new middle class"—exemplified by activists like the late Mehdi Ben Barka —to redefine nationalism and transform the system.

The old families consolidated and modernized their commercial and agricultural holdings during the Protectorate and subsequently, under the king's exemplary leadership, converted social connections and political influence into wealth. Waterbury vividly shows us how. He correctly adds that the political elite "is not (yet) recruited, except secondarily, from a class whose power is rooted in material wealth. . . . It seems certain, nonetheless, that there is occurring a process of class development, a process that started with the broad commercial contacts with Europe in the nineteenth century and which gained momentum during the protectorate period and above all since independence" (p. 159). The king is hardly the tool of this nascent bourgeoisie; rather he is its "Godfather." Why, then, is he content to manipulate elite factions rather than destroy them in an Iranian-type White Revolution which could build broader bases of support? After all, the elite members who have been "coaxed into the royal stables one by one" are "too disillusioned to fight the regime themselves and too attached to its benefits to renounce it" (p. 158). Waterbury's cultural paradigm cuts both ways, for the king could be a *za'im* (leader) rather than a mere arbiter.

But to be a *za'im* would require new organization and practical

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ideology in conflict with the king's legitimacy, of which the existing elite, however domesticated and corroded, remains the prime custodian. It is in this sense that stagnation is the product of Moroccan political culture, traditional in that the colonial situation did not produce the restratification necessary for its transformation. Traditional legitimacy, not segmentation, explains Morocco's stagnation, while the real tension is not among elite factions but rather between an immobile monarchy and a progressively mobilized society. The probable outcome is a military coup in the name of the dispossessed masses.

There are indeed behavioral obstacles to practical ideology in the Arab world (as elsewhere). Fluid factionalism either prevents effective decision-making or necessitates an authoritarian style of leadership that breaks down, as with the Muslim Brothers, when the charismatic leader no longer prevails. The durable organization presupposed by practical ideology seems virtually unobtainable. But why is this so? I reject the explanation of atavistic Arab behavior in favor of explanations derived from the intervening variable of elite structure. Elites, after all, are the carriers and models of politically central values and modes of behavior.

V

Far more systematically than Waterbury, William Quandt explores this intervening variable in the Algerian context. His data, the product of a more sensitive climate for research, are not as rich, nor is his insight into political style as penetrating as Waterbury's, but he does the best he can, and sometimes too much, with what was at hand. Algeria also has suffered from intense factionalism, tension, and stalemate,[24] but for different reasons than Morocco. While it is unfortunate that Quandt dismisses the tribal paradigm in one sentence (p. 12), he is on theoretically sounder ground than Waterbury. Algerian factionalism was not the outcome of the common behavioral style of a homogeneous elite but rather of competing heterogeneous subcultures. The recent trend away from factionalism toward a more rational system, as the elite has become more homogeneous, substantiates Quandt's approach.

He argues that the factionalism rampant in Algeria from 1962 to 1966 or so was the result of a discontinuous political socialization inherent in the revolutionary process whereby Algeria achieved independence. He distinguishes five major elite types, defined by distinct patterns of political socialization, that in varying proportions con-

[24] David and Marina Ottaway, *Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970), gives a first-rate account of Algeria since 1962.

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stituted the political elite from 1954 to 1968. The elite is defined as the 87 top leaders who occupied 179 top and 133 secondary positions and the 273 secondary leaders who occupied 379 positions during the period. Quandt obtained biographical data on little more than half of these individuals and placed them in their respective slots as 1) Liberal politicians, 2) Radical politicians, 3) Revolutionaries, 4) Military, or 5) Intellectuals. Each category is defined unambiguously in terms of early political career patterns, but there are some difficulties for particular individuals. How does one define Ben Bella, as a Radical or a Revolutionary? To be considered a Radical, one has to have been either a PPA-MTLD Central Committee member or candidate for office; a Revolutionary must have had some political experience, but in less important roles before 1954. Ben Bella had in fact been a candidate, but is deemed to be a Revolutionary. The distinction between the Military and the Revolutionary is also difficult to make in practice: some political experience before 1954 versus none at all. The ambiguity as to what constituted "political experience" perhaps helps to explain why the Revolutionaries "are harder to generalize about" (p. 71) than Liberals or Radicals, and also why some, for instance, seem rather surprisingly to have been quite unconcerned with "colonialism" or any form of political activity in their youth (pp. 71-77). Quandt's speculations about there being two types of revolutionaries—agitators and organizers—depending on whether or not they turned to politics late to handle some personal problem (p. 74) are fascinating but utterly unwarranted (as are other speculations) by his very small and shadowy number of cases. Some of Quandt's data-squeezing is ingenious and suggestive, but much is superfluous. Especially redundant is his chapter on the National Assembly in which he correlates various sorts of parliamentary behavior (column inches of debate and the like) with his five socialization types and a variety of other independent variables. He fails to show the relation he asserts to exist between socialization and behavior, and pays insufficient attention to the politics of the situation.

If Quandt's methodological baggage makes the book somewhat overweight, he has nevertheless made a valuable contribution. He successfully weaves a methodic account of the actors with a sound historical narrative, and, what is more important, the major premise behind the typology seems correct: "A changing consensus on the possibilities of political action to attain specific goals allowed one group after another to dominate the nationalist movement. And as each group assumed that role, the challenge was to provide effective leadership or

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risk being displaced by another set of political actors with other skills and beliefs" (p. 86). The Revolution ultimately required the skills of all five types simultaneously, but it could not organize or translate into practical ideology the energies of the respective components. Although the five types were certainly not the sole basis of cleavage and factionalism, their disparity contributed decisively to the breakdown in 1962.

Another of Quandt's hypotheses suggests why matters were eventually righted in Algeria. Following Frederick Frey's postulate that it is psychologically intolerable for most people of high status to submit to the influence of those with lower status,[25] Quandt notes the negative correlation within the Algerian political elite on the eve of independence between power on the one hand and social status and education on the other (pp. 157-58). The disparity helps to explain the rapid turnover of elites that followed and to predict the rise of the Intellectuals under Ben Bella and especially Boumedienne. His analysis also reveals interesting comparisons between the two leaders' political structures that transcend simple contrasts between the former's personal power and the latter's collegial rule or mediation between autonomous organs. Ben Bella included all the types "in virtually every institution, thereby apparently hoping to achieve an informal system of checks on the power aspirations of any one group" (p. 251). Boumedienne, on the other hand, had institutions more or less corresponding with particular types (see p. 252). An increasingly homogeneous group of Intellectuals, the Council of Ministers, has acquired more influence under Boumedienne, while other institutions, accommodating the Military, have been demobilized.

Factionalism may persist in Algeria, but it is not of the kind that almost tore the country apart. Factions may now conform to an agreed game, as in Morocco, rather than tear up the ball park. The game, however, bears little resemblance to Moroccan political ballet. The Algerian system is under tension, in that its social problems are at least as great as Morocco's, but it is not stagnant. Boumedienne and his technocrats have a strategy that may even be evolving into a practical ideology that expresses the ideals of the Revolution while implementing them. It is too early to say.

Elite analysis is more dynamic, hence more suitable for Algeria, than models built on behavioral paradigms. But much of the politics in the Arab world are static and sterile, and therefore fitting subject matter for Waterbury's microscope. Contrasts between the North African cases suggest a more general explanation of practical ideology

[25] Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 400 ff.

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which complements an observation Leonard Binder made but did not develop. It concerns historical timing. In much of the Arab world, as elsewhere in the Third World, "the converging processes of social mobilization and the philosophizing of politics . . . had not taken place when the vertical political cleavage between colonial and imperialist became too manifest to be resisted" (p. 112). The result was expressive ideology—either liberal nationalism copied from the imperialists or "a traditional, often religious, ideology sustained by a nationalist ontology which has been revised from the theological" (p. 113). Rarely has the colonial dialectic been fully pursued, as in Algeria or Tunisia, where social mobilization and the "philosophizing of politics" coincided with anti-imperialist struggle.[26] Most of the backward countries, including Arab ones, were given their independence while still in a pre-ideological age. In Egypt there have been several attempted revolutionary breakthroughs, but all have so far aborted. Pressures from the industrial powers, "imperialist" and Communist, continue to play upon these countries, however, while social tensions rise from within. It is doubtful that the tensions can be managed indefinitely without practical ideology and revolutionary organization. Cultural obstacles, it may be concluded, are not insurmountable.

[26] For further treatment of colonial dialectic, see my *Politics in North Africa* (Boston 1970), 34-90.

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NEW MYTHS AND OLD REALITIES:

Defense and Its Critics

By STEPHEN J. CIMBALA

Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970, 290 pp., $8.50.
Bruce M. Russett, *What Price Vigilance?: The Burdens of National Defense*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970, 256 pp., $2.45.
Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969*, New York, Harper and Row, 1971, 348 pp., $8.95.

THE national malaise over Vietnam has had many spillovers. Among them can be counted a shelf of works on the military-industrial complex and the role of the military establishment in American policy-making. Much of this material should never have been written; it is uninformed, naive, biased, and even nonsensical. Several recent contributions to the debate have attempted to raise the level of discussion by considering the defense problem as a matter of allocative theory and decision. Each of these books will be widely regarded as an authoritative pronouncement on the causes and cures of America's defense dilemmas. They have been written by distinguished scholars or former policy-makers whose reputations in their fields are excellent.

Nevertheless, the cumulative impact of these efforts is disappointing. This is not necessarily due to limitations in the analytical skills of individual authors, although these skills, as manifest in these contributions, do vary. Their small potential for cumulation, into a more comprehensive middle range or general theory of defense politics, is the result of drastically divergent approaches and methodologies. We are a long way from a scientific theory (or several scientific theories) of defense because we cannot agree on where to start. This disagreement extends to the most basic matter of deciding which questions are important. As Stanley Hoffmann has noted, theory as a "set of questions" is only the first plateau.[1] The disparate assumptions, patterns of inference, and conclusions of Seymour Melman, Bruce M. Russett, and Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith are good evidence of this fragmentation in origin and perspective.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to add two qualifications. First, the

[1] Stanley Hoffman, *The State of War* (New York 1965), 5.

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authors' divergence on important questions and their answers might be attributed to professional or disciplinary biases, but that would be shortsighted. Even more disagreement could be found among three political scientists writing about this problem, and many of these disagreements have already been voiced. Second, I recognize that the distance from a consensual theory of defense is not necessarily to be equated with the distance from a scientific theory. Consensus on ignorance and error is always possible. In the cases of the books reviewed below, however, a premature consensus of error is a remote possibility because any premature consensus is unlikely. For this reason I will consider these efforts, not in terms of their potential contribution to some larger defense theory, but as individual approaches with certain important insights and limitations.

Although they are noncumulative, these efforts share a common frame of reference. Problems of defense policy are described and explained as problems of defense management or welfare economics. The management perspective is adopted by Melman, and by Enthoven and Smith. The welfare economics perspective is a point of departure for Russett's discussions of alliances and the costs of defense, although his work includes other considerations as well. Not too much should be made of these shared orientations because they do not predispose the authors to fall short of compelling political explanation for the same reasons. Their shortcomings are better understood as matters of unique rather than common variation.

I.

Seymour Melman has come to bury the Pentagon, not to praise it. Surely no book has made such an impression upon popular discourse about defense policy in recent years as his *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War*.[2] It is laden with copious facts, charts, references, statistics, appendices (eight of them), and a bibliography. Moreover, the author is Professor of Industrial Engineering at Columbia University, and this work is a culmination of a series of studies under his direction about the war-oriented character of the American economy and the need for conversion to other emphases.[3]

In brief, Melman's thesis is that the "military-industrial complex,"

[2] Reviewers in the *New York Times Book Review* and the *New York Review of Books*, in the latter case economist Robert Heilbroner, were quite lavish in their praise of *Pentagon Capitalism* as a definitive study of the subject.

[3] See especially Melman's *Our Depleted Society* (New York 1965).

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the loosely structured convergence of military and business interests of President Eisenhower's day, has been supplanted by a "state-management" decision system introduced by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara after 1961. The state-management, for which the empirical referent appears to be the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), controls defense contractors so closely and completely that it is fair to speak of the latter as "sub-managements" within the central Defense Department "firm." As Melman puts it: "The state-management has also become the most powerful decision-making unit in the United States government. Thereby, the federal government does not 'serve' business or 'regulate' business. For the new management is the largest of them all. Government *is* business. That is state capitalism" (p. 2).

What does it mean to argue that an arm of the federal bureaucracy is a "management"? A management, according to the author, is defined by "the performance of a set of definable functions which give management its common character, whether the enterprise is private or public" (p. 20). These requisite functions of any management include decisions about what to produce, how to produce, how much to produce, and so forth (p. 20). "It is the performance of these functions by the new organizations in the industrial directorate of the Department of Defense," Professor Melman argues, "which defines it as a bona fide industrial management" (p. 20).

If government has become management, then it follows that government has become less "political" in traditional senses. The author does not shrink from this implication but instead invites it. He argues that American government and society have traditionally been based on a division of function between political and economic activities. This division of function, he writes, "was the grand design for American government and society, within which personal and political freedom could flourish alongside of rapid economic growth and technological progress" (p. 4). That is: freedom flourishes in American society if government is kept out of business, or at least out of the business of business.

Interlocking of governmental and business power means, according to Melman, that separation of the roles of citizen and employee is no longer possible for political man: he relates to the same persons as employee and citizen, and their "decision-power" over his life becomes unprecedented as a result (p. 5). This is ultimately destructive of individual liberty that is based upon the separation of roles, which in turn is based upon the separation of government and the func-

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tions of economic management in American society. The destructiveness to freedom is especially severe because of the size as well as the character of the new state-management: by the measure of "industrial activity governed from one central office" the Department of Defense management is the world's largest industrial enterprise (p. 5). In case the reader should infer that the author's insistence on the mutually exclusive distinction between political and economic activities is exaggeration for effect, the author indicates his explicitness on this point most unambiguously: "In its *beginning*, the government of the United States *was* a political entity" (p. 4, italics added).

With the foregoing as fundamental points of departure, the author is in for some complications. How does one evaluate the political behavior of a Defense Department that is no longer political but managerial? By "political" behavior I imply the concept of the purposes or ends toward which the activities of men and bureaucracies may be directed. Melman's analysis and conclusions on this point bear closer investigation. His—I believe unprecedented—argument is that the DOD's primary goals relate to the expansion of its own decision power within American domestic society, and not to its accomplishments in the name of "national security," national defense, or international politics. Thus the primacy of the assumption of managerial *function* is quite logically reinforced by a supporting corollary of the primacy of managerial purpose.

This argument is developed in discussing outputs of defense policy, both in the sense of outputs as modes of arms policy, such as deterrence, and of outputs as specific sets of decisions about military choices in conflict situations, such as the war in Vietnam. Melman's arguments about both kinds of policy outputs and their relationship to internal DOD decision-making are strikingly similar in their patterns of inference.

In both instances the author contends that the policy choices are logically absurd in terms of various criteria, and that therefore these decisions could not have been intended to serve the purposes attributed to them by decision-makers. For example, he scorns the notion of deterrence as an "experiment in applied psychology" which cannot possibly supply adequate defense to the nation in case of nuclear war. Accusing the policy-makers of the United States of a quest for vast quantities of overkill potential and nuclear "superiority" against the Soviet Union, he argues that these are merely devices for extending the decision power of the "para-state" in the Pentagon. What else could they be,

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since it is illogical to suppose that these weapons could "defend" anybody?[4]

The argument that deterrence is not defense is correct only in an obvious sense. What Melman says is that, if deterrence fails, then deterrence cannot defend anybody from the effects of nuclear war. Apart from the fact that this statement involves faulting deterrence for an attribute never claimed by its advocates, it needs qualification in a more specific sense. Deterrence can extend into nuclear warfare itself, according to deterrence theorists, and offensive strategic weapons (which are part of a deterrence arms policy) can be useful for purposes of damage limitation in the event of war. Melman belittles the central purpose of deterrence: the prevention of the outbreak of hostilities through arms policies which persuade potential adversaries that the mere initiation of conflict is guaranteed to be mutually devastating. The author has small regard for deterrence *because* it is psychological and relational instead of physical and one-sided![5]

Since these policies seem logically absurd to him (and they should, for he assumes their central purpose to be trivial), Melman reasons that some goal other than national defense and protection must be the actual purpose of such armament. In extending his fundamental assumptions, summarized above, he concludes that the real purpose of such weapons development and deployment must be aggrandizement of the Defense Department's decision power. Deterrence is merely a means to an end, the end being the management-end of greater do-

[4] That Melman views deterrence doctrine as a means to the end of greater Defense Department control over societal resources and extended political power is made clear in his chapter, "The Science Fiction of Defense and Its Consequences" (pp. 107-38). As he puts it, "The responsibility for shielding the United States against external attack has been turned into a means by which the scope and intensity of decision-power of the state-management has been enlarged" (p. 107).

[5] Melman acknowledges explicitly the difference between traditional defense and deterrence concepts: deterrence "does not refer to the ability to shield a society from attack in a physical sense, but to a threat-to-retaliate system which, it is hoped, would constrain a potential opponent from making the first move" (p. 110). But the implications of this acknowledgment for his more general arguments are misunderstood. To Melman, this specific inadequacy of deterrence as compared to traditional defense, for physical security and protection, is sufficient grounds to impeach deterrence generally as a mode of policy (and, by implication, the motives of defense officials who believe in deterrence). Even more disconcerting are the clinching lines of this argument, in which he confuses the distinction he acknowledged earlier, in order to prove the point: "In the name of defense, the state-management based in the Pentagon has been deploying an increasing array of strategic weapons systems. Analysis of the characteristics of these systems does not reveal them to be serviceable shields for protecting the United States from external attack" (p. 136). The existence of a condition caused by modern weapons technology is blamed by implication on the choice of deterrence as an arms policy, despite Melman's own clear statements revealing the absurdity of such criticism.

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mestic power and influence. Here Melman risks the proverbial trap of balance-of-power theorists in international politics who envision the pursuit of power as an end in itself. Power is a composite label for means used by individuals, groups, and nation-states for various purposes, but it is not very helpful as a specification of purpose.[6] The argument that the pursuit of power serves the goal of the pursuit of power encumbers explanation with a presumption of identity in means and ends.

Even more surprising is Melman's application of this pattern of inference to the specific context of American foreign policy in "the Vietnam wars program" and Defense Department participation in those decisions (pp. 139-62). He argues that our policy in Vietnam was logically absurd in terms of the meager results obtained for the amount of blood and treasure expended. Defense decision-makers realized that the application of military power to the Vietnam situation was not producing the intended results (p. 155), yet they persisted in these policies. Since this makes no apparent logical sense, what does make apparent logical sense? Again, what seems logical is that the DOD cares more seriously about extending its own domestic decision power, and that the results of the war in Vietnam are clearly of lesser importance. Put into Melman's framework, this means that the war in Vietnam was a way for the DOD to enhance its own power at the expense of other governmental bureaucracies. The other results of our Vietnam policy for our Department of Defense were trivial by comparison: "For this state-management has indeed scored a great success, enlarging the scope and intensity of its decision-power through the Vietnam war operation: it gained control over more money, more men, more real estate, more property, and more industry" (p. 157).

Here we observe the straitjacket into which Melman is pushed by his fundamental assumptions. If the stated intentions of policy are not fulfilled or do not seem intuitively logical, whatever happens must have been intended. To improvise and expand upon an earlier analysis by Graham T. Allison, this is the "rational policy model" with a peculiar twist.[7] The twist added by Melman is that he reviews what-

[6] The most noted balance-of-power theorist whose analysis has been criticized on this point is Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4th ed. (New York 1967). Notice that Melman's view of deterrence as a means to the end of greater DOD decision power is different from the more restricted argument that any *particular* deterrence doctrine, such as massive retaliation or flexible response, rationalizes the state of American preparedness which happens to exist. Melman goes beyond that in arguing that both preparedness and deterrence in general are rationalizations for other ambitions in domestic politics.

[7] Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1969), 689-718.

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ever happens with the question in mind, "What managerial purpose could this action have served?"

The assumptions about the essentially managerial character of the Defense Department (managerial being defined to exclude political) have led to confusion of the most basic variety in the analysis of political behavior. What is not apparently logical to Melman, the observer, is presumed illogical for the policy-maker. Yet the crucial empirical matter is the perception of the policy-maker and not the rationality of the observer. And there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that policy-makers do believe that deterrence is the best "defense" in the most inclusive sense, and other evidence to suggest that McNamara, Rusk, Rostow, and others did believe that the application of military power in massive doses would "win" the Vietnam war. The sincere enthusiasm of these men for flexible response strategy and counterinsurgency policy in Vietnam has been well documented.[8] That these expectations could be shown, after the fact, to have been logically or empirically in error would demonstrate that policy-makers failed to achieve their intended purposes, not that they intended other purposes. In the vocabulary of organization theory, Melman has confused unanticipated consequences with goal displacement. A more compelling interpretation would emphasize goal "distortion" rather than goal displacement in the DOD, as Amitai Etzioni has distinguished those two processes.[9] When organizational goals are continuous and abstract preoccupations, exaggerated concern with efficiency may restrict organizational effectiveness.

The irony of all this is that Melman, a concerned and authoritative critic of defense policy, has attributed to the Department of Defense a capacity for devious bureaucratic omniscience which is normally claimed only by the most boisterous partisans of the DOD itself. If he is correct, the DOD knew all along that deterrence was an inferior or deficient arms posture and that the intervention in Vietnam was doomed to defeat—but it was worth the price to get more power rela-

[8] For example, see Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York 1969), 20-23 and *passim*.

[9] Amitai Etzioni, *Modern Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), 8-10. Etzioni notes that when an organization's goals are unlimited or difficult to measure, its emphasis may turn to the measurement of those efficiency variables that *are* quantifiable. He suggests that "the distortion consequences of over-measuring are larger when it is impossible or impractical to quantify the more central, substantive output of an organization, and when at the same time some exterior aspects of the product, which are superficially related to its substance, are readily measurable" (*ibid.*, 9-10). National defense, as a state or condition never fully realized, creates this tendency for goal distortion through measurement of the measurables, as the surfeit of body counts, missile counts, and hamlet counts has demonstrated.

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tive to other organizations and groups in American politics and society. If the DOD is *that* clever, it is clever indeed, as well as a subversive threat to Presidential control of defense and foreign policy. But a Defense Department which was that clever should have done better in Vietnam, by its own announced standards, if only for better public relations and improved domestic success. In this case, bad policy for the state-management has already turned out also to be bad management. The removal of the veil of invincibility in defense policy has paved the way for Congressional attacks and public skepticism. Management is not independent of political purpose, and it is not an adequate substitute for fulfillment of political purposes. Neither the DOD nor its critics can bury its failure in Vietnam, in the sense of lack of accomplishment of any relevant foreign policy objective or purpose. The flexible response strategy, as applied through massive conventional warfare, failed to contribute to the objectives of counter-insurgency and stability for the Saigon government, without toppling the President and the party which had provided those objectives. These failures cannot be dismissed as means to the end of better "management." In contemporary times, government has become business-like, but it is not business, at least not yet. Precisely the opposite is implied by Melman's own data and analysis, which is obvious if we distinguish between the style of a process and the outcomes of that process. In the process of becoming more like business, government is engulfing business. "Pentagon capitalism" as a set of outcomes implies more Pentagon and less capitalism.

II

Bruce M. Russett's *What Price Vigilance?* is intended to bring concern about public policy into embrace with quantitative social science for a better understanding of the military-industrial complex and defense policy process. The author is dissatisfied with the methodological deficiencies of past efforts in this area, as he indicates at the outset: "The insistence on following the rules of contemporary methodology is especially important in this substantive area, in which until now the overwhelming majority of studies, however original and interesting, have relied largely upon intuition and anecdote as a basis for argument" (Preface, ix).

Russett's specific hypotheses about Senate voting on defense issues, alliance behavior, and the costs of defense to other national values are often creative and suggestive, as are his uses of roll call data and regression analysis to test those hypotheses. It is when the author be-

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comes more venturesome that he gets into difficulties. The problem is that Russett cannot avoid having to make important intuitive judgments which influence some of his conclusions as much as any data he presents. Perhaps this is inevitable in a work of this sort, which is primarily motivated by the author's confessed concern about the weight and costs of defense spending for American society. Nonetheless it vitiates the claim of uniqueness which Russett makes for his analysis.

The author's discussion of "criteria for evaluation" in the opportunity costs of defense is revealing of that limitation. In this section he makes the following assertions about redistribution of the burden of defense expenditures.

1. It is "bad to sacrifice future productivity and resources for current defense or war-fighting activities; insofar as possible such activities 'should' be financed out of current consumption" (p. 136).
2. According to the previous criterion, "one would hope to see periodic upswings in defense requirements financed largely out of personal consumption, with capital formation and such social investment in the public sector as health and education being insensitive to military demands" (p. 136).
3. Correspondingly, during periods of reduced military need "the released resources would be kept largely for investment and education rather than returned to private consumption" (p. 136).

As statements of preference these may well be laudable in an ethical sense, but it is doubtful that they are other than intuitive in a methodological sense. In his data analysis in this chapter, Russett computes various kinds of private and public expenditures as proportions of gross national product and then correlates them with the proportion of GNP represented by defense spending (p. 137). From this he develops an "Index of Proportionate Reduction" via regression analysis, which indicates the relative proportional reduction in another kind of expenditure as a function of defense (p. 140). The IPR shows, according to Russett, "the damage suffered by each category relative to its 'normal' base," and allows a comparison between the effect of defense spending on private consumption, total fixed investment, and other areas (pp. 139-40). The author's finding is that the proportionate reduction in investment is costlier (relative to its base) than the reduction in consumer spending, although the latter is larger in absolute terms (pp. 143-44).

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All of this is informative, but none of it provides support for the "criteria" advanced by Russett about the manner of allocating the burden of a rising defense budget among possibly slighted alternative uses for those funds. That it is "bad" to sacrifice "future productivity and resources" for current defense capabilities is a value judgment and one which is highly dependent upon circumstances in international politics. The conditions under which the author would accept his own criteria might vary enormously. Private consumption includes automobiles, refrigerators, food, and clothing. The degree to which these are considered more dispensable than fixed investment probably varies with the citizen's socioeconomic status and his occupational vulnerability to reductions in "current indulgence" (p. 144). More investment in education sounds noncontroversial when we emphasize future opportunities for social mobility for the recipients, but can those potential recipients afford to eat less or to use public transportation next month? Any answer to that question is as intuitive as I can imagine, although Russett may have an array of persuasive responses. The point is that no theory propounded or data base developed by Russett leads him to these statements of preferred public policy. Demonstrating that defense is "costlier" to fixed investment than to private consumption does not prove that a wiser public policy should favor the first at the expense of the second. Russett might even acknowledge this point, but his method of presentation in *What Price Vigilance?* creates the impression that, in his reasoning, the regression analysis is a critical step to a conclusion about preferred policy.

In his "diagnosis" of the military in American public life, the author reaches other conclusions based principally upon intuitive judgment. One interesting example is Russett's discussion of the possibility of increased Congressional control over defense decisions. Giving greater power to Congress in defense matters will not make any worthwhile difference in policy outputs without first "building under those with decision-making power a power base that will enable and encourage them to resist defense demands" (p. 186). That is, unless Congress exerts its power to *curb* military spending, its power is exerted in a way that will not "improve" the situation (p. 187). The equation of "improving" matters with reducing defense expenditures is misleading because this evaluation is as *ad hoc* as the previous statements about the most desirable redistribution of defense costs (p. 187).

Russett's empirical theory of the policy process as relevant for defense is in marked contrast with the analysis by Melman. Melman sees the problem as too much concentration of decision-making

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power in the state-management; Russett argues that we cannot control the military because power in American politics is not centralized enough (pp. 184-85). The dispersion of power among governing institutions means that "once an interest, in this case the joint interest of the military and its civilian allies in maintaining heavy defense spending, is firmly established in the political system, it is extraordinarily difficult for others to cut back that interest's power" (p. 185). Having made this analysis, Russett avoids the logically consistent prescription. If dispersed power is the cause of that condition, it will serve poorly as a remedy. Countervailing power is the implied necessity, given Russett's diagnosis, but he is aware that such an acknowledgement would create other problems: if a *defense* colossus is intolerable, what colossus *is* tolerable?

The methodological problem is that dispersed power may be the permissive background condition which made possible the growth of the military-industrial complex; if so, the precipitant factors in short-run military predominance cannot logically be laid at the same doorstep. Otherwise one risks damning pluralism with the faint praise of its presumed deficiencies. Russett gets painted into this corner by contending that the power dispersion which permitted the military-industrial complex to evolve can also be depended upon to limit its political influence: "For civil-military relations, this means there is a strong degree of protection against widespread, pervasive military domination of the nation" (p. 185). But if *that* is true, why is Russett "concerned" at all, except about marginal trade-offs as a problem for welfare economists? It is plausible to assume that his concern is motivated in large part by fear of movement toward that very condition which (he says) our system protects us against. He cannot choose among his intuitions, and his data analyses are of little assistance despite their value for testing more specific hypotheses.

Similar dilemmas face the author when he considers the possibility for long-term change in American decision-making practices. Russett asserts that "a survey of human experience provides little reason for certainty that a radically different system would be better" (p. 189). If a "radically" different system holds little promise, what can be expected of the author's recommendations for less drastic (?) reforms: a "new Utopia" which is "a detailed blueprint of a better society, combining the three goals of the French Revolution with far more success than was achieved by the activists of 1789" (p. 190). And, "like hard-nosed political science, political philosophy must become 'relevant'" (p. 190). The author's lack of faith in radicalism or in

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Congress apparently derives from a belief that political philosophy, if "relevant," is quicker and surer: ". . . I do not believe it is naive to think that knowledge is the beginning of power" (p. 191). Russett has come a long way from the roll call analysis of Senate voting on defense and national security issues in the early chapters to a destination of knowledge as power for altering the defense policy process. Yet this skepticism about his ambitiousness in policy prescription should not be overstated. Actually Russett's willingness to advance bold, intuitive judgments does not detract from many portions of the presentation, and it may make the book more interesting for nonprofessional readers. Ironically, the author's intuitions are better than most, and he should be less eager to consign them to the museum of analytic artifacts. The attempt to mix rigor and relevance is partly successful precisely because Russett includes strong ingredients of both.

III

Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith are concerned principally with "the process of planning military strategy, forces, and budgets in the Defense Department, with special emphasis on the role of the systems analysis office in that process" (p. 7). Under former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Enthoven was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, and Smith was his special assistant. The book is more than an inside dopester account of tales told and messages declassified. It provides an overview of strategy determination and defense budgeting under McNamara from the perspective of the systems analysis office. The contribution of systems analysis to strategy and budget determination, according to the authors, was to bring together those two worlds of decision which had been separated in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

Their thesis is that adoption of the perspective and methodology of systems analysis by the DOD improved defense policy-making in two ways, one strictly intellectual and one more broadly political in nature. The intellectual improvement came from considering strategy and force requirements together with costs within the same analytic framework. Formerly, military leaders determined force requirements and strategy within the services and negotiated them among service chiefs. The determination of military requirements proceeded independently of budgetary decisions made by civilians. The process of adjusting military force recommendations to budgetary limitations was made difficult by this procedural and substantive isolation. A frequent

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

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and characteristic result was the imposition of an arbitrary fiscal ceiling for service recommendations as a group, without consideration of the impact of that ceiling upon military capabilities. The total funding available for defense was divided arbitrarily among the services by partitioning the fiscal pie according to accepted formulas. Those formulas rarely corresponded to military requirements within or among services except by accident.

The political change in defense policy-making involved the creation of an independent, analytic, and mostly civilian advisory staff for the secretary. Its importance in the policy process resulted from the support it provided, according to Enthoven and Smith, for McNamara's conception of his role as an active manager rather than a passive judge or referee. McNamara intended to intervene and direct the Defense Department to an unprecedented degree; for that purpose he needed a staff responsive to his interests and one which viewed problems from his perspective (pp. 79-80). The systems analysis office, which was staffed largely by civilians, provided support for the secretary's perspective, in the authors' view, by assuming the role of an adversary and attempting to deflate service proposals and evaluations.

Enthoven and Smith are careful to distinguish the matter of the size of a secretary's staff from the issue of the staff's character. In making this distinction, they reveal that its primary purpose was political rather than analytic in the strictest sense. They note that "the important issue was not how much staff the secretary had, but rather what kind of staff he had, and to what extent the staff was actually his. A staff is only a real aid to an executive when its outlook is his outlook and its interest is his interest" (p. 87). This begs the obvious question: what *is* the secretary's "interest"? The authors' answer to that question is worth considering at length.

As they see it, the secretary's interest obviously coincides with the broader "national" interest. This point is repeated throughout, but the discussion of the implementation and rationale for PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) as a management tool is representative. The main purpose of PPBS, according to Enthoven and Smith, was "to develop explicit criteria, openly and thoroughly debated by all interested parties, that could be used by the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress as measures of the need for and adequacy of defense programs" (p. 33). Certainly explicit criteria and wider policy debate are respectable shibboleths which are difficult to disparage in principle. All this is necessary because "it is

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the Secretary of Defense who is charged with ensuring that the interests of the nation take precedence over the special institutional interests of the military departments, the defense contractors, the scientists, the localities, and other groups that make up or depend upon the Defense Department" (p. 33).

This is a suggestive statement which is as significant for its omissions as for its contents. A presumption that service interests are particularistic while the secretary's interest is not can only make sense politically if you are sitting in the systems analysis office (or in the secretary's chair). That presumption has already loaded the argument (for the benefits of an independent civilian staff responsive to the secretary) by defining the top hierarchical position as a nonpolitical or suprapolitical interest. In defense policy-making, however, the secretary's interests are as particularistic as are those of the services, the contractors, or the other hyperdependents of the military-industrial complex. The secretary's interests are different, not transcendent.

The process of "open and explicit analysis" was important politically, I believe, because it enabled President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara to change national military strategy in fundamental ways. The innovations in method were significant because they intentionally facilitated the adoption of the Kennedy-McNamara "flexible response" strategy and the concomitant transitions in American foreign policy objectives.[10] Kennedy and McNamara began with a desire to adjust American foreign policy to compensate for perceived failures of previous administrations, especially those of the preceding Republican administration. It was the perception of Kennedy and his lieutenants that America's global influence and military position were slipping because Communists had shifted tactics to a protracted conflict through wars of national liberation. The United States had to revise its military posture in order to deal with the threat of such insurgencies: in practice, this would require a massive reorientation of military priorities (intra-service and inter-service) in order to develop significant conventional and counterguerrilla warfare capabilities. The importance of this content of flexible response doctrine should not be ignored despite three qualifications. The first recognizes that "flexible response" can have a vaguer connotation of across-the-board increases

[10] Flexible response strategic doctrine as defined and implemented in the Kennedy administration is set forth in William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York 1964). A more recent case for flexible response in defense policy is made by Paul C. Warnke and Leslie H. Gelb, "Security or Confrontation: The Case for a Defense Policy," *Foreign Policy*, No. 1 (Winter 1970-71), 6-30.

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in all forces, thereby transcending strategy rather than articulating it. The second acknowledges that some of the more ambitious Kennedy-McNamara foreign policy objectives may have derived from increased strategic capabilities as much as they dictated a need for those capabilities. A third qualification recalls that the diverse elements of that doctrine were not articulated with the same conceptual precision or perceived importance, nor did they appear simultaneously.[11]

The enforcement of this strategic reorientation on the DOD would not be had for the asking. In the short run it meant more for the Army and less for the Air Force among services, and a redistribution of functional emphasis within services. General purpose forces within the Army and tactical air forces would receive increased doctrinal emphasis and fiscal support. Systems analysis helped to make the case for flexible response to the services, to Congress, and to other skeptics. It fulfilled this political purpose admirably, but the authors' implication that it did so by improving *analysis* is only the tip of the iceberg. The crucial payoffs were in changed policy outputs for Kennedy and McNamara; analysis was a way of getting there.

McNamara's introduction of the Draft Presidential Memoranda (DPMs), prepared in the systems analysis office, gave OSD the initiative in stating strategic assumptions and required the services to react *to those assumptions.* The authors regard the ensuing process as an expanded policy debate despite their own acknowledgment that assumptions are most of the ball game in defense analysis: "In any analysis, the assumptions drive the conclusions" (p. 64). However, they take a dim view of inter-service rivalry which might put additional assumptions into the defense debate, because the Joint Chiefs of Staff is "really a committee of hostile and competing interests" whose positions "are generally compromises arrived at through hard bargaining" (p. 98). The objections to "competing interests," "compromises," and "hard bargaining" among military leaders seem inconsistent with their assertion of having created a more open policy debate. Apparently these systems analysts regard an expanded policy debate as one which takes place *within a policy consensus* (agreement

[11] On the first two points see Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Technology, Strategy, and the Uses of Force," in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *The Uses of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Boston 1971), 24; on the third point, see Morton H. Halperin, *Defense Strategies for the Seventies* (Boston 1971), 47-51.

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on important assumptions) rather than one which precedes that consensus.[12]

Enthoven and Smith understand it quite differently because they understand it from McNamara's perspective as a *manager*. They have failed to weigh the more important role for an "activist" secretary: the adoption of the administration's preferred policies despite resistance from those political interests for whom the adjustments are most painful.[13] McNamara's perspective as a spokesman for preferred policies which were controversial is lost in the authors' fascination with better management tools. The pitfall of such fascination with management devices is that they are rarely neutral with respect to the content of preferred policies. The assertion or suggestion that McNamara's managerial innovations have "improved" defense policy-making is a *defense of a particular policy content* in military strategy and foreign policy. In this case that content is the "flexible response" strategic doctrine, its emphasis on conventional and counterguerrilla warfare, and its reliance on mutual "assured destruction" at the level of superpower bilateral nuclear deterrence. If they are *not* a defense of particular policy content, such assertions of managerial improvement are politically vacuous. It is highly probable that Pentagons are reshuffled because major policy issues are at stake in which decision-makers have strong preferences, and not because defense secretaries wish to leave better management methods to their successors.

In summary, I would state that Enthoven and Smith have joined Melman by accident rather than by design in a view of management as an end in itself. The criteria for evaluation of a defense secretary's performance, if they are correct, rest principally on his ability to make the process of defense decision more "explicit," "open," or "analytic." The defense secretary is presumed neutral with respect to the outcome of that revised process, or it is assumed that his perceived payoff matrix emphasizes a more open policy debate as against any particular policy content. I doubt that such a secretary would be of

[12] The importance of the Draft Presidential Memoranda in decision-making in the McNamara Pentagon is emphasized by Enthoven and Smith, 53-58, and by Malcolm W. Hoag, "What New Look in Defense?" *World Politics*, XXII (October 1969), 4.

[13] In the useful distinction made by William A. Gamson, the secretary's role as a systemic authority has been emphasized to the exclusion of consideration of his role as a potential partisan. See Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Illinois 1968), 21-37. A related distinction has been made by Glenn H. Snyder with respect to the "neutral expert" and "policy advocate" roles for participants in the policy-making process. See Snyder's "The New Look of 1953" in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York 1962), 504. Snyder notes that the "neutral expert" and "policy advocate" roles pertain to the range of discretion of a decision-maker rather than to his range of competence, two dimensions which are crucially interrelated for systems analysts as policy advocates.

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much service to the President from the President's perspective. Presidents are concerned with the adoption of policy outputs, the content of which will produce the desired results in domestic and international politics. Those desired results, and therefore those preferred policy outputs, *may* or *may not* be supported by open, explicit, and analytic studies. If they are not, the methodological innovations will be temporarily or permanently shelved.

No better illustration of this contention is available than the authors' own discussion of the isolation of the systems analysis office from decision-making on the Vietnam war. This would seem improbable from a managerial perspective; we would expect the innovations of a more open, explicit policy debate to be applied directly to this most important policy matter. Yet the authors tell us that "PPBS was not involved in the really crucial issues of the Vietnam war" (p. 267). The systems analysis office "played no policy role in the decision to go into Vietnam, in the decision to bomb North Vietnam, in the determination of targets to be bombed, in the timing of bombing pauses, or in the development of strategy or tactics" (p. 270).

At least three interpretations may account for this phenomenon. The first might be that the authors are engaged in a self-serving denial of shared complicity in an unpopular war. I will reject that out of hand because the tone and content of the book suggest that Enthoven and Smith are straightforward about admitting their own shortcomings. The second interpretation might be that traditional decision-making patterns re-asserted themselves in the heat of battle. The war was seen as a strictly military responsibility in the sense that the judgments of line military commanders should not be second-guessed by civilians with slide rules. This interpretation is favored by the authors.

A third probable interpretation is consistent with my critique of the Enthoven-Smith work in general. The systems analysts were fenced off from Vietnam because open, explicit, analytic consideration of policy might not have supported the administration's policy content. President Johnson perceived his needs as needs for support of the war strategy being favored by military commanders, against critics inside and outside the administration. The systems analysis office, to the degree that it was explicit and open in its evaluations, might have provided new ammunition for old critics and created new critics as well. From this perspective, a President under duress, lacking confidence in his command of substantive foreign policy, might well interpret systematic analysis as a potential source of opposition to his policies.

Although this interpretation has no more obvious face validity than

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that of Enthoven and Smith, it does emphasize the likelihood that, either management is politically useful, or it is not useful to politicians. Enthoven and Smith are not professional politicians but are not to be dismissed for this reason. Their case for systematic analysis in defense is presented cogently and without excessive trumpeting. But we need to recognize that good "analysis" begins and ends with good "policy." A weak policy cannot be redeemed by the best analysis or by redefining the purposes of politics as management. And it is worth recalling that Presidents have their own "cost effectiveness" in the arena of public reward and retribution. Cost, for a President, involves diminishing popularity and eventual electoral punishment, in the worst case; effectiveness implies increasing popularity and re-election. In these senses the verdict on the Kennedy-Johnson Vietnam war policy has already been delivered. Systems analysis cannot make policies for Presidents. Its availability changed the odor and flavor of arguments on behalf of policies, but the sources of those policies lay elsewhere: they were objectives in the minds of decision-makers that represented their desired states of affairs in world politics.

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